Joachim Fest - Plotting Hitler's Death

Each step in the plan was predicated on the success of the previous steps. Just a few weeks before the invasion stalled, the general staffs had been made aware of a “preparatory commando unit” whose task would be to slip through the lines after Moscow was surrounded and assume responsibility for certain “security duties” in the heart of the Soviet capital. The unit’s leader reported to the army commanders that Hitler wanted Moscow razed to the ground. The eastern border of the German Reich would then be advanced to the Baku-Stalingrad-Moscow-Leningrad line, beyond which a broad, lifeless “fire­break” would extend to the Urals. 22

Defeat also put an end to the mission of the commando unit. Hitler’s daydreams of master and slave races, resettlement programs, mass exterminations, and the renewal of bloodlines were also shat­tered, as were increasingly monstrous and megalomaniacal visions of himself as a world savior, though he continued to propound them in his “table talk” and monologues over the ensuing years. His magic spell broken by this setback, Hitler realized much more clearly than ever before that time was working against him. There is every reason to think that his disputes with the generals had been prompted largely by his nagging fear that the hourglass was indeed running down. Judgment day was not yet at hand, as one contemporary observer noted, but “dark clouds were gathering.” 23

Ironically enough, the opposition, too, felt that time was working against them and deepening their dilemma. If they took action after a military defeat, such as had just occurred for the first time, they could probably count on more support from the populace, at least in the short term. But they also ran the risk of making a martyr of Hitler and so giving rise to another stab-in-the-back legend. None of the con­spirators had forgotten the poisonous effect of this legend on the government that was established after the First World War. On the other hand, by launching the coup after a string of military victories the conspirators ran the risk of operating without popular support in Germany, even if their actions opened the prospect of negotiating satisfactory peace terms. When Tresckow asked a friend what he thought the solution was, the friend responded that risk was inevita­ble and that “the most favorable time externally” was necessarily “the least favorable internally.” 24

As 1942 dawned, the conspirators faced the increasingly pressing question of whether a Germany that had rid itself of Hitler would have any hope of negotiating an acceptable peace with the Allies. The answer was clearly crucial, especially as far as the generals were con­cerned, and it had become all the more urgent since Hitler’s declaration of war on the United States on December 11, following Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor. A colossal worldwide coalition of powers was emerging that would sooner or later overwhelm the Reich. Furthermore, Great Britain and the Soviet Union had signed a mutual-assistance pact as of July 12, 1941, according to which neither party would enter into cease-fire negotiations without the consent of the other. One month later Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt had announced the Atlantic Charter, which, notwithstand­ing its ringing declarations about peace, made plain their intent to disarm Germany for many years to come. Thus, even before the for­mal entry of the United States into the war, Beck, Hassell, and Popitz began to discuss whether it was not already too late for a coup. Even a government formed by the resistance, they felt, might “no longer be able lo obtain an acceptable peace.”

The plotters were probably well aware of the tensions within the Allied coalition, but this only heightened their fears rather than diminished them. It seemed most inauspicious that the various attempts to resume contacts with London after the French campaign had met with no response, and it was easy to foresee that as time passed and more people were killed, attitudes would only harden. As the likelihood of an Allied victory increased, the prospect of negotiations would grow even dimmer. This would remain true, the conspira­tors felt, as long as Moscow, London, and Washington did not agree on a joint policy toward Germany. Even if the Allies did reach agree­ment, it was likely that every dispute would be settled at Germany’s expense, for when coalitions of this kind seek a common denominator they usually find it in the harshest possible conditions for the van­quished.

Concern over the shrinking window of opportunity heightened the pressure on the opposition to act. During the summer of 1942, Ger­man forces again began scoring impressive victories, especially along the southern wing of the eastern front. This did nothing, however, to prevent heated controversies from erupting once more between Hitler and his generals. After an angry exchange, Halder was finally sent packing in September. Although he had long kept his mounting hatred of the regime to himself and no longer actively participated in the resistance, the opposition circles felt they were losing their last contact in the highest echelons of the military. In their notes from this period they write again and again of “little hope,” “few chances for success,” and “no initial spark.” Their generally depressed state of mind was such that they developed no plans and lacked any real drive or even a leader whom they all recognized. Exhausted by the contin­ual setbacks, they placed their hopes on the visibly worsening rela­tions between Hitler and the army, which they thought might prompt some as-yet-unknown officer to lead a revolt, and on the stirrings within Army Group Center.

Considering that the movement was led by experienced officers, it is remarkable how little planning had been done by this point and how much better the conspirators were at theorizing than they were at organizing. It was by no means easy, of course, to put together a resistance organization in a police state. Under the constant supervi­sion of a huge security apparatus, the movement faced countless dan­gers and difficulties: it had to keep to a manageable size and yet be broad enough to have players in all the key positions; it had to bring together large numbers of people who were both reliable and willing to run tremendous risks. As it grew, the danger of discovery through recklessness or betrayal mounted.

Enormous efforts were required just to build up and bring to­gether the three main hubs of resistance: the field army, the home army, and the civilian groups. In March Beck’s office was finally des­ignated as the headquarters. 25At about the same time the conspira­tors scored perhaps their greatest success so far when Oster managed to establish close ties with General Friedrich Olbricht, the head of the OKW General Army Office and the acting commander of the reserve army. By nature and in manner a prudent administrative of­ficer, General Olbricht proved one of the most determined and reso­lute opponents of the regime. Perhaps because he lived by the maxim that “a general staff officer doesn’t make a name for himself,” he has never received the recognition he deserves for the role he played in the preparations for July 20 and in the actual events of that day. 26

In contrast to many of his fellow officers, Olbricht had supported the Weimar Republic and never allowed himself to be seduced, after the Nazi seizure of power, by any of Hitler’s successes or his hints of future rewards. It was typical of Olbricht that as early as 1940, at the height of Hitler’s triumphs, he had reached the conclusion that the dictator would have to be overthrown in a violent coup. Olbricht was motivated primarily by religious and patriotic considerations but also by the profound distaste of a cultivated man for the primitiveness of the Nazis and their moral unscrupulousness. He became the de facto technical head of the conspiracy, and it was his task to lay the ground­work for the government takeover to follow Hitler’s assassination. His removal would provide the much-discussed “initial spark” that would set the rest of the plan in motion.