Eric Schlosser - Command and Control

“but when you get in it”: “Excerpts from Comments by Wallace and LeMay on the War and Segregation,” New York Times , October 4, 1968.

“We seem to have a phobia”: Ibid.

jeered by protesters yelling, “Sieg heil”: Quoted in “LeMay, Supporter of Dissent, Seems Upset by Hecklers,” New York Times , October 25, 1968.

the antiwar movement was “Communist-inspired”: Quoted in Jerry M. Flint, “LeMay Fearful Communists Threaten American Values,” New York Times , October 31, 1968.

a B-52 took off from Mather Air Force Base: For the Yuba City crash, see Airmunitions Letter, No. 136-11-56H, Headquarters, Ogden Air Material Area, April 19, 1961 (SECRET/RESTRICTED DATA/declassified), pp. 2–18; “Joint Nuclear Accident Coordinating Center Record of Events,” (For Official Use Only/declassified), n.d.; and Maggelet and Oskins, Broken Arrow , pp. 173–93.

“continue mission as long as you can”: Quoted in Maggelet and Oskins, Broken Arrow , p. 176.

“a weak point in the aircraft’s structure”: The report also noted that the B-52 has “a skin-loaded structure that readily disintegrates upon impact.” See “Accident Environments,” T. D. Brumleve, J. T. Foley, W. F. Gordon, J. C. Miller, A. R. Nord, Sandia Corporation, Livermore Laboratory, SCL-DR-69-86, January 1970 (SECRET/RESTRICTED DATA/declassified), p. 58.

On Johnston Island in the central Pacific: For the missile explosions that occurred during the test series known as Operation Dominic, see Hansen, Swords of Armageddon , Volume IV, pp. 382–445; “Operation Dominic I, 1962,” U.S. Atmospheric Nuclear Weapons Tests, Nuclear Test Personnel Review, Defense Nuclear Agency, February 1983; Reed and Stillman, Nuclear Express , pp. 136–137; and Maggelet and Oskins, Broken Arrow , Volume II, pp. 96–98.

Two thirds of the Thor missiles used in the tests: Four of the six missile tests ended prematurely. Project 8C in the Fish Bowl series of Dominic had been carefully planned to determine the effects of a nuclear detonation on a reentry vehicle’s heat shield and other components. “The experiment was not completed,” a report later said with disappointment, “because after approximately 1 minute of flight the missile blew up.” One of the two successful tests had unexpected results. During the Starfish Prime shot, a 1.4-megaton warhead was detonated at an altitude of about 250 miles. The electromagnetic pulse was much stronger than anticipated, damaging three satellites, disrupting radio communications across the Pacific, and causing streetlights to go out on the Hawaiian island of Oahu, about eight hundred miles away. See “Operation Dominic: Fish Bowl Series,” M. J. Rubenstein, Project Officers Report — Project 8C, Reentry Vehicle Tests, Air Force Special Weapons Center, July 3, 1963 (SECRET/RESTRICTED DATA/declassified), p. 6; “United States High-Altitude Test Experiences: A Review Emphasizing the Impact on the Environment,” Herman Hoerlin, a LASL monograph, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Ocotber 1976; and “Did High-Altitude EMP Cause the Hawaiian Streetlight Incident?” Charles Vittitoe, Electromagnetic Applications Division, Sandia National Laboratories, System Design and Assessment Notes, Note 31, June 1989.

three workers at an Atomic Energy Commission base: For details of the Medina explosion, see “Run! Three Do; Injuries Are Minor,” San Antonio Express, November 14, 1963; “‘Just Running’: Panic in Streets for Few Moments,” San Antonio Light , November 14, 1963; “Tons of TNT Explode in Weapons Plant,” Tipton [Indiana] Daily Tribune , November 14, 1963; Hansen, Swords of Armageddon , Volume VII, p. 272; Maggelet and Oskins, Broken Arrow , Volume II, pp. 98–100.

a B-52 encountered severe air turbulence: For details of the Cumberland Broken Arrow, see Airmunitions Letter, No. 136-11-56N, Headquarters, Ogden Air Material Area, March 10, 1964 (SECRET/RESTRICTED DATA/declassified), pp. 2–17; Dan Whetzel, “A Night to Remember,” Mountain Discoveries (Fall/Winter, 2007); Maggelet and Oskins, Broken Arrow , p. 198.

