Günter Bischof - The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968

Once Černík had joined the group at the negotiating table, Brezhnev repeated once again his point of view 41and underscored that there had been no alternative to “taking this step if the aim was to prevent Czechoslovakia from leaving the path of socialism” and that Svoboda was on his way to Moscow. Before he arrived, Brezhnev said, those present should reassess the situation and think about a government with Černík at the top: “Perhaps we should recognize… a government with Comrade Černík as leader.” If, on the other hand, the Party Conference was to be considered legal, Czechoslovakia would find herself in the bourgeois camp in a matter of days. This was meant as an aide mémoire for Dubček and Černík.

Kosygin finally made the explicit point that the measures for which the participants were casting around and which would ultimately be taken to resolve the crisis would need to find the approval of both Czechoslovakia and the “fraternal countries.” Brezhnev continued along the lines of the strategy he advocated and stressed that the top priority at the moment was finding a way out, “It is only after we’ve managed to do that that we may indulge in mutual recriminations and work out who’s made the biggest blunder.” Much less conciliatory was the tone chosen by Podgornyi who thought he had understood Dubček as saying there was nothing one could do about the resolutions passed on the previous day at the Prague Party Conference. Černík reputedly tried to calm the situation down, 42and Kosygin painted once more on the wall the Kremlin’s most abhorred bugbear in connection with a recognition of the Party Conference: a bourgeois Czechoslovakia within a month, “perhaps even sooner.” At the end of the first round of talks, after about one and a half hours, Podgornyi topped this with another worst-case scenario: “If we do not take appropriate measures, this will lead to civil war—and you will be the ones to take responsibility for it.” 43The meeting was adjourned without any results. The next step was not yet, as Dubček has mistakenly recorded in his autobiography, the meeting with the Svoboda delegation, as this did not take place until late in the evening. The delegation must have been shortly before touchdown in Moscow at this stage, and Brezhnev and the leading Politburo members were getting ready to go the airport to receive Svoboda with pomp and circumstance.

Shortly before 4 p.m. Moscow time, the special flight from Prague via Bratislava touched down at Vnukovo Airport near Moscow. 44Because Svoboda was on a state visit, he was given the official VIP treatment. Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Podgornyi were all there in person on the tarmac of the air field; then the delegation was escorted to the Kremlin. 45

At first, Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Podgornyi received only the Czechoslovak president. Svoboda was accompanied by his son-in-law, Milan Klusák, the former Czechoslovak UN ambassador and Svoboda’s most important adviser. Brezhnev felt linked to Svoboda by shared memories of front warfare in WWII and had originally staked high hopes on him. 46However, after the invasion Svoboda did not behave as the Soviet leadership had hoped he would. He did not read out the draft speech in the form in which it had been delivered to him by the Soviet Politburo through the Soviet ambassador to Prague; in Svoboda’s eyes, it only offered further proof of how out of touch the Soviets were with the situation on the ground. 47Such direct words would have painted Svoboda in the eyes of the Czechoslovak public as Moscow’s vassal and would have destroyed his authority in the country at one blow. The Soviet leadership had presumably counted on Svoboda finding the right words. This demonstrates again how thoroughly the Soviet leadership misjudged the situation in the ČSSR, a fact for which the pointed disinformation and exaggerations on the part of the Politburo hardliners and, above all, the head of the KGB, Yuri Andropov, must ultimately be held accountable. Andropov was never at a loss in construing all kinds of arguments that were supposed to justify the drastic solution advocated by him. 48

After the invasion, Svoboda had also rejected a proposal put forward by the Soviet ambassador in Prague, Chervonenko, to the effect of installing a new government comprising the famously “healthy” forces loyal to Moscow. 49He may have done so less because he was averse to Chervonenko’s proposal as such than on the basis of an assessment of the country’s situation which was more realistic than that of the Kremlin.

