Christopher Davidson - After the Sheikhs - The Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies

Probably the most important Gulf peace-keeping mission came to light in 2008, again involving the UAE. First revealed by the BBC, likely because the UAE authorities were initially cautious about publicising their anti-Taliban activities and explicit support for the US-led coalition, it was reported that about 250 UAE troops and a number of armoured cars had been deployed to Afghanistan since 2003 in order to maintain supply line security and deliver humanitarian aid. It was also reported by the BBC that the UAE contingent had had to fend off Taliban attacks, thus making it the only Arab force in Afghanistan that was actually engaging the enemy. [346] 38. The National , 14 May 2009; BBC News, 28 March 2008. The commanding officer had stated ‘if we have any types of personal attacks we react with fire. And after that we go to the elders in this area and say: “Why are you shooting us? We came here to help you.” And we try to convince the people about the US, about British. They came to give peace’. [347] 39. BBC News, 28 March 2008.

More recently, the UAE’s state-backed media has reported extensively on the contingent’s activities, claiming UAE troops have been actively participating in the Afghan National Army’s ‘hearts and minds’ campaign in Helmand province. According to one British observer attached to the troops, the presence of such Muslim troops in Afghanistan has been drawing crowds, with many Afghans ‘willing to shake hands with these men from “Arabistan”… and with the Emiratis handing out copies of the Koran, notebooks, pens, and chocolate’. The observer went on to describe what he considered the UAE contingent’s ‘most effective weapon in the conflict in Afghanistan’—the offering of invitations from senior UAE soldiers to village elders to join them for midday prayers. He claimed this was ‘…a potent force at work — one the Taliban dared not challenge and one the [US-led] coalition cannot wield. The robust kindness offered by these Emirati troops is a simple but powerful weapon for change in Afghanistan’. The observer also connected the peace-keeping operation with the UAE’s development assistance to Afghanistan, explaining that close to the UAE’s base in the country ‘Afghan men can drive their families along a UAE-funded tarmac road, visit a UAE-built clinic where their women and children can receive treatment from Emirati female doctors, while a UAE-funded radio station offers news and music programming in Pashtun’. [348] 40. The National , 22 July 2011.

Best reflecting the massive political benefits to the UAE’s ruling families of the mission in Afghanistan was the widely reported screening of a documentary film at the crown prince of Abu Dhabi’s majlis in August 2011. Attended by a vast number of UAE dignitaries, including most of the UAE’s rulers, crown princes, and ministers, there were also delegations present from other Gulf monarchies, including Bahrain’s minister for foreign affairs, along with about 400 other guests. Entitled ‘Mission: Winds of Goodness’, the documentary focused on ‘honouring the brave individuals fulfilling important duties on behalf of their country’ while also demonstrating ‘how the UAE forces must rely on their courage, training, and most importantly each other, in order to carry out this important work in the most hostile and challenging of circumstances’. Significantly, the press release published by the UAE’s official state news agency also described the ‘UAE’s policy to provide support to Afghanistan including healthcare and education projects, such as the construction of clinics and schools; and developing sufficient community infrastructure, such as mosques, roads, and schools’ before concluding that ‘…the UAE’s presence as part of an international coalition in Afghanistan has helped maintain security to ensure that humanitarian projects are not undermined by criminal forces that seek to disrupt the provision of aid’. [349] 41. WAM , 22 August 2011.

As regards mediating conflicts and disputes, in recent years — and especially since the 1995 accession of its current ruler, Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani — Qatar has been by far the most prominent regional peace-broker, having hosted countless conferences and been intimately involved in several key peace deals, often in countries that have benefited from its development assistance. Moreover, as will be discussed later in this book, since the advent of the Arab Spring in 2011 Hamad’s efforts have become even more prolific. Qatar’s newfound role should perhaps come as no surprise, given that it is the smallest and, per capita, the wealthiest of the Gulf monarchies. The country would be a valuable prize for any foreign aggressor, and given these precarious geo-strategic circumstances Qatar’s ruling family probably has the most to gain from positioning their state as the region’s active neutral par excellence or, as other observers have described it ‘the Switzerland of the Gulf’. An article in Qatar’s current constitution even underlines its commitment to such a strategy, while also carefully stating that it would never involve itself in the domestic affairs of another state: ‘…the foreign policy of the State is based on the principle of strengthening international peace and security by means of encouraging peaceful resolution of international disputes; and shall support the right of peoples to self-determination; and shall not interfere in the domestic affairs of states; and shall cooperate with peace-loving nations’. [350] 42. Article 7 of the 2005 constitution, as cited by Wright, Steven, ‘Qatar’ in Davidson, Christopher M. (ed.), Power and Politics in the Persian Gulf Monarchies (London: Hurst, 2011).

Prior to 2011, Qatar’s most notable success was its role in ending the standoff in Lebanon between Hezbollah and the broad, anti-Syrian ‘March 14’ alliance. Following nearly a year and a half of city centre protests that began in December 2006, Hezbollah-aligned militias finally occupied central Beirut in May 2008 and for more than a week brought the country to a standstill. Promptly inviting representatives from all factions to Doha, Qatar’s ruler staged the Lebanese National Dialogue Conference which quickly resulted in the forming of a new national unity government and the appointing of a new Lebanese president. [351] 43. The Doha Agreement was reached on May 21 2008. Known as the ‘Doha Agreement’, Qatar’s efforts in ending the deadlock were praised by the UN Security Council which stated that it ‘welcomed and strongly supported the agreement reached by Lebanese leaders in Doha… which constituted an essential step towards the resolution of the current crisis’. In Lebanon firework displays and music concerts were held across the country, with several banners featuring the Qatari ruler being prominently displayed.

In 2007 Qatar then played a key role in brokering the extradition of six Bulgarian nurses from Libya. Having been accused of deliberately infecting over 400 children with HIV in 1998, they had been sentenced to death before having their sentences commuted to life imprisonment. Although France captured most of the headlines in facilitating their release, Nicolas Sarkozy conceded that ‘…some humanitarian mediation by the friendly government of Qatar was decisive in helping with the release of the medics’. [352] 44. Broadcast on Al-Jazeera , 6 August 2007. Perhaps most controversially, Qatar was heavily involved in brokering the 2010 ceasefire in the Sudan between the Khartoum government and the Darfur rebels. Having invited the Sudanese president — Omar Al-Bashar — to Doha, despite an International Criminal Court arrest warrant having been issued for his alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity, the Qatari ruler also invited the presidents of Chad and Eritrea. [353] 45. BBC News, 4 March 2009; CNN , 23 February 2010. A permanent truce was eventually signed in summer 2011, with Qatar’s role again being fêted by both regional players and the international community. Significantly, the signing session took place in a Doha hotel, presided over by the ruler and in the presence of several African heads of state in addition to UN and African Union representatives. Emphasising Qatar’s efforts, Hamad stated that ‘…the State of Qatar is keen to coordinate with its regional and international partners to see the people of Darfur and Sudan enjoy security and stability, as they are the two conditions for development and stability’. [354] 46. Capital Eritrea , 14 July 2011. Also in East Africa, Qatar’s attempts to resolve the long-running border disputes between Eritrea and Djibouti have also received international attention, although success has not yet been forthcoming. In 2010 a high-ranking Qatari delegation arrived in Djibouti after previously visiting Eritrea. But without support from Ethiopia — which broke off relations with Qatar in 2008 on the grounds that ‘Qatar’s support for Eritrea had made it a major source of instability in the Horn of Africa’—an agreement was not reached. [355] 47. Somaliland Press , 7 June 2010.