Christopher Davidson - After the Sheikhs - The Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies

Nevertheless, despite the region’s poor track record, protection of the environment has recently become a high profile policy in some Gulf monarchies. The UAE and Qatar governments in particular have transformed what was previously a liability for their regional and international reputations into something of a strength. A plethora of projects, institutions, new government departments, and other initiatives have been announced — most of which aim not only to remedy their domestic environmental crises, but also to promote international research and development into cleaner energy and other environmental clauses. [299] 78. For a full discussion see Luomi, Mari, The Gulf Monarchies and Climate Change: Abu Dhabi and Qatar in an Era of Natural Unsustainability (London: Hurst, 2012). In much the same way that wealth distribution strategies to citizens and funding of religious establishments have been closely associated with key members of the ruling families, the same has often been true with these environmental projects. The state-backed media have provided extensive coverage, often publicly linking a specific ruling family member to a development, thus winning him or her favourable domestic headlines. It has also been a policy area which has largely attracted favourable international coverage, with many of the articles being republished for domestic readers.

The new Qatar Environment and Energy Research Institute for example falls directly under the umbrella of the ruler’s wife. Aiming to ‘mitigate climate change and contaminants harmful to the environment’ and focusing on ‘Qatar’s desert and marine ecologies, plant and animal life, and air quality’, it is well financed and has thus far been lauded by the domestic media [300] 79. As stated on the Qatar Foundation official website. and further afield. A recent RAND Corporation publication focusing on the institute, for example, begins by stating that ‘Qatar’s leadership has created a vision of sustainability for the country’. [301] 80. See Kalra, Nidhi, Recommended Research Priorities for the Qatar Foundation’s Environment and Energy Research Institute (Los Angeles: RAND Corporation, 2011). More extensively, Abu Dhabi has set up the new Environmental Agency Abu Dhabi (EAD) and recently commissioned the Stockholm Environmental Institute in Sweden to formulate a rigorous climate policy for the emirate. [302] 81. Gulf News , 14 August 2008. Since 2009 there has also been the Zayed Future Energy Prize which now presents winning companies or government departments with prizes of over $4 million. [303] 82. The prize fund was increased to $4 million in 2012. All photographs displayed on the prize’s official website feature the crown prince in the centre of groups of high profile international dignitaries, while all text descriptions of the prize refer to the ‘legacy of Sheikh Zayed’. [304] 83. See http://www.zayedfutureenergyprize.com/en/ But by far the most high profile environment-related initiative in the region has been Abu Dhabi’s Masdar City. Being built by the Abu Dhabi Future Energy Company (ADFEC), which is a subsidiary of the crown prince’s Mubadala Development Company, the plan has been to create a large carbon-neutral development in the emirate’s hinterland. The broader aim is for Masdar to provide the infrastructure for a free zone that will allow up to 1,500 renewable energy and other environment-related international companies to base themselves in Abu Dhabi, or at least have their regional headquarters there. Some of these will be focused on carbon capture technologies and it is expected that they will export their services to nearby countries still relying on outdated hydrocarbon extraction technologies. [305] 84. The National , 23 July 2008. ADFEC is also hoping to attract research and development focused companies to Masdar in an effort to make Abu Dhabi the region’s capital for green technologies. [306] 85. The National , 22 July 2008. Similarly, Mubadala’s investment in the Finnish company WinWinD is likely to lead to a wind power joint venture in Masdar. [307] 86. AMEInfo , 23 September 2008. In support of all these companies is a new research centre — the Masdar Institute — and several leading international research bodies are already operating there. [308] 87. Masdar City press release, July 2008. Again, there has been extensive coverage by the domestic media, and although there has been some criticism of Masdar in the international media, Mubadala and the crown prince have generally benefited from ADFEC’s overall aims.

In parallel to their domestic ruling bargains, there also exist several strategies aimed at securing the survival and raising the status of the Gulf monarchies in the region and internationally. For many years the priority was building strong links with the rest of the Arab world, especially Palestine and those Arab states that refused to acknowledge Israel. This had the twin aims of satisfying pro-Palestinian and anti-Israeli sentiments in their own populations while also allowing the ruling families to sit more comfortably alongside Arab nationalist governments. More recently, and especially since Kuwait’s invasion by Iraq and subsequent liberation by a US-led force in 1991, the priority has been gaining influence and good standing in those states perceived as the most reliable security guarantors — namely the Western powers. Rising tensions with Iran, and a seeming impasse over its developing nuclear programme, have meant that such Western-centric efforts have continued to intensify. But there is now also the added dimension of seeking improved relations with the Eastern powers, including China, which have not only become key trading partners but may also soon offer alternative security guarantees. A third, but interconnected priority for the Gulf monarchies has been the need to forge good relations with other Muslim states and communities, including those far beyond the Arab world. Complimenting their efforts at boosting Islamic credentials and heading off domestic Islamist opposition, this strategy is also intended to deflect and counter external Islamist extremist aggression — a threat which became particularly acute following 9/11 and the subsequent al-Qaeda campaign in Saudi Arabia. [309] 1. For the most comprehensive analysis of this ‘Al-Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula’ campaign see Hegghammer, Thomas, Jihad in Saudi Arabia: Violence and Pan-Islamism Since 1979 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

To some extent, the Gulf monarchies have employed conventional strategies to achieve these aims: building up military defensive capabilities with equipment primarily sourced from the West; joining regional organisations such as the Arab League; and attempts to build collective security arrangements between themselves — most notably the Gulf Cooperation Council. As will be discussed later, despite much scholarly attention having been paid to these strategies, they have been fraught with risks and their successes remain limited. Instead a number of other, subtler, policies perhaps better explain the external survival of the Gulf monarchies.

First, as a natural extension of the domestic rentier state and their popular wealth distribution strategies, the Gulf monarchies have become increasingly keen to distribute some of their resources to less fortunate neighbours, mostly in the form of development aid, charity, or gifts to other Arab, Muslim, or nearby states. Second, efforts have been made by most Gulf monarchies to use their location and resources to position themselves as useful ‘active neutrals’—either by despatching peace-keeping missions or mediating regional disputes. This strategy has usually allowed them to avoid taking sides in nearby conflicts, while also consolidating a reputation of benevolence and peacefulness in less stable or potentially threatening states. Also it has helped deflect broader Arab public opinion away from their difficult-to-disguise dependency on Western military protection. Third, there have been long-running efforts to fund museums, universities, and other cultural projects and institutions in the Western powers — and increasingly their Eastern counterparts — in order to improve recognition and opinion of the Gulf monarchies, and thus help build up their ‘soft power’ base in these influential states. In some cases even development aid has been channelled into these countries for this purpose. As with the domestic survival strategies, there are again significant divergences in these sets of policies, depending on the individual circumstances of each Gulf monarchy. Nevertheless, a pattern is clearly evident, with at least some aspects of each strategy being visible in each monarchy.