Алистер Смит - The Spoils of War - Greed, Power, and the Conflicts That Made Our Greatest Presidents

War Hawk Richard Johnson of Kentucky similarly presaged later Manifest Destiny arguments: “I shall never die contented until I see her [Britain’s] expulsion from North America and her territories incorporated with the United States. . . . In point of territorial limit the map will prove [conquering Canada’s] importance. The waters of the St. Lawrence and the Mississippi interlock in a number of places and the Great Disposer of Human Events intended those two rivers should belong to the same people.”31

Clearly for some, the acquisition of Canada was an essential goal in itself. For many others, it was described as a bargaining chip to gain British concessions on trade. As Henry Clay put it, “Canada was not the end but the means, the object of the War being the redress of injuries, and Canada being the instrument by which that redress was to be obtained.”32 However, Clay goes on to say, “But it has ever been my opinion that if Canada is conquered it ought never to be surrendered if it can possibly be retained.” Just before the declaration of war, John Randolph would declare, “Ever since the report of the Committee on Foreign Relations came into the House we have heard but one word,—like the whippoorwill, but one monotonous tone,—Canada, Canada, Canada!” Clay may have believed what he said when pointing to the war as the means to redress injuries, but his actions when it came to support for a stronger blue-water navy belied his claim. Of the leading War Hawks in Congress, only William Lowndes voted in favor of legislation to significantly expand the navy—Clay did not, Calhoun did not, Cheves, Williams, Grundy, Johnson, and Porter did not. Once they knew the Federalists were not with them on the declaration of war, they had no more reason to take actions that were designed to redress the issue felt most keenly by Federalists; that is, the maritime grievances.33

For the War Hawks, the idea of expanding the country by seizing Canada was seen to be an attractive possibility that could be easily fulfilled. Many in the United States assumed it would be a simple “matter of marching” to take Canada and that its citizens would gladly throw off the British yoke as the Americans had decades earlier. Clay stated, “I trust I shall not be deemed presumptuous when I state, what I verily believe, that the militia of Kentucky are alone competent to place Montreal and Upper Canada at your feet.”34 In response to claims that the United States was not ready to commence hostilities, Calhoun declared, “So far from being unprepared, sir, I believe that in four weeks from the time that a declaration of war is heard on our frontiers the whole of Upper and a part of Lower Canada will be in our possession.”

Contrary to such expectations, the land war did not go well for the unprepared and unrealistic United States. The first engagement was testament to the fact that victory would not be just a walkover. Having advanced into Canada, US commander Hull fell back to Fort Detroit and after a brief siege surrendered to the numerically inferior forces led by General Brock and Tecumseh. A big contributor to the difficulty in achieving success against Canada lay at the feet of those who were reluctant to recognize that war cannot be fought without cost. Indeed, reluctance to learn this lesson is a crucial problem that must be remedied if we are to diminish presidential or congressional inclinations to wage wars without regard to their expense. This theme, so prominent in 1812, remains fundamental to understanding George W. Bush’s Iraq War nearly two hundred years later, as we show in Chapter 5.

Paying the Costs of the War

UNDER WAR HAWK LEADERSHIP, CONGRESS PROVED UNWILLING TO adequately finance the war. Particularly reluctant to pay for the army, although more willing to pay for naval expansion, and sensitive to the sectional divide between their interests and those of the War Hawks, the Federalists wanted to know how the war was to be paid for. As Federalist New York congressman Harmanus Bleecker inquired, “Where are your armies; your navy? Have you money? No, sir! Rely upon it, there will be, there can be, no war.”35 John Randolph echoed a similar sentiment: “Go to war without money, without men, without a navy! Go to war when we have not the courage, while your lips utter war, to lay war taxes! when your whole courage is exhibited in passing Resolutions! The people will not believe it!”36

As it turns out, and as we might expect from self-interested politicians, the War Hawks ultimately were prepared to pay to increase the army but not the navy. That is, they were willing to support the costs—and even then to a limited degree—of Madison’s third grievance, against the conspiracy of the British and the Indian “savages” on “our frontiers,” but not to fund the naval requirements of those (Federalist) states with strong commercial interests and little desire for a fight, especially over Canada or the frontier.

Of course, there were those on all sides of the issue who were concerned about how the war would be paid for. It was one thing to dream of territorial expansion and quite another to face the hard political reality of needing to raise taxes to pay for the effort required by war. Federalist James Bayard hoped the difficulties of financing the war would cool the War Hawks, as he stated in a letter on January 25, 1812:

Nothing has depressed the war spirit here more than the frightful exhibition made by Gallatin of War taxes. Many who voted for the army will not vote for the taxes and I much doubt whether any one proposed by the Secretary can be carried thro both Houses of Congress. They are not such fools at the same time as not to know that war cannot be carried on without money. And when they have arrived at the point—no money, no war—even they who are now panting after war if they cant have it without taxing the people and of course ruining their popularity will abandon the object.

I shall consider the taxes as the test, and when a majority agree to the proposed taxes, I shall believe them in earnest and determined upon war, but till then I shall consider the whole as a game of juggling in which the presidency and the loaves and fishes belonging to it are the objects they are contending for.37

Bayard rightly saw that the earnest desire for war depended strongly on not taking any actions that would affect the welfare of War Hawk politicians by “ruining their popularity.” Perhaps to the surprise of men like Bayard, the War Hawks, under the guidance of Clay, in fact managed to pass a series of bills through Congress in preparation for war. For instance, the army was theoretically increased by twenty-five thousand men—although as John Randolph predicted, it was an “army on paper only”38 as few of the men had actually been recruited. Congress was less adept at funding the rebuilding of the navy, which is difficult to reconcile from a “national interest” perspective if the real objectives of the war were primarily maritime, as stated in the president’s letter of June 1, 1812. But if viewed, as Bayard did, in terms of what might ruin a politician’s popularity, it should have been clear that for War Hawks a strong army with which to gain territory was of paramount interest, while the maritime issues were at very best secondary and, after all, more of concern to Federalist constituencies than Republican ones.

In December 1811, War Hawk Langdon Cheves proposed a bill to fund the building of ten additional naval ships and to repair others.39 Fellow War Hawks, however, feared that naval expansion would divert funds from the army—which, after all, was the military arm most needed if Canada were to be added to the territory of the United States—and so they opposed the measure, asserting that the United States should not have a permanent navy. Often their opposition to funding a blue-water navy is explained benignly as a realistic assessment that the nation could not build a navy of such a size as to compete with the thousands of ships in the British navy. We must realize there are two devastating objections to this argument. First, if the members of Congress and the president thought it was hopeless to compete against the British navy and they were sincere that a main purpose of the war was to alleviate trade restrictions, then they were on a fool’s errand in going to war and they knew it. Second, the objection to ship building was almost exclusively limited to Republicans with expansionist interests; Federalists were all for building a larger navy to defend their vulnerable coastal towns and cities.