Günter Bischof - The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968

We may assume with a degree of probability bordering on certainty that there are no official Soviet records of the actual discussion between the Czechoslovak and the Soviet delegations in Čierná nad Tisou. During the “negotiations” after 23 August, Brezhnev merely referred to private discussions, one-on-one talks, and the like. Despite this basic situation, it appears certain today that the Czechoslovak side and most notably Dubček acceded in principle to the Soviet demands for changes in the cadres and for dismissals. 9

Once the Declaration of Bratislava was signed, the Soviet side had a frame of reference that could be used for the justification of both their further course of action and that of the Warsaw Five. In Bratislava, the last compromise between the parties prior to the occupation of the ČSSR was formulated on the basis of a Soviet draft, which amounted to a legitimation of the “bureaucratic coup d’état ” that was already being prepared in the presidium of the KSČ by the “healthy forces.” In Bratislava, Vasil Bil’ak handed the Soviet delegation the letter that was soon to become notorious, the “invitation by the healthy forces” in the KSČ asking for a “collective rescue operation” by the five interventionist states. The other KSČ leaders were left in the dark with reference to Bil’ak’s move. 10

Dubček’s alleged infringement of the Bratislava accord was ultimately used by the Soviet side to justify the invasion. Moscow needed time to organize the “bureaucratic coup d’état ,” which was supposed to take place in the presidium of the KSČ so as to coincide with the invasion. If Dubček failed to honor the accord, which, as he saw it, was a foregone conclusion in any case, the “healthy forces” now had a lever to oust him.

The straw that broke the camel’s back in Moscow’s eyes was the telephone conversation between Brezhnev and Dubček on 13 August. 11Dubček was noticeably on edge and offered a string of excuses. The Kremlin’s primary interest was the prompt realization of the moves agreed on in Čierná nad Tisou. As it was, neither Jiři Pelikán was relieved of his post as head of TV, nor Zdeněk Hejzlar as head of the Broadcasting Company, nor was the Ministry of the Interior divided into two. This meant that Viliam Šalgovič, who was loyal to Moscow, had to continue in a position that was subordinate to Minister of the Interior Pavel Nowotný.

Three days after this conversation on the phone, on 16 August, Brezhnev addressed a handwritten letter on behalf of the Politburo of the CC CPSU to the KSČ leader. 12In it, Brezhnev deplored the continued anti-Soviet attacks in Czechoslovakia and Dubček’s infringement of his undertakings to divide the Ministry of the Interior into two and to dismiss František Kriegel, Česimír Císař, and Pelikán. This letter was delivered to Dubček by the Soviet ambassador in Prague, Chervonenko. In a postscript to Chervonenko’s instructions, the Politburo mandated him to make the contents of the letter known to the “healthy forces” in the KSČ.

Two days later, on 18 August, the Politburo of the CC CPSU addressed another—this time, official—letter to the presidium of the CC KSČ in Brezhnev’s name. On page after page, Moscow documented in this “letter of warning” 13anti-Soviet attacks notably in the Czechoslovak media. In the same Politburo resolution, a letter to Alois Indra and Bil’ak was given the green light as was the draft of a declaration that might come in useful for the “friends” as the basis for an address to the Czechoslovak people after the invasion.

The letter to Dubček could not be delivered to him on 18 August, for he was not in Prague that day; he had gone to meet János Kádár. 14After consulting Indra and Bil’ak, who were both informed of the letter’s substance, 15Chervonenko advised “headquarters” to have the letter delivered on Monday, 19 August. 16The Politburo signaled their consent; taking up a suggestion of the “friends,” that is of Bil’ak and Indra, they also added to the letter a reference to Brezhnev’s letter to Dubček of 16 August. 17This was done to give Bil’ak and Indra an opportunity to underline Dubček’s mistakes and to criticize him for having kept the Kremlin’s “warnings” secret from his comrades. In contrast to the letter of 16 August, in which Brezhnev had referred in detail to the one-on-one talks in Čierná nad Tisou and had reproached Dubček with not having solved the “cadre issues,” by which he meant that Dubček had not dismissed Pelikán and those of his mind-set, none of these topics were mentioned explicitly in the second letter.

The letter was finally delivered to Dubček by the Soviet ambassador at around 10 p.m. on 19 August. Dubček’s failure to respond to the written requests was ultimately to serve the “healthy forces” as a pretext for a motion of no confidence against the KSČ leader in the session of the presidium of the CC KSČ on 20 August. Dubček interpreted the letter as yet another protest or reprimand in the Kremlin’s unending series. He failed to see anything new in it. This was also mentioned by Chervonenko when he reported to Moscow on the delivery of the letter. 18

On 20 August 1968 at 2 p.m., the presidium of the Central Committee of the KSČ had assembled for a meeting; preparations for the Slovak Party Congress were to have been the most important item on the agenda. However, the real emphasis lay elsewhere. The members loyal to Moscow were planning to engineer a vote of no confidence against KSČ leader Dubček. However, things took a different turn; the session dragged on and on in interminable disputes on matters of procedure. The planning for the “bureaucratic coup d’état ” started to unravel. No motion of no confidence against Dubček was proposed. The weakness of the forces loyal to the Soviet Union “made… an internal coup impossible so that it was the military intervention that ultimately provided the basis required for such an undertaking.” 19Shortly before midnight, Prime Minister Černík announced that he had just been informed by the minister of defense, Dzúr, that Czechoslovakia was at that moment being occupied by socialist “fraternal countries.” 20It was only then that Dubček pulled Brezhnev’s last letter of 17 August addressed to him from his briefcase. 21

At around 12:30 a.m., President Svoboda entered. 22The members of the presidium had called him asking him for his advice. According to Bil’ak, he was in a good mood; during the discussion of the condemnation of the intervention, he gave no indication as to which way he was inclined. Dubček is even said to have accused Svoboda of having actually called the Soviets. 23

At 1:30 a.m., the presidium of the CC KSČ approved the draft of a first declaration. It condemned the invasion yet requested the population to maintain calm. The motion was opposed by the Communists loyal to Moscow, Vasil Bil’ak, Drahomír Kolder, Emil Rigo, and Oldřich Švestka. František Barbírek and Jan Piller, who had pledged to support a vote against Dubček, now cast their vote, presumably in the light of the military invasion, in favor of the motion. 24

After the end of the session, most presidium members remained in the CC building; Černík returned to his official residence, and President Svoboda to the Hradshin. Two hours later, Černík was arrested. Shortly afterwards, the CC building was occupied. Dubček and other leading functionaries were placed under house arrest. At 6 a.m., Císař was arrested and cross-questioned. On the way to the Soviet embassy, he apparently managed to escape, leaving Prague and going underground for several days. 25

Early the next morning, the radio station Vltava [“Moldau”] began transmissions from the GDR in Czech and Slovak and presented the rationale behind Czechoslovakia’s military invasion by the Five from the invaders’ point of view. 26At 6 a.m. the as yet unoccupied station Czechoslovak Radio broadcast a message from Dubček himself. 27He appealed to the population not to stay home from work. The Foreign Ministry ordered the broadcasting company to keep on repeating that the occupation of the country was wholly unjustified, and at 8:15 a.m., Svoboda addressed the nation via radio. He appealed to his compatriots to refrain from acting emotionally and to remain utterly calm. 28