Günter Bischof - The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968

I have no illusions whatsoever, but, the situation being what it is, I still think that Dubček has got to be made use of, if that is possible. Why do we have to make use of him? In order to expose him so that the influence that he still wields is undermined, in order ultimately to send him packing. Dubček must be made to sign something here, something that the counterrevolution simply cannot accept…. How we dispose of him afterwards is a matter that is of no interest at present. 72

Brezhnev pointed out that Svoboda was going to insist that Dubček’s name was inserted in the communiqué. Gomułka came to Brezhnev’s aid and underscored that this was needed to appease the population. Ulbricht replied it would have opposite effect. Podgornyi reaffirmed once more that Svoboda would insist on Dubček and Černík being mentioned by name. Brezhnev in the end, resorted to a most drastic formula: “We fully expect a civil war, we reckon with its outbreak. There can be no such thing as capitulation. We count on you. We’ve got to find a way.” 73

For the afternoon, talks were scheduled between the Soviet leaders and Smrkovský, Špaček, and Šimon. Brezhnev used similar tactics as on the previous day. He said that he was far from blaming what had happened on the Czechoslovak comrades; “maybe all of this happened behind your backs.” He again conjured up the worst-case scenario of a civil war in the ČSSR and again explained in detail the significance of the 14th Party Congress and the consequences that would ensue if it was declared to have been legal. Asked by Brezhnev whether he considered the Party Congress to have been illegal, Smrkovský replied: “The Party Congress is as illegal as our own stay here in Moscow.” However, if the Czechoslovak people came out in support of the proposal to have the Party Congress reenacted, he was not going to raise any objections. Smrkovský declared he was opposed to bloodshed in his home country and to anything that threatened socialism. Once they were back in Czechoslovakia, they could also declare the Party Congress illegal.

Generally speaking, the dramatis personae have left accounts of the talks in which they are portrayed rebuffing heroically the demands of the Soviet leaders. The minutes of the talks did nothing to preserve the nuances of the wording and were presumably “touched up” in retrospect in any case, so they cannot be used to refute these claims. Podgornyi, for one, was decidedly less than impressed with Špaček’s attitude (“I have a feeling that Comrade Špaček is somehow devoid of all enthusiasm”); Brezhnev concurred (“What worries me is that Comrade Špaček is showing so little conviction in his answers”). In the end, after Brezhnev had assured them once more of his unqualified “support” and had requested Comrades Šimon and Špaček to modify their tone, all the people involved declared themselves prepared to have the 14th Party Conference annulled. 74In the evening, Svoboda informed Prague via the Czechoslovak embassy that the negotiations were set to continue and urged the government” not to interfere in the unsolved problems of the Party.” 75Later that night, Czechoslovak radio broadcast a message from Svoboda saying negotiations were making solid progress, but depended for their outcome on the maintenance of public order in the ČSSR. 76Shortly afterwards, another message was broadcast that also originated with Svoboda and amounted to less than the truth: Svoboda claimed that he had insisted on Dubček, Černík, and Smrkovský being involved in the negotiations. This was the first step in the genesis of the myth of Svoboda as the savior of Czechoslovakia.

On Sunday, 25 August, Švestka, Josef Lenárt, Milous Jakeš, Barbírek, Rigo, and Zdeněk Mlynař joined the Czechoslovak delegation, which meant that the pro-Soviet wing within the delegation was strengthened. 77Dubček was ill and in bed, 78and Indra could likewise not take part in the internal Czechoslovak talks for health reasons. He had had a heart attack and was taken to a Moscow hospital. 79Even Brezhnev was presumed to have fallen ill and to have spent the whole day in bed. 80Late in the afternoon, it was, therefore, only Podgornyi, Kosygin, and Arvīds Pel’she who met with the heads of the “fraternal parties.” The Soviet leaders informed Ulbricht, Gomułka, Kádár, and Zhivkov about the state of the negotiations. 81

On 26 August 1968, an “agreement” was finally signed, the so-called Moscow Protocol. It provided the basis for all reforms, resolutions, and staff decisions to be reversed that had been passed during the run-up to the 14th Party Congress of the KSČ as well as for the reintroduction of censorship and the stationing of Soviet troops—initially until the situation had reverted to being “normal” again. The Moscow Protocol was, as the Czechoslovak government committee saw it, a “classic case of a grossly asymmetrical agreement, imposed by force of arms and intimidation.” 82It would be going very far to call the Moscow Protocol the result of negotiations between equal partners. 83

The only “concession” on the part of the Kremlin was dropping the “charge” of “counterrevolution.” Dubček, Černík, and Smrkovský remained in office for the time being, for they were needed to steer Czechoslovakia without bloodshed back on to the path of “normalization.”

On 14 and 15 October 1968, the treaty on the permanent stationing of Soviet troops in the ČSSR was signed. This was the end of the chapter in the reform Communist movement that demonstrated the incompatibility of any reforms that went beyond mere cosmetic changes in the makeup of the regime within the Communist system.

Newly accessible documents, notably the hitherto unpublished parts of the stenographic transcripts of the Moscow “negotiations” from 23 to 26 August 1968, prove that the Soviet leaders were partly clueless how to break the deadlock resulting from the invasion and/or failed to convey to the Czechoslovaks a clear idea of their strategy. The pictures of the military occupation served as a smokescreen for the actual sorry predicament of the Moscow-led interventionist coalition. Politically speaking, the Kremlin had ended up in a cul-de-sac. The plan to install a revolutionary government, which had been legitimated to an extent by “recommendations” given to Bil’ak and the “healthy forces” by the Politburo of the CC CPSU before the invasion, was in tatters.

Given the tense situation in Moscow, President Svoboda, subsequently and for long time to come was celebrated as “Czechoslovakia’s savior,” even proposed getting rid of Dubček as a political actor. Brezhnev however saw quite clearly that Dubček’s dismissal would only have prepared the ground for worse to come. The fact remains that Svoboda would have been prepared to betray Dubček. He dropped him because being in the USSR’s good graces was more important to him than continuing to support the reforms of the Prague Spring.

The “negotiations” in Moscow after the military intervention were conducted by the Soviets with the preeminent aim of preventing Dubček from returning to Prague wearing the martyr’s crown. In addition to this, the Soviets were determined to deal with the 14th Party Congress of the KSČ, which had elected a new party leadership immediately after the invasion, and to have it annulled. In the eyes of the Kremlin, this was the only alternative to Czechoslovakia’s relaunching itself as a western bourgeois republic and presumably turning its back on the Warsaw Pact. A revision of the results of World War II would have been the last thing the Kremlin was prepared to endorse.

Svoboda contributed a great deal to the “normalization” of the situation in the ČSSR; under his aegis, Communist rule was consolidated again. Slovakia’s autonomy, which was carefully nurtured by Husák, was one of the levers of this “normalization.” Dubček was cunningly exploited and degraded to a tool to further Soviet interests in the country, a role he came increasingly to embrace voluntarily. His successor, Husák, became a replica of János Kádár—with one difference: he did not advance to the post of first secretary of the party in the jaws of the invasion.