Another accident with a Mark 53 bomb: For details of the Bunker Hill Broken Arrow, see “B-58 with Nuclear Device Aboard Burns; One Killed,” Anderson [Indiana] Herald, December 9, 1964; “Memorial Services Held at Air Base,” Logansport [Indiana] Press, December 10, 1964; “Saw Flash, Then Fire, Ordered Plane Abandoned, Pilot Recalls,” Kokomo [Indiana] Morning Times, December 11, 1964; “A Review of the US Nuclear Weapon Safety Program—1945 to 1986,” R. N. Brodie, Sandia National Laboratories, SAND86-2955, February 1987 (SECRET/RESTRICTED DATA/declassified), p. 13; “Remedial Action and Final Radiological Status, 1964 B-58 Accident Site, Grissom Air Reserve Base, Bunker Hill, Indiana,” Steven E. Rademacher, Air Force Institute for Environment, Safety, and Occupational Health Risk Analysis, December 2000; and Maggelet and Oskins, Broken Arrow , pp. 204–10. After an accident that exposed five hydrogen bombs to burning jet fuel, the Air Force told the Kokomo Morning Times that there had been “no danger” of a radiation hazard.

a Minuteman missile site at Ellsworth Air Force Base: See “Accidents and Incidents,” Incident #2, p. 182; and “Review of the US Nuclear Weapon Safety Program,” p. 14. The most detailed account can be found in Maggelet and Oskins, Broken Arrow , Volume II, pp. 101–9.

a group of sailors were pushing an A-4E Skyhawk: The story of this long-hidden accident has been told in detail by Jim Little, a retired chief warrant officer with a long career managing nuclear weapons for the U.S. Navy. Little watched the plane roll off the deck of the Ticonderoga. His account of the accident can be found in Maggelet and Oskins, Broken Arrow , Volume II, pp. 113–16, and in his book, Brotherhood of Doom: Memoirs of a Navy Nuclear Weaponsman (Bradenton, FL: Booklocker, 2008), pp. 113–14.

“Brakes, brakes”: Quoted in Little, Brotherhood of Doom , p. 114.

recently graduated from Ohio State University: Webster had flown seventeen combat missions in Vietnam and gotten married the previous year. One of his close friends from high school, Roger Ailes, later the president of Fox News, created a scholarship fund in Webster’s name. See William K. Alcorn, “Webster Scholarship to Help City Youths,” Youngstown [Ohio] Vindicator , July 3, 2006.

“responsibility for identifying and resolving”: President Kennedy also asked to be kept informed about “the progress being made in equipping all Mark 7 nuclear weapons assigned to ground alert aircraft with velocity sensing safety devices.” He returned to the broader issue just nine days before his assassination, issuing a directive that safety rules be adopted for each weapon in the stockpile. Those rules would have to be approved by the secretary of defense — and shared, in writing, with the president of the United States. See “National Security Action Memorandum No. 51, Safety of Nuclear Weapons and Weapons Systems,” May 8, 1962 (SECRET/RESTRICTED DATA/declassified), NSA; and “National Security Memorandum No. 272, Safety Rules for Nuclear Weapon Systems,” November 13, 1963 (SECRET/RESTRICTED DATA/declassified).

the Titanic Effect: Donald MacKenzie mentions the “Titanic effect” in the context of software design. “The safer a system is believed to be,” he suggests, “the more catastrophic the accidents to which it is subject.” And as a corollary to that sort of thinking, MacKenzie argues that systems only become safer when their danger is always kept in mind. See MacKenzie’s essay “Computer-Related Accidental Death,” in Knowing Machines , pp. 185–213. The Titanic effect is discussed from pages 211 to 213.