Christopher Davidson - After the Sheikhs - The Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies

Together, these air landing rights rents and the various oil concession payments were viewed by Britain as strategic subsidies which would help reinforce the status of the Gulf monarchies and thus prolong the selfenforcing, low-cost nature of the peace treaties. On the one hand, the new rents were understood to reduce the likelihood that Britain would have to resort to coercive measures to maintain its relationships. In 1939 the Political Resident even remarked that ‘…a key reason for the goodwill between the British and the rulers was that negotiations over air and oil gave the rulers a square deal which carried a money bag rather than a big stick’. [94] 38. India Office S/18/B/469. While on the other hand, according to the India Office, the new rents were understood to have provided ‘greater protection for the chiefs of tribes who were willing to co-operate… and to protect them from any danger that they might face as a result of their co-operation’. [95] 39. India Office S/18/B/414. Specifically, the new rents facilitated the setting up of prototype, pre-oil versions of the aforementioned rentier states. Received directly by the ruling families and their governments, the rents were in turn used to distribute some wealth to their populations rather than having to rely on taxation from merchants.

Overall, the new British-influenced political and economic structures that emerged kept most of the region’s monarchies in power well into the twentieth century. It is no coincidence, perhaps, that every sheikhdom involved in the British protection treaties was by the 1950s also in receipt of at least one form of British rent payment. Indeed, in much the same way as Britain’s earlier political support for breakaway sheikhdoms such as Dubai and Qatar, its intervention on behalf of a favoured member of Oman’s ruling family in the 1870s, and its military assistance for Kuwait in the 1920s, the new rents also became an important part of the survival and in some cases creation of Gulf monarchies. In the case of Ajman, for example, the lack of air landing rights or oil concession payments became such a source of concern that the sheikhdom was purposely selected to host a British military base — an agreement which netted Ajman’s ruler an annual rent of 10,000 rupees and allowed him to reduce taxation in his sheikhdom. [96] 40. The base was at Manama in Ajman. Hawley (2007), p. 278. Similarly profiting from British rents was the Sharqiyin tribe of Fujairah — a semi-autonomous Indian Ocean coastline territory nominally controlled by Sharjah. In 1951, concerned that the Sharqiyin were being courted by the American-Saudi oil giant, Aramco, Britain moved to lock the area into another IPC concession. In 1952 the Shariqin’s chief [97] 41. Muhammad bin Hamad Al-Sharqi. was duly upgraded to the status of the other Trucial States’ rulers: this allowed the IPC to begin payments, and Fujairah was declared to be independent of Sharjah. [98] 42. Examples of these can still be viewed in the Fujairah museum.

Conversely, when sheikhdoms were deemed to be no longer of strategic interest to Britain, or their ruling families were proving problematic, Britain moved to cut payments and in extreme cases facilitated the collapse of dynasties. Hamriyyah and Dibba, for example, were quietly reabsorbed by Sharjah, as without rent payments their respective rulers were in no position to maintain sufficient loyalty from resident tribes. Similarly, the Indian Ocean coastline town of Kalba, which in 1936 had been recognised by Britain as a sheikhdom with its ruling family receiving rent for air landing rights, was reabsorbed by Sharjah in 1951. Britain had already ceased payments after failing to build an airbase and had chosen not to intervene following a series of fratricidal killings within its fragmented ruling family. [99] 43. Heard-Bey (1996), pp. 75–76; Hawley (2007). p. 113; Rush, Alan (ed.), Ruling Families of Arabia: The United Arab Emirates (Slough: Archive Editions, 1991), pp. 457–465. Other examples included the Al-Kaabi family of Mahadha, close to Oman. Despite repeatedly presenting his case to Britain in the late 1950s for both recognition and the need for rent payments in return for providing soldiers to help guard oil exploration parties, he was refused and Britain allowed Mahadha to fall under the control of Muscat’s Al-Said. [100] 44. Hawley (2007), p. 182.

