Christopher Davidson - After the Sheikhs - The Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies

Responsible for most of the federal government’s decision-making is the Council of Ministers. Since its establishment in 1972 its composition has always reflected the relative power and influence of the member emirates. Although originally made up of eleven ministers in addition to a prime minister, the COM soon expanded to nineteen positions as the other emirates began to supply their contingents of appointees. [152] 96. Kéchichian (2008), p. 206. The premiership was transferred to the crown prince of Dubai, before the above-mentioned constitutional crisis persuaded the ruler of Dubai to become prime minister as well as vice president. Abu Dhabi has always held the lion’s share of COM positions including the deputy premiership and ministerial posts for the interior, higher education, and public works. Today, the COM’s membership has increased to twenty ministers and four ministers of state, including four women. But it remains equally in favour of Abu Dhabi, with members of its ruling family now also controlling the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Ministry for Presidential Affairs among other portfolios. In total, there are now five members of the Al-Nahyan family serving as ministers while other Abu Dhabi nationals serve as the ministers for justice, [153] 97. Hadef Jawan Al-Dhaheri. the economy, [154] 98. Sultan bin Said Al-Mansuri. and energy. [155] 99. Muhammad bin Dhaen Al-Hamili. Moreover, at least two further ministers are de facto members of the Abu Dhabi contingent given their close ties to the emirate.

Operating beneath the COM, the Federal National Council is a consultative body made up of contingents from each emirate. Comprising forty members, including an internally elected speaker and two deputies, this chamber sits for sessions of two years at a time, and has several subcommittees. Much like the COM, the more powerful emirates dominate, [156] 100. Kéchichian (2008), p. 285. As per article 72 of the constitution. with Abu Dhabi and Dubai each supplying eight members, while Sharjah and Ra’s al-Khaimah supply six, and the other three emirates supply just four. [157] 101. Rizvi, S., ‘From Tents to High Rise: Economic Development of the United Arab Emirates’, Middle Eastern Studies , Vol. 29, No. 4, 1993, p. 665. These contingents, which were originally all appointed, were often made up of senior representatives of non-ruling tribes or sections, and they now include women. As with the Qatari Advisory Council, in recent years there has been mounting criticism of the FNC, with many of its members and other citizens claiming it is largely ineffective. While it has been successful in petitioning ministers on rather banal subjects, [158] 102. These have normally been over concerns that were already shared by the Council of Ministers, such as the need for tightening anti-drug legislation and the need for further modifying the UAE’s property laws. Al-Nahyan, Shamma bint Muhammad, Political and Social Security in the United Arab Emirates (Dubai: 2000), pp. 122–123. it has been incapable of making more substantive interventions, [159] 103. Especially in cases where the FNC’s views were likely to diverge from the relevant minister’s outlook, such as over the price of petrol or the cultural content of terrestrial television. Ibid., p. 121. and has often failed to elicit responses from ministers. [160] 104. There have been examples of the FNC’s letters to ministers having remained unanswered for several months, and occasions when the FNC has been unable to persuade ministers to attend their sessions and answer basic questions on their policies. Ibid., pp. 178–179,188. In 2006 elections were held for half of the FNC positions, but these were widely ridiculed as only a few thousand UAE nationals were eligible to vote. A second round of elections should have taken place in late 2010 but were delayed until late 2011. As with Saudi Arabia’s 2011 Municipal Council elections, the latest FNC elections seem to have been used as a concession to the Arab Spring, as the size of the electorate was expanded to 80,000. Yet this still represented only a small proportion of UAE nationals — about 12 per cent [161] 105. Reuters, 24 September 2011. —and the FNC’s powers have remained very limited. [162] 106. WAM , 21 June 2011. Embarrassingly for the UAE’s president — who had publicly called for a high voter turnout — fewer than 30 per cent of eligible voters actually participated. [163] 107. Reuters, 24 September 2011.

At the apex of the emirate-level governments are the private offices and courts of both the rulers and crown princes. Given Abu Dhabi’s much greater geographic size, it also has ruler’s representatives in both its eastern and western regions, and these also have their own private offices and courts. While it remains possible for unilateral decisions to be made by the rulers’ offices and then issued as decrees, as in other Gulf monarchies, in practise only Abu Dhabi and Dubai’s rulers still exercise this privilege, with most legislation now being crafted by the federal COM. Abu Dhabi, Dubai, and Sharjah all have emirate-level executive councils, which tend to deal with most domestic matters. In many ways the Abu Dhabi Executive Council — founded in early 1971, before the creation of the UAE — is more powerful than the COM, as it presides over several Abu Dhabi-specific government entities including the influential Supreme Petroleum Council, three municipalities and three police forces (one for the capital and one for each of its two outlying regions), along with a score of recently established Abu Dhabi specific bodies including an education council, an environmental agency, and a tourism authority.

Sharjah’s executive council, although much smaller, operates along similar lines, but it is noteworthy that Dubai’s executive council is far less formal, with its meetings being arranged on a more ad hoc basis, often in the conference suites of business hotels. In some ways, the nature of Dubai’s council is supposed to reflect the emirate’s history as a dynamic business hub, with it often being referred to as ‘Dubai Inc’. Also at the emirate-level, at least in Abu Dhabi and Sharjah, are national consultative councils which are supposed to operate in a similar manner to the FNC and have faced similar criticisms. The Abu Dhabi National Consultative Council’s usefulness is particularly questionable given that the Abu Dhabi Executive Council is not required to consider the recommendations that it receives. Moreover, after more than forty years of operation the ADNCC remains entirely appointive, and — incredibly — only three of its current members were first appointed in the last twenty years. None of the members are female, in contrast with the Sharjah National Consultative Council which now has 17 per cent female membership. [164] 108. Davidson (2009), p. 125.

In contrast to Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE’s constituent emirates, which were the last of the Gulf monarchies to achieve independence, Oman is actually the oldest independent Arab state. But by the mid-twentieth century its politics were almost equally dominated by Britain, which was not only instrumental in Oman ceding its Gwadar province to Pakistan in 1958 and putting down the aforementioned Dhofar rebellion in the mid-1970s, but also played a central role in installing Oman’s current sultan, Qaboos bin Said Al-Said, in the midst of the conflict. With Qaboos’ father, Said bin Taimur Al-Said, struggling to unite the country, prevent mass emigration, and placate the rebels, Britain judged Qaboos to be the ruling family’s best hope. Thus, in 1970 a British-backed arrest team — claiming the consensus of the rest of the Al-Said dynasty — detained Said and, in something of a repeat of the arrest and removal of Abu Dhabi’s ruler in 1966, he was forced into exile in favour of his younger rival. Since then Qaboos has not faced a direct challenge, or at least not from other members of the ruling family, and after Muammar Gaddafi’s ousting and death in 2011, he is now the Gulf’s longest serving head of state.