Martin Jacques - When China Rules the World

At a conference in Beijing in 2005, Moeletsi Mbeki, deputy chairman of the South African Institute of International Affairs, spelt out these fears:

Africa sells raw materials to China and China sells manufactured products to Africa. This is a dangerous equation that reproduces Africa ’s old relationship with colonial powers. [1081] [1081] See John Reed, ‘ China ’s Africa Embrace Evokes Imperialist Memories’, Financial Times , 27 September 2006. The equation is not sustainable for a number of reasons. First, Africa needs to preserve its natural resources to use in the future for its own industrialization. Secondly, China ’s export strategy is contributing to the deindustrialization of some middle-income countries… it is in the interests of both Africa and China to find solutions to these strategies. [1082] [1082] Moeletsi Mbeki, South African Journal of International Affairs , 13(1): 7 (2006), quoted in Marks, introduction in Manji and Marks, African Perspectives on China in Africa , p. 5.

Perhaps the country that most exemplifies this inequality is Zimbabwe, where the Chinese enjoy a powerful presence in the economy, controlling key strategic areas like the railways, electricity supply, Air Zimbabwe and the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation. [1083] [1083] Karumbidza, ‘Win-Win Economic Co-operation’, p. 95. The fact that China has a carefully worked-out and comprehensive strategic approach to its relationship with Africa, while the African response, in contrast, is fragmented between the many different nations, poorly informed about China, and based on an essentially pragmatic rather than strategic view, serves only to exacerbate this inequality. [1084] [1084] Rocha, ‘A New Frontier in the Exploitation of Africa’s Natural Resources’, p. 31; Sautman and Yan, ‘Honour and Shame?’, pp. 55-6. Chris Alden argues that ‘at the regional and multilateral levels African reactions to Beijing have been basically lacking in any strategic approach, as well as being fundamentally uncoordinated.’ Alden, China in Africa , p. 77. The danger is that African nations enter into agreements with China over the exploitation of their natural resources which are too favourable to China, or use the revenues gained in a short-term fashion, perhaps corruptly, to benefit various interest groups, or possibly both.

Although China ’s presence has been hugely welcomed across the continent, and has generated considerable enthusiasm, [1085] [1085] Howard W. French and Lydia Polgreen, ‘ China Brings Its Deep Pockets to Africa’, International Herald Tribune , 13 August 2007; Alden, China in Africa , p. 35. there is also unease and concern. This has been most manifest in Zambia, where in the last presidential election in 2006 the opposition candidate propounded a strongly anti-Chinese line, declaring that ‘Zambia is becoming a province — no, a district — of China’, and gained 29 per cent of the vote, prompting the Chinese ambassador to imply that China might withdraw its investments in the event of his winning. [1086] [1086] Alden, China in Africa , pp. 74-6; Michelle Chan-Fishel, ‘Environmental Impact: More of the Same?’ in Manji and Marks, African Perspectives on China in Africa , p. 144. One of the strongest and most persistent criticisms is that Chinese companies prefer to employ Chinese rather than local workers, with the proportion of Chinese workers sometimes reaching as high as 70 per cent. [1087] [1087] Rocha, ‘A New Frontier in the Exploitation of Africa’s Natural Resources’, p. 25. There are also frequent complaints that Chinese managers display negative attitudes towards local people. [1088] [1088] Karumbidza, ‘Win-Win Economic Co-operation’, p. 101. Both of these, of course, touch directly upon the problem of Chinese attitudes towards those of darker skin, and especially Africans, which I discussed in Chapter 8. The evidence is still too sparse to draw any proper conclusions as yet, though the problem is unsurprising. There is a widely held view, especially in the West, that China ’s refusal to require any conditionality in terms of governance means that it is prone to turn a blind eye to human rights abuses, such as those in Darfur. [1089] [1089] Ali Askouri, ‘China’s Investment in Sudan: Displacing Villages and Destroying Communities’, in Manji and Marks, African Perspectives on China in Africa , pp. 74, 80; Curtis and Hickson, ‘Arming and Alarming?’, p. 41. That has certainly been the case, but the Chinese have recently shown growing sensitivity towards Western criticism, as well as that from within the continent, and as a result have helped to pressure the Sudanese government into accepting the presence of a joint United Nations/ African Union peacekeeping force in Darfur. [1090] [1090] Jim Yardley, ‘ China Offers Defense of Its Darfur Stance’, International Herald Tribune , 8–9 March 2008; Alden, China in Africa , pp. 120, 123-4. There is little evidence, however, that China ’s record in Africa is any worse — and in fact is almost certainly far better — than the West’s own miserable catalogue of support for corrupt and dictatorial regimes on the continent, not to mention its colonial legacy. [1091] [1091] Sautman and Yan, ‘Honour and Shame?’, p. 57. Finally, in a rather different vein, the Chinese have become the target of terrorist groups, for example in the Niger Delta and Ethiopia, a phenomenon which is surely set to grow as the Chinese presence and influence expands and they assume the role, visibility and responsibilities of a global power not only in Africa but elsewhere too. [1092] [1092] ‘Rebels Raid China-run Oil Facility in Ethiopia ’, International Herald Tribune , 25 April 2007; ‘Chinese Worker Abducted in Niger ’, posted on www.bbc.co.uk/news, 7 July 2007; Obiorah, ‘Who’s Afraid of China in Africa?’, pp. 51-2.

The significance of China ’s African mission is enormous. Its rapidly growing influence suggests that in due course it will probably become the dominant player on the continent, and serves as a bold statement of China ’s wider global intentions. The speed of China ’s involvement in Africa, and its success in wooing the African elites, has put the West on the defensive in a continent where it has a poor historical record. [1093] [1093] Alden, China in Africa , pp. 102, 106-7, 118, 129. Unlike the ‘scramble for Africa’ in the late nineteenth century, which generated bitter intra-European rivalry, China’s involvement has not as yet produced significant tensions with the US, Britain or France, though that could change. The recent establishment of the United States Africa Command to coordinate its military relations and activities on the continent suggests that it is concerned about China ’s growing influence; as of late 2008, however, the US had failed to find an African location for its headquarters, stating that it would be based in Stutt gart for the foreseeable future. Apart from the rather more attractive terms that China offers African countries, one of the reasons for its remarkable progress on the continent is that it does not carry the same kind of historical baggage as the West, a fact which it regularly stresses. In this context China has emphasized that Zheng He’s voyages to East Africa in the early fifteenth century sought no territory and took no slaves, in contrast to the Europeans. More importantly, during the Maoist period China was, in contrast to the West, a staunch supporter of the African independence movements. Thus China, with its own experience of colonization, its anti-colonial record and its status as a developing country, has more legitimacy and enjoys a greater affinity with the African nations than does the West. [1094] [1094] Ibid., pp. 9-10, 15, 18–20, 31. This is reflected in the fact that in the 2007 Pew Global Attitudes Survey, for example, respondents in ten African countries expressed far more favourable attitudes towards China than they did towards the United States.