Eric Schlosser - Command and Control

James L. “Skip” Rutherford III was working: Interview with Skip Rutherford.

“It’s about the Titan missiles”: Ibid.

The missiles were old, the airmen said: I spoke to one of the airmen, who preferred to remain anonymous, and he confirmed Rutherford’s account.

Pryor was disturbed by the information: Interview with David H. Pryor.

other members of Congress were concerned: Dan Glickman spoke to me about his efforts to retire the Titan II. I’m glad that he saved a copy of the Damascus accident report and donated it to Wichita State University, along with his other congressional papers.

At Launch Complex 533-7, about an hour southeast of Wichita: My description of the accident in Rock, Kansas, is based principally on “Report of Missile Accident Investigation: Major Missile Accident, Titan II Complex 533-7, Assigned to 381st Strategic Missile Wing, McConnell Air Force Base, Kansas,” conducted at McConnell Air Force Base, Kansas, September 22–October 10, 1978. Albert A. Kamas, a Wichita attorney who represented a number of people hurt in the accident, not only shared his memory of the event but also sent me documents, newspaper clippings, and videotaped local news accounts of it. Julie Charlip, who covered the story for the Wichita Eagle, graciously shared her reporting on it. And Colonel Ben G. Scallorn, who headed the accident investigation, discussed its findings with me.

Malinger had never been inside a Titan II silo before: See David Goodwin, “Victim of AF Missile Accident Wanted Only to Be a Mechanic,” Wichita Eagle , January 18, 1979.

“Oh my God, the poppet”: “Major Missile Accident, Titan II Complex 533-7,” affidavit of Charles B. Frost, Second Lieutenant, Tab U-4, page 3.

“What was the poppet”: Ibid.

“Get out of here, let’s get out”: Quoted in ibid.

“Where are you?”: Ibid.

“Come back to the control center”: Ibid.

“I can’t see”: Quoted in ibid., affidavit of Richard I. Bacon, Jr., Second Lieutenant, Tab U-7.

“Hey, I smell Clorox”: Quoted in ibid., Frost affidavit, Tab U-4, p. 3.

quickly registered one to three parts per million: Cited in ibid., p. 5.

“My God, help us, help us, we need help”: Quoted in ibid., p. 4.

“Hey, door eight is locked”: Ibid.

“Hey, you guys, get out of here”: Ibid., p. 5.

“Come help me”: Quoted in ibid.

“This is three-seven…. The locks are on the safe”: Ibid.

“Where’s the dep, where’s the dep?”: Quoted in ibid.

“We’ll get him later”: Ibid.

“My God, please help me”: Quoted in ibid., Affidavit of Keith E. Matthews, First Lieutenant, Tab U-3, p. 4.

“Get them under the fire hydrant”: Ibid., p. 5.

Jackson… climbed the ladder all the way to the bottom in his RFHCO: It was clearly possible to wear a RFHCO and enter the escape hatch. “Airman Jackson changed helmets,” the report said, “and went to the bottom of the air intake shaft (escape hatch) but could not find the entry to the control center.” Jackson had never been in it before and climbed down until reaching a pool of water at the very bottom. The darkness and the cloud of oxidizer — not the size of the shaft or the escape hatch — prevented him from getting into the control center. The quote is from page 8 of the report. See also the affidavit of John C. Mock, Jr., technical sergeant, Tab U-25, pp. 1–2. Mock was a PTS team chief and supervisor, but he’d never gone down the escape hatch, either.

Someone hadn’t put a filter inside the oxidizer line: See “Major Missile Accident, Titan II Complex 533-7,” p. 10.

someone may have deliberately omitted the filter: According to Jeff Kennedy, oxidizer would flow more quickly without the filter, and the job could be completed in less time. Some PTS crews were willing to break the rules. But if you wanted to cut corners and not get caught, you also had to remove the O-ring. Otherwise it might clog the line and cause a leak — like it did during the Rock, Kansas, accident. Kennedy interview. See also Julie Charlip, “Missile Workers a Special Breed,” Wichita Eagle , May 31, 1981.

The Air Force recommended… that black vinyl electrical tape be used: After the accident, the Air Force assembled a team of experts from Boeing, NASA, Martin-Marietta, and other aerospace groups to examine the RFHCOs involved in the Rock, Kansas, accident. They found, among other things, that the suits were vulnerable to leakage at the “glove-cuff interface,” especially when a forceful spray of liquid was applied there. Sealing the interface with vinyl electrical tape, the group decided, would be a possible, “very short term solution.” See “Class A Ground Launch Missile Mishap Progress Report No. 61,” Eighth Air Force Accident Investigation Board, McConnell Air Force Base, September 24, 1978; and Julie Charlip, “Missile Suit Flawed, Says AF Report,” Wichita Eagle , February 20, 1979.

Carl Malinger had a stroke, went into a coma: See Goodwin, “Victim of AF Missile Accident.”

his mother later felt enormous anger at the Air Force: Ibid.

failed to “comply with [Technical Order] 21M-LGM25C-2-12”: “Major Missile Accident, Titan II Complex 533-7,” p. 11.

“To err is human, …to forgive is not SAC policy”: Quoted in Moody, Building a Strategic Air Force , p. 469.

Its warhead was more than seven times more powerful: The single W-56 warhead on the Minuteman II had a yield of about 1.2 megatons. The W-62 warheads carried by Minuteman III missiles at the time had a yield of about 170 kilotons. Each Minuteman III had three of them, for a combined yield of slightly more than half a megaton. The 9-megaton warhead atop the Titan II was far more powerful.

the fifty-four Titan IIs represented roughly one third of their total explosive force: Cited in Walter Pincus, “Aging Titan II Was Time Bomb Ready to Go Off,” Washington Post , September 20, 1980.

one of Rutherford’s confidential sources later told him: Rutherford interview. See also Pincus, “Aging Titan II Was Time Bomb.”

a siren “might cause people to leave areas of safety”: “Letter, From Colonel Richard D. Osborn, Chief Systems Liaison Division, Office of Legislative Liaison, To Senator David Pryor,” November 7, 1979, David H. Pryor Papers, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville.

Colonel Richard D. Osborn told Pryor: Ibid. The sirens could prove especially dangerous, Osborn argued, “during periods of darkness.”

one half to two thirds of the Air Force’s F-15 fighters were grounded: The Tactical Air Command considered a plane “fully mission capable” if it could be flown with one day of preparation. In 1978 about 35 percent of TAC’s F-15 fighters were fully mission capable; the proportion was about 56 percent in 1980. Cited in Marshall L. Michel III, “The Revolt of the Majors: How the Air Force Changed After Vietnam,” dissertation submitted to Auburn University, Auburn, Alabama, December 15, 2006, pp. 290–91.

The Strategic Air Command had lost more than half of its personnel: In 1961, SAC had 280,582 personnel; by 1978, it had 123,042. The 1961 figure is cited in Polmar, Strategic Air Command , p. 72. The 1977 figure comes from Alwyn Lloyd, A Cold War Legacy, 1946–1992: A Tribute to Strategic Air Command (Missoula, MT: Pictorial Histories Publishing Co., 1999), p. 516.