Christopher Davidson - After the Sheikhs - The Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies

By 2001, however, the ruling family chose to return to earlier neo-patriarchal strategies by holding a referendum on a ‘National Action Charter’ that would supposedly transform Bahrain into a constitutional monarchy. In 2002 a new constitution was duly implemented on the basis of the charter which promised the creation of a bicameral, halfelected parliament, the abolishing of much maligned ‘security courts’, and a new requirement that half of all judges were to be elected. In 2006 ‘political societies’ were even approved, [138] 82. Ibid., p. 43. bringing Bahrain the closest of all Gulf monarchies to accepting political parties. However, the charter also re-designated the emir as ‘king’ with Bahrain becoming a kingdom rather than an emirate, and the king remained in control of all key appointments, including the prime minister and all of the cabinet ministers. Crucially, he also retained the power of approving or rejecting all proposed legislation. [139] 83. Ibid., p. 40. But interestingly, in parallel to the Khalifa bin Salman-controlled government, the king also set up a new Economic Development Board (EDB), which was gradually assigned more and more control over Bahrain’s economy. Given that the EDB is chaired by the king’s eldest son and crown prince, Salman bin Hamad Al-Khalifa, and given that — until recently at least — Khalifa bin Salman’s ministers had to answer to the EDB, [140] 84. Ibid., pp. 41–42. Bahrain provides a good example of how state formation in the Gulf monarchies has often been manipulated in order to manage ruling family divisions. Broadly speaking, the Al-Khalifa dynasty has become factionalised into conservatives led by the prime minister and a number of key members of the royal court, and reformists, led by the crown prince. The king, rather precariously, has had to sit somewhere in the middle.

Although having shared a similar imperial history to Bahrain, Qatar’s post-independence state formation process has been quite different and much more autocratic, mostly due to its smaller population and — as discussed in the following chapter — the ruling family’s greater ability to distribute wealth and resources. A ‘Basic Law of Qatar’ had already been drafted in 1970, a year before Britain’s departure, and this went on to become a provisional constitution in 1972. Although designed to be as flexible as possible, so as to reflect the transitional nature of the Qatari state, [141] 85. Wright, Steven, ‘Qatar’ in Davidson, Christopher M. (ed.), Power and Politics in the Persian Gulf Monarchies (London: Hurst, 2011), p. 118. it nonetheless provided the basis for setting up an appointed Council of Ministers and a twenty-member Advisory Council or Majlis Al-Shura . Although the latter was also appointed, some concessions were made to electoral politics, with Qatar being divided into ten tribal districts, the leaders of which could each nominate four members, two of whom would then be selected by the emir. [142] 86. Ibid., pp. 119–120. In 1975 the Advisory Council was expanded to thirty-five members, but it remained under the full control of the Al-Thani family, with the emir able to re-appoint its members indefinitely and to block or ratify all proposed legislation. [143] 87. Ibid., p. 120.

Much like the Kuwaiti constitution and the second Bahraini constitution, Qatar’s provisional constitution also sought to combine patriarchal authority with legal-rational authority by slipping in a clause aimed at establishing the permanency of the ruling family. This required all Qatari citizens to ‘…pledge their loyalty and absolute obedience to the Ruler in the fear of God’. Moreover, in another attempt to strengthen the dynasty and prevent unwanted succession disputes the constitution described the need for consensus between ruling family members, although without outlining procedures or specifics. [144] 88. Ibid., p. 119.

Upon his succession in 1995, Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani made a number of promises to reform Qatar’s political institutions and several decrees were duly signed. Three years later the first elections were held for Qatar’s Chamber of Commerce and Industry; and in 1999 the first elections were held for Qatar’s twenty-nine member Municipal Council, with over 22,000 men and women voting. In 2007 a second round of elections were held, with about 50 per cent of the electorate voting. [145] 89. Kamrava, Mehran, ‘Royal Factionalism and Political Liberalization in Qatar’, Middle East Journal , Vol. 63, No. 3, 2009, p. 416. Much like the Saudi elections though, these were only for an institution with very limited powers, and no influence on Qatar’s central government. In 2003 a referendum had already taken place on the subject of a new, permanent constitution to replace the original 1972 provisional constitution. Significantly the new constitution — approved by 97 per cent of Qataris — committed the state to becoming ‘democratic’ and called for a new, elected Advisory Council as opposed to the original appointed body. The council was to be expanded to forty-five members, thirty of whom would be elected; it would sit for four year terms and its recommendations would still require the emir’s approval. [146] 90. Ibid., p. 416. Elections were promised for 2005 but never materialised, as was also the case in 2010. The council thus continues to be fully appointed and is increasingly criticised for its ineffective role and limited scope. Indeed, it only meets for eight months a year, and only sits for two hours a week. [147] 91. Ibid., p. 417. Nevertheless in late 2011 another announcement was made that the promised reforms would still take place, with elections due to be held in 2013 for thirty of the forty-five positions. [148] 92. The Guardian , 1 November 2011.

The UAE’s state formation has been more complicated, not least due to the existence of a federal government that came into being following independence in 1971, and the continuing existence of various emirate-level governments answering to their respective ruling families. Originally envisaged as a loose confederation, with only limited powers being transferred to federal ministries, a provisional constitution was signed by the six founding rulers in late 1971, and then by the ruler of Ra’s al-Khaimah in early 1972. Given that Abu Dhabi, as discussed, was in control of most of the UAE’s oil reserves and had become the UAE’s capital, most of the new ministries were located there. But neither defence nor oil policies were transferred to the federal government, as it was felt that too rapid centralisation of such key matters would harm the status and prestige of the poorer emirates’ governments, thus risking friction and instability. Indeed, when Abu Dhabi attempted to unify the different emirate-level armed forces in the late 1970s both Dubai and Ra’s al-Khaimah threatened their withdrawal from the union, prompting a constitutional crisis. Only in 1996 was the constitution made permanent with a unified UAE Armed Forces being established under Abu Dhabi’s umbrella. By this stage Dubai and most of the other emirates were pressing ahead with costly infrastructure projects in efforts to build up more diverse economic bases, and preferred to transfer as many costly services as possible to Abu Dhabi and the federal government. [149] 93. For a full discussion see Davidson (2009). pp. 61–69.

Overseeing the federal government since 1971 has been the Supreme Council of Rulers, which is made up of the seven hereditary rulers of each emirate and, on occasion, their respective crown princes. While the constitution allows for an SCR presidential election to take place every five years, [150] 94. See Al-Nabeh, Najat Abdullah, ‘United Arab Emirates: Regional and Global Dimensions’ (PhD thesis. Claremont Graduate School, 1984). in practice the rulership of Abu Dhabi remains synonymous with the presidency of the UAE, not least because of Abu Dhabi’s single-handed financing of most federal development projects. The SCR also reflects Dubai’s elevated status in the UAE by awarding only the rulers of Abu Dhabi and Dubai veto power in its meetings — as per an article of the constitution, [151] 95. Article 49. See Al-Gurg, Easa Saleh, The Wells of Memory (London: John Murray, 1998), p. 140; Kéchichian, Joseph A., Power and Succession in Arab Monarchies: A Reference Guide (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2008), p. 284. —and by always appointing the ruler of Dubai as the UAE’s vice president. In support of the SCR, or more specifically the president, there exists a presidential office and a presidential court with its own staff. However, given the ruler of Abu Dhabi’s similar emirate-level institutions it is unclear if the two function independently.