Martin Jacques - When China Rules the World

During the 1980s, after two decades of bitter antagonism, China ’s relations with the Soviet Union began to improve. It was the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early nineties, however, that was to provide the conditions for a complete transformation in the relationship between the two countries. Russia became a pale shadow of its former Soviet self, with only half of its former GDP and less than half of its previous population, though still with around 80 per cent of its old territory. [1109] [1109] Lowell Dittmer, ‘Ghost of the Strategic Triangle: The Sino-Russian Partnership’, in Suisheng Zhao, ed., Chinese Foreign Policy (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2004), p. 217. Meanwhile, China embarked on its reform programme and enjoyed non-stop double-digit growth. Together, these two developments represented a huge shift in the balance of power between the two countries, with China now in a far more powerful position than its erstwhile rival. During the nineties the two countries finally agreed, after centuries of dispute, on a common border, which, at 2,700 miles, is the longest in the world. From being a highly militarized region, the border became a centre of trade and exchange. The resolution of the frontier issue enabled Russia and China to withdraw large numbers of troops from either side of the border, Russia to Chechnya and (in response to NATO’s expansion) its Europe-facing territory, and China to the Taiwan Strait. [1110] [1110] Ibid., p. 213. In the steadily improving atmosphere between the two, they established, along with several newly independent Central Asian nations, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, for the purpose of promoting collaboration and improving security in the region. A shared, overarching Sino-Russian concern about the overweening power of the United States in the post-Cold War world, with Russia feeling particularly vulnerable following the collapse of the Soviet Union and China relatively isolated after Tiananmen Square, was a major factor in the signing of a strategic partnership agreement between the two countries in 1998. [1111] [1111] Ibid., pp. 220-21.

Nonetheless, there must be severe doubts as to the strategic potential of their relationship. The underlying problem is Russia ’s sense of weakness, on the one hand, and China ’s growing strength, on the other. Although the rapprochement had much to do with Russia ’s sense of vulnerability following the collapse of the Soviet Union and its desire to make peace with its neighbours, that frailty also left it feeling insecure and suspicious of China. The most obvious expression of this anxiety is to be found in the Russian Far East, where a population of a mere 7.5 million confronts a population of 112 million in the three provinces of China’s north-east. Now that the border has been made porous, numerous Chinese have crossed into Russia to seek work and ply their trade. In 1994 Russian estimates put the number of Chinese residents in Russia ’s Far East at 1 million, compared with a Chinese estimate of less than 2,000. According to some demographic projections, Chinese could be the second largest minority ethnic group in the Russian Federation by 2051. Exacerbating these fears is the demographic crisis facing Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union, with one estimate suggesting that its population will fall by 3 million between 2000 and 2010 to 142 million. [1112] [1112] Ibid., p. 215; Garver, China and Iran , p. 300. The Russian fear of being overrun by Chinese immigration speaks both of old prejudices and new fears. The size of the Chinese population tends to arouse these anxieties elsewhere, but they are compounded in Russia ’s case by a long history of prejudice and conflict, the huge demographic imbalance between the two countries, and their long border.

The fact that Russia is rich in oil, gas and many other commodities — as well as being its major supplier of weapons — clearly makes it a very attractive partner for China. But Russia has proved a difficult collaborator, loath to meet its needs, certainly on the terms desired by China. In a long-running saga over the route of a new Russian east-west oil pipeline, with Russia reluctant to concede that it should go to China, as proposed by the Chinese, an agreement was finally reached in February 2009 that there would indeed be a branch to China, in return for Chinese loans to Russian firms. [1113] [1113] Yu Bin, ‘ China and Russia: Normalizing Their Strategic Partnership’, in David Shambaugh, ed., Power Shift: China and Asia’s New Dynamics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), pp. 238-9. The Russians are wary of becoming trapped in a relationship with China where they are reduced to being the provider of raw materials for their economic powerhouse neighbour. [1114] [1114] Stephen Blank, ‘ China, Kazakh Energy, and Russia: An Unlikely Ménage à Trois’, China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly , 3: 3 (November 2005), p. 105. Since the turn of the century, indeed, the Russians have become increasingly protective of their oil and natural gas interests, aware that, in its weakened state, these are hugely their country’s most valuable assets, especially in a global market where prices, until the credit crunch, were moving rapidly in their favour. Having rolled back American, European and Japanese stakes in its oil industry, Russia is hardly likely to grant Chinese oil companies a similar interest in the future. Moreover, having embraced resource nationalism under Vladimir Putin, Russia is now driving very hard bargains over its oil and gas with both Europe and its former territories. The Russian suspicion of Chinese intentions extends to the Central Asian nations that previously formed part of the Soviet Union. Russian sources, it has been reported, revealed in August 2005 that one reason for Moscow’s haste in seeking to enter the former American base at Karshi Khanabad in Uzbekistan is that China had made discreet expressions of interest in acquiring it themselves. [1115] [1115] Ibid., pp. 107-8. China has found itself confronted with many obstacles in its desire to acquire oil interests in Central Asia, even in Kazakhstan, where it has its only major oil stake in the region; the considerable resistance and suspicion would seem to have been encouraged by Russia, which regards Central Asia as its rightful sphere of influence. [1116] [1116] Ibid., pp. 105-8.

None of this is to suggest that the relationship between China and Russia is likely to deteriorate, though that is not inconceivable should Russian fears about the rise of China become acute, perhaps even persuading Russia, in extremis, to turn westwards and seek some kind of solace with the European Union or NATO. It does, however, indicate that serious tensions arising from the major imbalance of power between them are likely to constrain the potential for the relationship becoming anything more than an arrangement for maintaining their bilateral relations in good order, which, given their troubled history, would in itself be no mean achievement. [1117] [1117] Lowell Dittmer, ‘Ghost of the Strategic Triangle’, pp. 220-21. For the time being, at least, a strong mutual concern about US power is likely to bind the two countries together, as it has already, in a limited but significant way, on issues like Iraq and Iran. At the same time trade between the two has been increasing very rapidly, with a five-fold rise between 2000 and 2007. Russia ’s intervention in Georgia and subsequent recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states in 2008 were not well received in Beijing although there was no official criticism, simply an expression of concern. It was a further reminder that relations between the two powers are far from simple. [1118] [1118] Geoff Dyer, ‘ Russia Fails to Secure Regional Backing’, Financial Times , 28 August 2008; Geoff Dyer, ‘ Russia Could Push China Closer to the West’, Financial Times , 27 August 2008; Bobo Lo, ‘ Russia, China and the Georgia Dimension’, Centre for European Reform Bulletin , 62 (October/November 2008).