Christopher Davidson - After the Sheikhs - The Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies

As a more established regional peace-broker, the UAE has also had a number of successful interventions, albeit more low profile than Qatar’s efforts. The first example of such UAE mediation was in 1974 when Abu Dhabi’s ruler solved a territorial dispute between Egypt and Libya. [356] 48. Anthony, John Duke, Arab States of the Lower Gulf: People, Politics, Petroleum (Washington DC: Middle East Institute, 1975), p. 152. More notably, in 1991 he then attempted to save Iraq from full scale invasion by meeting with the Saudi king and Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak in an effort to forge an agreement between Saddam Hussein and the displaced ruler of Kuwait, Jabar Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah. [357] 49. Heard-Bey (1996), pp. 388–391. In early 2003 Abu Dhabi was again an active intermediary, proposing an emergency summit with the aim of diverting the US from attacking Iraq. A meeting was held in Sharm el-Sheikh and presided over by the Arab League Secretary-General. [358] 50. Amr Moussa. Saddam Hussein and his family were reportedly offered sanctuary in Abu Dhabi if they complied with American demands to leave Iraq. [359] 51. The National , 28 July 2008; Mutawwa (2005), p. 99. Since Khalifa bin Zayed Al-Nahyan’s succession as ruler of Abu Dhabi in 2004, the UAE’s has to some extent continued with these policies. In early 2007 the minister for foreign affairs flew to Iran to meet government representatives, [360] 52. Oxford Business Group , ‘Abu Dhabi: The Report 2007’, p. 25. and later that year (and within the space of just one week) Khalifa separately hosted both Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the US vice president Dick Cheney, seemingly in an effort to defuse the Iran-US nuclear standoff. [361] 53. Reuters, 11 May 2007; BBC News, 13 May 2007. In 2008 the UAE was again active, inviting the US Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice, who was en-route to East Asia, to Abu Dhabi to debrief US envoy William Burns on his Iran negotiations and also to meet with the UAE minister for foreign affairs. Crucially, just one week before, Abu Dhabi’s crown prince had received Ali Rida Sheikh Attar — an envoy of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and undersecretary to the Iranian minister for foreign affairs. [362] 54. Gulf News , 18 July 2008. Combined, these diplomatic actions earned the UAE praise during UN Security Council meetings in August 2008. [363] 55. The National , 8 August 2008.

For many years the Gulf monarchies’ soft power strategy in the West was primarily an offshoot of their sovereign wealth funds. In addition to these funds’ investments in multinationals, blue-chip companies, and mature real estate; additional investments and associated sponsorships have been made in higher profile, headline-grabbing, ventures that may not necessarily turn a profit. The aim, it seems, has been to boost awareness of the Gulf monarchy in question with certain Western powers, at every level from government officials to members of the public. In almost all cases these brand-focused investments have been made in countries that either have a history of providing Gulf monarchies with protection or security guarantees, or can realistically be expected to provide assistance in a future emergency.

For the same reasons that it has emerged as the most energetic regional peace-broker, Qatar is unsurprisingly the most active proponent of the strategy. The ruling family-owned Qatar Holdings, for example, bought London’s prestigious Harrods department store in 2010, after an earlier failed attempt to buy the British national grocery chain Sainsbury’s. Having paid $2.3 billion for Harrods — believed to be an overly generous offer — Qatar Holdings’ chairman (who is also Qatar’s prime minister and a key member of the ruling family) announced that the purchase would not only ‘add much value to its portfolio of investments’ but that Harrods was also ‘…a historical place. I know it’s important, not only for the British people, but it is important for tourism’. Similarly, the Qatar Holdings’ vice-chairman described the purchase as a ‘landmark transaction’ for Qatar. [364] 56. BBC News, 8 May 2010. Meanwhile Qatar has been acquiring other iconic properties in London including the old Chelsea Barracks and the American Embassy building on Grosvenor Square. The building of Europe’s tallest skyscraper — the London Shard — was also financed mostly by Qatar, namely the Central Bank of Qatar, which holds an 80 per cent share. The $3 billion, 310 metre tower houses two duplex apartments specifically for use by the Qatari ruling family, and its official opening ceremony in July 2012 was hosted by the Qatar Holdings’ chairman. [365] 57. Daily Mail , 4 July 2012. When asked for comment, the Central Bank governor was clear about the rationale behind the investment, explaining that he was confident ‘…the Shard would become a symbol of the close ties between Qatar and the UK’. Likewise, the Qatari ambassador to the UK stated that ‘…the UK is a dear country to us… our investment is a long term investment, we don’t need the cash now… we think the UK is the right place to put our investment. The UK is a strategic partner with our country’. [366] 58. The Guardian , 30 December 2011.

Elsewhere in Europe Qatar has also been active, with the Qatar Foundation — chaired by the ruler’s wife — signing a record $230 million sponsorship deal in 2011 with Spain’s Barcelona Football Club, [367] 59. Associated Press , 25 September 2011. one of the biggest brands in international soccer. Having previously shied away from shirt sponsorship and preferring to display the UNICEF children’s charity logo, in 2010 an audit revealed that the club was nearly $500 million in debt. Although marketing experts were reported to have been working on finding a way of displaying both logos on the new shirts, it was admitted that if that proved impossible then the Qatar Foundation logo would take precedence. [368] 60. BBC Sport, 10 December 2010. This now appears to be the case, with the UNICEF logo having been relegated to the back. In France, it has been the turn of Qatar’s largest sovereign wealth fund — the Qatar Investment Authority — which has also bought into soccer via a new, sports-focused investment vehicle, Qatar Sports Investments. In 2011 QSI took a controlling, 70 per cent stake in Paris St. Germain [369] 61. ESPN , 31 May 2011. and promptly appointed a Qatari national as the club’s new president — the first non-French president in the club’s history.

Although now out of the limelight, and a little less spendthrift since Dubai’s 2009 crash and the subsequent Abu Dhabi bailout packages, the UAE has also been a prominent brand-focused sovereign wealth investor in the West, and especially in Britain and the US. Dubai’s various investment vehicles have, for example, purchased the Carlton Tower and Lowndes hotels in central London along with a fashionable art deco hotel in Manhattan, [370] 62. The Essex Hotel. and more conspicuously, the London Eye and the Madame Tussauds waxworks, [371] 63. The latter of which was acquired in 2006 for $800 million. which were acquired in 2006 by Dubai International Capital. In 2007 Dubai’s Nakheel even purchased the decommissioned iconic British cruise liner the QE2 for about $100 million, planning to convert it into a floating hotel. [372] 64. Daily Mail , 16 March 2010. Most successful, in terms of branding, has been Dubai’s Emirates airline’s $150 million fifteen year naming rights for London’s Arsenal Football Club’s new stadium, which was opened in 2006 in parallel with an eight year Emirates shirt sponsorship deal for the club. [373] 65. BBC Sport , 5 October 2004. Now simply referred to as the ‘Emirates Stadium’, the Emirates logo is emblazoned on the side of the building and has become a key London landmark.