By the time of Abdul-Aziz bin Saud’s death in 1953, Saudi Arabia had already become an internationally recognised state [101] 45. The United Nations recognized Saudi Arabia in 1945. with rulership having been handed on to his eldest sons, albeit with some turbulence. The first to take over was Saud bin Abdul-Aziz, who then abdicated in 1964 in favour of his more reform-focused younger brother, Faisal bin Abdul-Aziz. Following Faisal’s 1975 assassination at the hands of a younger relative, [102] 46. Faisal bin Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud was assassinated by a nephew, Faisal bin Musaid Al-Saud. Faisal bin Musaid was declared insane by medical doctors, but was nonetheless beheaded later that year. BBC News, 25 March 1975. he was succeeded by Khalid bin Abdul-Aziz, who was then succeeded in 1982 by Fahd bin Abdul-Aziz. Since Fahd’s death in 2005 another of Abdul-Aziz’s sons, Abdullah bin Abdul-Aziz, has been king, having already effectively ruled Saudi Arabia as Fahd’s crown prince and regent since 1996. [103] 47. Fahd bin Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud suffered a stroke in 1996 and handed over most duties to his crown prince and younger brother, Abdullah. In parallel to the now very elderly Abdullah, and underscoring the ongoing centrality of the original Saudi-Wahhabi pact to the Saudi state, the religious community continues to be led by the Al-Sheikh family — the direct descendants of Muhammad bin Abd Al-Wahhab. [104] 48. Obaid, Nawaf E., ‘The Power of Saudi Arabia’s Islamic Leaders’, Middle East Quarterly , Vol. 6, No. 3, 1999, pp. 51–58. Presently led by the one-eyed Abdul-Aziz bin Abdullah Al-Sheikh, the Al-Sheikh remain in control of key positions in government, especially in justice and education, and maintain close family ties to the Al-Saud through intermarriage. [105] 49. Hassner, Ron Eduard, War on Sacred Grounds (New York: Cornell University Press, 2009), p. 143. Together with other relatives and allies they also continue to dominate a number of state-backed bodies such as the Council of Senior Religious Scholars, thus forming the official religious establishment in Saudi Arabia.

Since Saud’s accession, Saudi Arabia’s government has been run by a Council of Ministers. Established by charter, it has served as both the executive and the legislative body of the Saudi state, with all of its members being appointed by royal decree. [106] 50. Coates Ulrichsen, Kristian, ‘Saudi Arabia’ in Davidson (2011), p. 70. In 1992, after a number of demands and petitions made to the ruling family by both liberal and conservative opponents in the wake of the Kuwait crisis [107] 51. Referring to the 1990 invasion of Kuwait by Iraq and the subsequent liberation of Kuwait by a US-led international coalition. and the return of western troops (including female soldiers) to the region, Fahd instigated a number of reforms aimed at appeasing the religious community while also providing the state with a greater veneer of accountability. [108] 52. Nolan, Leigh, ‘Managing Reform? Saudi Arabia and the King’s Dilemma’, Brookings Doha Center Policy Briefing, May 2011. Collectively, the new ‘Basic System of Governance’ or ‘Basic Law’ re-confirmed Islamic Sharia law as the basis for all legislation in the state, while also establishing new regulatory bodies to monitor government performance and separate the judiciary from other parts of the government — albeit with judges still being appointed by the king. To provide a greater degree of stability for the ruling family and to guard against internecine disputes or coups d’état, the 1992 reforms also clarified that succession would be limited to male descendants of Abdul-Aziz. [109] 53. Coates Ulrichsen, ‘Saudi Arabia’ in Davidson (2011), pp. 68–69. In this way, Fahd sought to enshrine in law some of the stabilisation mechanisms later observed by Michael Herb in his aforementioned work on dynastic monarchies. [110] 54. See Herb, Michael, All in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution, and Democracy in the Middle Eastern Monarchies (New York: State University of New York Press, 1999). In 1993, in a further effort to promote accountability, Fahd established a new Consultative Council or majlis al-shura . Although, as with the Saudi judges, all involved were appointed by the king. [111] 55. Ibid., p. 70.