Алистер Смит - The Spoils of War - Greed, Power, and the Conflicts That Made Our Greatest Presidents

In Madison’s view, when it came to a question of war, the natural authority to turn to for guidance as to what policy should be executed was the constitutionally mandated leader of the House of Representatives, the Speaker. When Madison submitted his letter to Congress, Henry Clay was the Speaker of the House—and leader of the War Hawk faction of Madison’s own political party, the Republican Party. Clay was, of course, a strong advocate of war. It is reasonable to infer that Madison, himself reluctant to fight the war, deferred to Clay both in calling for a declaration of war and in framing it around the maritime grievances as well as the true concern—national territorial expansion. Why War Hawks like Clay would have wanted such a framing will become evident as we proceed.

Domestic Ambition, Expansionism, and War

THE MAIN POINT OF CONTENTION THAT PROVOKED WAR WAS BRILAIN’S remaining colonies in North America; that is, what is today Canada. In a speech in December 1811, John Randolph, an old-school anti–War Hawk Republican and staunch opponent of war, questioned the motives of those who sought war: “This war of conquest, a war for the acquisition of territory and subjects, is to be a new commentary on the doctrine that Republics are destitute of ambition—that they are addicted to peace, wedded to the happiness and safety of the people.” He also questioned the willingness to finance the war: “But it seems this is to be a holiday campaign—there is to be no expense of blood, or treasure, on our part—Canada is to conquer herself—she is to be subdued by the principles of fraternity.”22

Randolph’s concerns were spot-on right on both counts: the war was about land acquisition and the government was utterly unprepared for war. This lack of preparation emanated largely from the president’s own decisions, starting with his actions when he was Jefferson’s secretary of state. Jefferson and Madison, working together, had reversed the Federalist policies of building up a professional military and a firm fiscal foundation. They had weakened the US’s position, yet Madison urged Congress to go to war. As Henry Clay, leader of the War Hawk faction and fellow Republican, declared of his president:

It is in vain to conceal the fact—at least I will not attempt to disguise with you—Mr. Madison is wholly unfit for the storms of War. Nature has cast him in too benevolent a mould. Admirably adapted to the tranquil scenes of peace blending all the mild & amiable virtues, he is not fit for the rough and rude blasts which the conflicts of Nations generate. Our hopes then for the future conduct of the War must be placed upon the vigor which he may bring into the administration by the organization of his new Cabinet. And here again he is so hesitating, so tardy, so far behind the National sentiment, in his proceedings towards his War Ministers, that he will lose whatever credit he might otherwise acquire by the introduction of suitable characters in their places. . . . On the part of the Legislature never was there a body assembled more disposed to adopt any and every measure calculated to give effect and vigor to the operations of the War than are the Members of the 12th Congress.23

And so it was that Clay and his War Hawk colleagues took the lead in planning the war, empowering themselves through Congress’s authority to declare war and then using the power of the purse to serve their partisan interest at the expense of their Federalist rivals. Even in their partisan zeal, however, they used the power of the purse remarkably ineptly. Their fear of negative political fallout seems to have dominated good judgment about how a war alleged to be over maritime issues was to be fought! They were strong on rhetoric and ambition, and naive or, as Clay accused others, pusillanimous in their expectations of what was to come and what it was to cost. In fact, lacking a strong military with which to challenge Britain, Congress relied on amazingly wishful thinking: it presumed the nation would face no meaningful resistance. Clay led the charge in the contention that the United States was more than adequately prepared for war. He claimed,

But it is said that we are not prepared for war, and ought therefore not to declare it. This is an idle objection, which can have weight with the timid and pusillanimous only. The fact is otherwise. Our preparations are adequate to every essential object. Do we apprehend danger to ourselves? From what quarter will it assail us? From England, and by invasion? The idea is too absurd to merit a moment’s consideration. Where are her troops? . . . Can any one believe, that . . . the British government could be so infatuated, or rather mad, as to send troops here for the purpose of invasion? . . . Have we cause to dread an attack from her neighboring provinces? That apprehension is still more groundless. Seven or eight millions of people have nothing to dread from 300,000. . . . Nor is any serious danger to be apprehended from their savage allies. Our frontiers may be easily protected against them. . . . But our coast and seaport towns are exposed and may be annoyed. Even this danger, which exists in a certain degree, has been much exaggerated. No land force can be brought to bear against them, because Great Britain has none to spare for such a service; and without a land force, no great impression can be made. . . . 24

The facts at the time should have led any thoughtful person to believe that Clay’s argument was pure fancy. The United States certainly did not have a military establishment to put fear in the hearts of British leaders: The American military officers who were to lead the fight, for instance, were a mix of aged veterans of the Revolutionary War or untrained greenhorns. Further, the United States relied heavily on state militias, which on occasion fought well but in general performed miserably and often refused to cross state borders (even the term “United States” was plural, not singular, back then). Plus, crucially, the new nation essentially had no navy with which to go head-to-head against the world’s greatest naval power, Britain.

The Congress’s Sectional Interests: O Canada . . . With glowing hearts we see thee rise

WITH THE PRESIDENT RELUCTANT AND THE COUNTRY ILL-PREPARED, how is it that Congress was gung-ho for war? The answer resides in the sectional differences across the country. Sectional considerations lay at the heart of the real aims of the congressional leadership that pushed to declare it, why the war was fought in the manner it was, and why the Jeffersonian Republicans ultimately could claim victory.25

Following the 1810 congressional elections, the House was dominated by the Republicans, who had won 107 seats, up 13 seats from 1808 when the unpopularity of the Non-Importation Act had harmed them. In comparison, the Federalist Party held only 36 seats in Congress. Its strength was somewhat greater than these numbers alone implied, however, because the Federalists consistently voted as a bloc against the administration. The Republicans, in contrast, were divided into factions, including Old Republicans, the Invisibles, the Clintonians, and the War Hawks, each holding quite different ideas about important policy matters, including relations with Britain. The Old Republicans, led by John Randolph, believed in traditional Jeffersonian policies of small government in support of citizen farmers. Their members came primarily from southern agricultural states. Invisibles and Clintonians fell politically between the main Republicans and the Federalists. The Invisibles favored greater war preparedness, while the Clintonians, who came predominantly from states with strong commercial interests, were against trade restrictions, such as Jefferson’s Non-Importation Act. The most influential faction was the War Hawks, composed of about a dozen young representatives from southern and western states; that is, about one ninth of the Republican congressional delegation. For them, the most pertinent issues were the “savage” Indians on the frontier, territorial expansion, and increasing their future political influence.