Ultimately, he felt it was more appropriate to discuss the country’s future directly with the Soviet leaders, which was, at least from his point of view, the only option that was left. Dubček always felt that Svoboda had sympathized with the ideas of the “Prague Spring.” 50

In his very first statement, Svoboda referred to the above-mentioned “offer” to form a new government, saying, “I received an offer yesterday to form a new government. I think this would constitute a breach of the Constitution.” 51In what followed, Svoboda seems not to have expressed himself clearly so that Brezhnev had to ask him what point he was making. At this point, the minutes unfortunately do not provide a verbatim record of the talks. According to the recorder’s summary of Svoboda’s statement, Svoboda appears to have proposed that “Comrade Dubček return to Prague, confess his guilt, and give up his powers.” On the other hand, Svoboda is reported to have said that if someone else was going “to be given a turn,” then “this was likely to stir popular discontent even more.” Asked by Brezhnev who should take over as first secretary of the KSČ if “Dubček were to resign from power,” Svoboda replied, “It is obvious you have not really been following me.” Presumably Svoboda was simply extemporizing without having a clear idea as to what fate was in store for Dubček at the hands of the Soviet leadership. He had also been left in the dark with respect to how Dubček had been treated so far. Svoboda now enquired about Dubček’s whereabouts and Brezhnev replied: “He is well.” Svoboda said in response, “We would all benefit if he were to resign from his post. But if he stays on, we can live with that, too. Dubček should address these issues himself but should do so in Prague.” 52

From the start, Svoboda conveyed his readiness to drop Dubček, yet this was not the end of the matter. He underscored with great emphasis this would be the best solution but added that he was not prepared to take the responsibility for this step. Svoboda had betrayed Dubček.

In the course of the talks, Svoboda said that the entire government would remain in office only if Černík was retained as head of government (a point to which the Soviet leadership, as we have already seen, had signaled their approval in principle in the first round of talks at midday involving only Dubček and Černík but this fact had been kept from Svoboda). Bil’ak could not possibly, according to Svoboda, be recycled as head of government, for he was a traitor in the eyes of the people. Subsequently, Brezhnev rehearsed the scenario that was likely to unfold if Dubček were to return to Prague and publicly confess his guilt. Who would then be elected to succeed him, Brezhnev asked, by a party presidium that contained “neither Piller nor Kolder nor Bil’ak nor Indra.” It was, therefore, inevitable, Brezhnev continued, for Dubček, Smrkovský, and Černík to declare the Party Conference of the previous day illegal. Klusák then pointed out to the Soviet leadership that a majority of Communists believed “that this CC has been duly elected.” “If you declare it illegal… then there will be two parties in Czechoslovakia and most people will join the faction that has the new CC on its side.” This meant, in other words, that the KSČ was going to be subjected to attrition and that most party members would feel their loyalty lay with the new faction. In dealing with the comrades, it was, therefore, advisable, according to Klusák, not to “tackle this issue in too peremptory a manner.” Kosygin objected that given the status of Czechoslovakia as a federation there was no denying that the Slovaks had been underrepresented at the Party Conference. To make matters worse still, the Party Conference had been convened solely by the Prague Municipal Committee, and neither the CC nor the Presidium had been informed. Klusák tried to calm tempers down by emphatically pointing to the situation prevailing in Prague: “You’ve got to realize that the city is gripped by tumults. You can either prolong these tumults or you can come up with a sensible solution to this problem so that the population understands that quiet has been restored.” Klusák’s advice was for “these three,” namely Dubček, Černík, and Smrkovský, to return to Prague. Svoboda was also emphatic about giving people no pretext to say “that all this has been done on your orders, that we have betrayed the people, and that we have capitulated to you.” If they managed to do that, Svoboda felt “positive results were within reach.” Then he noted, “Afterwards we can do anything you want.” 53Svoboda was ready to capitulate so that the CzechoslovakSoviet friendship would be kept unblemished.