In contrast, Lorentz’s combined theory of the electromagnetic field, electric charges and the aether was basically a theory of the first kind – it aspired to a fundamental description of the world in terms of its ultimate constituents. Einstein deliberately decided not to follow such a path in his own work on electrodynamics, from which the special theory of relativity emerged. He based it as far as possible on general principles. The fact is that Max Planck’s quantum discoveries (Box 1) and Einstein’s own development of them a few months before the relativity paper had persuaded Einstein that something very strange was afoot. Despite his admiration for Maxwell’s equations, he felt sure that they could not be the true laws of electromagnetism because they completely failed to explain the quantum effects. He had no confidence in his ability to find correct alternatives. Then, and to the end of his days, Einstein found the quantum baffling. He felt deeply that it was a huge mystery. By comparison, relativity (the special theory at least) was almost child’s play.
It was this attitude that largely shaped Einstein’s strategy in approaching the problem of the electromagnetic aether. He resolved to make no attempt at a detailed description of microscopic phenomena. Instead, he would rely on the relativity principle, for which there seemed to be strong experimental support, and make as few additional assumptions as possible. In the event, he was able to limit these to his assumption about the nature of light propagation. This was the one part of Maxwell’s scheme that he felt reasonably confident would survive the quantum revolution.
This had important consequences for the theory of time. Poincaré’s 1898 paper showed that it must answer two main questions: how simultaneity is to be defined, and what duration is. Associated with the second question is another, almost as important: what is a clock? Because of his approach, Einstein answered only the first question at a fundamental level. He gave at best only partial answers to the other two, and gave no explicit theories of either rods or clocks. Instead, he tacitly assumed the minimal properties they should possess. Otherwise, he relied to a very great extent on the relativity principle. It took him far. Few things in physics are more beautiful than the way he postulated the universal relativity principle and the one particular law of light propagation, and then deduced, from their combination, extraordinary properties of rods, clocks and time. If the premises were true, rods and clocks had to behave that way.
During his protracted creation of general relativity, Einstein used this trick several times. The strategy was always to avoid specific assumptions, and instead to seek principles. In this way he avoided ever having to address the physical working of rods and clocks: they were always treated separately as independent entities in both relativity theories. Their properties were not deduced from the inner structure of the theory, but were simply required to accord with the relativity principle. Einstein was well aware that this was ultimately unsatisfactory, and said so in a lecture delivered in 1923. He made similar comments again in 1948 in his Autobiographical Notes .
However, the tone of his comments does not suggest that he expected any great insight to spring from the rectification of this ‘sin’ (Einstein’s own expression). Only a ‘tidying up’ operation was needed. This gap in the theory of duration and clocks has still not been filled. I know of no study that addresses the question of what a clock is (and how crucially it depends on the determination of an inertial frame of reference) at the level of insight achieved in non-relativistic physics by James Thomson, Tait and Poincaré. Throughout relativity, both in its original, classical form and in the attempts to create a quantum form of it (which we come to in Part 5), clocks play a vital role, yet nobody really asks what they are. A distinguished relativist told me once that a clock is ‘a device that the National Bureau of Standards confirms keeps time to a good accuracy’. I felt that, as the theorist, he should be telling them, not the other way round.
The truth is that a chapter of physics somehow never got written. Despite his great admiration for Mach, Einstein was curiously insensitive to the issues highlighted by Mach and Poincaré. He did not directly address the nature and origin of the framework of dynamics. Despite an extensive search through his published papers and published and unpublished correspondence, I have found no indication that he ever thought really seriously about issues like those raised by Tait’s problem. This is rather surprising, since these were ‘hot topics’ during the very period in which Einstein created special relativity. He did not ask how the spatiotemporal framework (i.e. the framework of space and time used by physicists) arose; instead, he described the finished product and the processes that take place within the arena it creates.
In fact, Einstein and Hermann Minkowski, whose work will shortly be considered, brought about a marked change of emphasis in physics. To use an expression of John Wheeler, the ‘royal high road of physics’ from Galileo until Einstein was dynamics. Maxwell saw his own work as an extension of the principles developed by Galileo and Newton to new phenomena and to the field notion introduced by Faraday. At the same time, other scientists like Carl Neumann and Mach became aware of the need for new foundations of dynamics. In Poincaré’s writings of around 1900, one can see clear hints of how dynamics might have been developed further as the main stream of research. In particular, an explicit theory of the origin of the spatiotemporal framework might have emerged. That is more than evident from Poincaré’s 1898 paper on time and his 1902 comments, discussed in Chapter 5.
All this was changed by Einstein’s 1905 paper. Because of his quantum doubts, he distrusted explicit dynamical models. Within a few years a dualistic scheme appeared. Newton’s absolute space and time were replaced by space-time, but this was not the complete story. Actual physics emerged only with the statements about how rods and clocks behaved in space-time. This is where the scheme was dualistic. The behaviour of rods and clocks – and with it a theory of duration – never emerged organically from the structure of space-time, it was simply postulated. This is not to say the dualistic scheme is wrong in the statements it makes. Einstein’s theory is as secure as its foundations; there is no hint of failing there. However, insight into the nature of time and duration was lost.
For all that, general relativity does contain, hidden away in its mathematics (as I have already indicated), a theory of duration and the spatiotemporal framework. However, this did not come to light for many decades and even now is not properly appreciated. How this came about, and an account of the ‘hidden dynamical core’ of general relativity, are the subject of the next chapters.
It may help to end this chapter with a general remark on time. It is impossible to understand relativity if one thinks that time passes independently of the world. We come to that view only because change is so all-pervasive and so many different changes all seem to march in perfect step. Relativity is not about an abstract concept of time at all: it is about physical devices called clocks. Once we grasp that, many difficulties fall away. If light did not travel so much faster than normal objects, we would observe relativistic effects directly and they would not strike us as strange. There is nothing inherently implausible in the idea that clocks travelling past us at high speed should be observed to go slower than the watch on our wrist. Motion of the clock might well alter the rate at which it ticks. After all, when we swim through water, we feel the way our body responds. If there were an aether, clocks could well be affected by their motion through it. What is difficult to grasp is how observers travelling with the moving clocks think our wristwatch is running slow, while we think just the same about their clocks (this apparent logical impossibility has been dealt with in Box 10). However, the important thing is to get away from the idea that time is something . Time does not exist. All that exists are things that change. What we call time is – in classical physics at least – simply a complex of rules that govern the change.
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