Günter Bischof - The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968

Brezhnev insisted on the Czechoslovak leadership collectively declaring the Party Conference illegal; in his eyes, the only question was how to effect this most elegantly. It is crucial to stress here once more that Brezhnev, Podgornyi, and Kosygin understood perfectly well that a recognition of the Party Conference’s resolutions was inevitably going to lead to a de facto dissolution of the KSČ and to a loss of the party’s monopoly on power, to the transformation of the ČSSR into a “bourgeois” republic and, ultimately, to the country severing its links with the Warsaw Pact. In order to prevent this the Soviet leadership, very much against its original inclination, had to pay the price of leaving Dubček, Černík, and Smrkovský in their posts in order not risk a civil war, which had repeatedly surfaced in the talks as the superlative worst-case scenario. Brezhnev said, “We will not replace Černík, let him keep his post. After some time, he will reshuffle his government…. Let Dubček also retain his post. We did not seriously consider removing him. If he then resigns of his own initiative, that’s a different matter. And let Smrkovský stay on as well.” That is what happened. 54

Svoboda underscored once more that the formation of a new government that had at first been considered would turn out to be counterproductive (“Then people would spit at me”). Even though he was an old man, there was a lot he “could do to strengthen our friendly ties.” Svoboda went on to say, “Given the opportunity I would do anything.” Yet he immediately balked at being the first to denounce the Party Conference as illegal and linked this to Dubček’s consent (“Pending Dubček’s consent and that of other comrades, I will…”). 55Brezhnev replied to Svoboda that there was no denying that he was the president and surely entitled in that capacity to voice his opinion. He explained shortly afterwards that the troops would not be withdrawn until there were appropriate formal declarations of commitment, which required moreover the consent of the allies. Klusák inquired whether German soldiers were stationed on Czechoslovak soil. Brezhnev assured him that there were no Germans among the invading troops; they had been “held back.” This had caused considerable irritation among the comrades in East Berlin, according to Brezhnev, and a sense that they “were somehow not considered trustworthy.” 56

Svoboda’s original planning had provided only for a short visit to Moscow and an early return to Prague immediately after the talks with the Soviet leadership. Brezhnev did not demur, but insisted that the other members of the delegation remain in Moscow for further “negotiations.” Svoboda, therefore, wondered whether it would not be best, in case his “influence was going to be needed during the negotiations… to schedule another round of talks” while he was still present. Klusák went one better declaring they had better all meet with Dubček, Černík, and Smrkovský “today.” Brezhnev signaled agreement and Podgornyi suggested taking a break, after which they would all assemble once more on the same day.

Because the strategy to be adopted was now clear, Svoboda declared that it was now possible for the comrades to join the talks. Brezhnev and Kosygin left the room. In the meantime, Podgornyi talked to Svoboda and Klusák. Summing up developments in Czechoslovakia, he said that the “rightists” had played their cards very cleverly in Czechoslovakia. They had organized everything in a manner that provided no reason for anyone to feel provoked. “They all kept on claiming that they were doing their utmost for the construction of socialism and for friendship, but what they were doing was in fact the exact opposite.” 57

Brezhnev and Kosygin returned shortly afterwards. All the other members of the delegation and the Czechoslovak ambassador in Moscow, Vladimír Koucký, also took part in the meeting. Brezhnev embarked on a monologue explaining that Svoboda had already been approached on the issue of how to find a solution “that will do justice to all sides.” 58He emphasized that the Soviets had never opposed the resolutions of the January and the May plenary sessions of the CC KSČ and had never demanded a change of leadership. There had been a frantic search for a political settlement right to the very end. What was at issue was not whether the “headlong campaign” against the CPSU and the Soviet Union in the media was considered offensive, but that the “whole ideological influence had been one-sided to an extent that endangered the entire system of the state and the cause of socialism in Czechoslovakia.” 59Brezhnev criticized Dubček (“Why has Dubček become the object of a cult to an extent we did not even experience with Stalin?”) and told Husák and Bil’ak about the two occasions he had spoken with Dubček from the Crimea, about which Dubček had not even informed the members of his Presidium. He had then sensed, in his own words, “treachery and dishonesty,” and it had been obvious that “if one allowed things to continue unchecked and did not take measures to counteract them, the Party Conference was going to pass a resolution that would propel Czechoslovakia along the road leading to the restoration of capitalism.” In order to prevent this, a guarantee was needed: “We had one [the agreement of Čierná nad Tisou], but it proved worthless. We don’t want to be had a second time.” 60

Brezhnev’s monologue amounted to a plea for finding a way to classify the Party Conference as illegal. Brezhnev conceded that this could not possibly be affected by Dubček and Černík from Moscow, so some other way had to be found. Podgornyi spoke next. He noted the necessity of the invasion; otherwise, the “progressive” forces loyal to Moscow would have been blown to smithereens “before the Party Conference or at the Party Conference.” Podgornyi continued, “There is no way we can tolerate hostile acts against the socialist community or against the Soviet Union. We will have no truck with such things.” According to Podgornyi, the responsibility for the situation that had arisen “lay with all of you,” “notably with Comrade Dubček.” “War and bloodshed” must not be tolerated. 61

Now it was Husák’s turn. Having expressed his gratitude for being allowed to take part in the meeting, he explained that he understood only too well why the fraternal parties had expressed criticism on account of Czechoslovakia. Everybody was, of course, entitled, according to Husák, “to see things… from their point of view.” However, he could not help thinking “that the Soviet comrades had overestimated the danger inherent in the given situation and had overreacted” so that in Bratislava, too, the impression had been created “that one was, in fact, confronted with an occupation.”

Husák claimed there were only two possibilities for moving forward: either a totalitarian leadership for Czechoslovakia or a “political deal” that created “normal working conditions.” Speaking on behalf of the leadership of the Slovak Communist Party and the government of Czechoslovakia, he urged the Soviet leadership “to release the leaders who have been arrested.” Husák let it be immediately understood that he felt the Soviet demand for a declaration of commitment was only reasonable “to prevent Czechoslovakia” opting for a development “outside the socialist camp.” In addition to this, “the anticommunist and anti-Soviet propaganda must be liquidated.” These goals, however, could have been achieved, according to Husák, “without resorting to a military intervention.” Husák cemented his position in advance as far as the Party Conference was concerned. He felt it was going to be easy for him “to say that this Party Conference had not been legal,” yet one had to allow for the fact that the Party Conference was classified as legal by most of its participants. The situation was extremely difficult, but he was prepared to work for a solution with all his might.