Eric Schlosser - Command and Control

The smallest attack option… almost two thousand weapons: Cited in “U.S. Strategic Objectives and Force Posture Executive Summary,” National Security Council, Defense Program Review Committee, January 3, 1972 (TOP SECRET/declassified), NSA, p. 29.

the largest with more than three thousand: Cited in ibid., p. 28.

a “horror strategy”: Quoted in Burr, “‘Horror Strategy,’” p. 63.

“how one rationally could make a decision”: Kissinger was wondering how the Soviet Union could launch such an attack on the United States; but his doubts about the sanity of such a move applied equally to the American war plans of the time. “To have the only option that of killing 80 million people,” he said at another meeting, “is the height of immorality.” For the first quote, see “Review of U.S. Strategic Posture,” NSC Review Group Meeting, May 29, 1969 (TOP SECRET/declassified), NSA, p. 12. For the second, see “Memorandum for Mr. Kissinger, Subject, Minutes of the Verification Panel Meeting Held August 9, 1973,” August 15, 1973 (TOP SECRET SENSITIVE CODE WORD/declassified), NSA, p. 8.

It was called QUICK COUNT: For information about the computer model, see N. D. Cohen, “The Quick Count System: A User’s Manual,” RAND Corporation, RM-4006-PR, April 1964. I learned about Quick Count from another report, one that was “designed to be of use to those who have only a rudimentary knowledge of targeting and the effects of nuclear weapons but who need a quick means of computing civil damage to Western Europe.” See “Aggregate Nuclear Damage Assessment Techniques Applied to Western Europe,” H. Avrech and D. C. McGarvey, RAND Corporation, Memorandum RM-4466-ISA, Prepared for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense/International Security Affairs, June 1965 (FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY/declassified). Between pages 19 and 23, you will find a guide to potential blast mortalities in the twenty-four largest cities in Western Europe, derived using Quick Count. The table listing the likely “Incremental Mortalities,” “Weapon Order,” and “Cumulative Mortalities” is a good example of calm, efficient, bureaucratic madness.

the “obstacle course to recovery”: “Recovery from Nuclear Attack, and Research and Action Programs to Enhance Recovery Prospects,” Jack C. Greene, Robert W. Stokely, and John K. Christian, International Center for Emergency Preparedness, for Federal Emergency Management Agency, December 1979. The chart outlining the postattack obstacle course appears on page 7.

“No weight of nuclear attack which is at all probable”: Ibid., pp. 22–23.

NATO nuclear policy “insists on our destruction”: See “Minutes of the Verification Panel Meeting,” p. 2.

“I must not be — and my successors must not be”: Quoted in Terriff, Nixon and the Making of U.S. Nuclear Strategy , p. 76.

General Bruce K. Holloway… deliberately hid “certain aspects of the SIOP”: Quoted in Burr, “‘Horror Strategy,’” p. 62.

“with a high degree of confidence”: Another top secret report found that, before the Soviet missiles hit, “it is possible that no President could be sure, with the present warning configuration, that an attack was in progress or that a retaliation was justified.” The first statement is quoted in Wainstain, et al., “Evolution of U.S. Strategic Command and Control,” p. 424; the second, in ibid., p. 408.

The World Wide Military Command and Control System had grown to encompass: Cited in “The Worldwide Military Command and Control System: A Historical Perspective (1960–1977),” Historical Division, Joint Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 1980 (SECRET/declassified), NSA, p. 121.

The National Emergency Airborne Command Post… did not have a computer: See “Countervailing Strategy Demands Revision of Strategic Forces Acquisition Plans,” Comptroller General of the United States, MASAD-81-355, August 1981, pp. 24–25.

the entire command-and-control system could be shut down: See “Strategic Command, Control, and Communications: Alternative Approaches for Modernization,” Congress of the United States, Congressional Budget Office, October 1981, pp. 15–16; and May, et al., “History of the Strategic Arms Competition,” Part 2, pp. 605–6.

The system had already proven unreliable: For the growing problems with the WWMCCS, see “Worldwide Military Command and Control System: Historical Perspective,” pp. 93–112; and the chapter entitled “Three WWMCCS Failures,” in David Pearson, The World Wide Military Command and Control System: Evolution and Effectiveness (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2000), pp. 71–92.

“A more accurate appraisal”: Quoted in Wainstein, et al., “Evolution of U.S. Strategic Command and Control,” p. 432.

“confused and frightened men making decisions”: May et al., “History of the Strategic Arms Competition, Part 2, p. 607.

Nixon tried to end the Vietnam War by threatening the use of nuclear weapons: The details of this risky and unsuccessful plan can be found in Scott D. Sagan and J. Suri, “The Madman Nuclear Alert,” International Security , vol. 27, no. 4 (2003), pp. 150–83.

“I call it the Madman Theory, Bob”: Quoted in ibid., p. 156.

nuclear weapons were once again utilized as a diplomatic tool: For the DEFCON 3 alert in 1973, see Scott D. Sagan, “Nuclear Alerts and Crisis Management,” International Security , vol. 9, no. 4 (Spring 1985), pp. 122–31.

the administration’s bold diplomacy: The DEFCON 3 alert was part of a complex strategy aimed not only at the Soviet Union but also at the leadership of Egypt and Israel. Kissinger was pleased by the outcome, noting in his memoirs that “we had emerged as the pivotal factor in the diplomacy.” See Henry A. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982), p. 612.

“What seems ‘balanced’ and ‘safe’ in a crisis”: Quoted in Sagan, “Alerts and Crisis Management,” p. 124.

He argued against the adoption of a launch-on-warning policy: Iklé’s opposition to launching missiles quickly was part of a larger critique of American strategic policy. See Fred Charles Iklé, “Can Nuclear Deterrence Last Out the Century?” Foreign Affairs , January 1973, pp. 267–85.

“Launching the ICBM force on attack assessment”: “The U.S. ICBM Force: Current Issues and Future Options,” C. H. Builder, D. C. Kephart, and A. Laupa, a report prepared for United States Air Force Project RAND, R-1754-PR, October 1975 (SECRET/FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA/declassified), NSA, p. 81.

“accident-prone”: See “Minutes, National Security Council Meeting, Subject, SALT (and Angola), December 22, 1975” (TOP SECRET SENSITIVE declassified), NSA, p. 9.

“the Soviets must never be able to calculate”: Ibid., p. 9.

“It is not to our disadvantage”: Ibid.

a military aide carrying the “football”: The contents of the president’s football were described in Bill Gulley, with Mary Ellen Reese, Breaking Cover: The Former Director of the White House Military Office Reveals the Shocking Abuse of Resources and Power That Has Been the Custom in the Last Four Administrations (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1980). Despite its lurid subtitle, the book probably offers the most accurate description of the football at the time.

“any emergency order coming from the president”: See Carroll, House of War , p. 354–56. The quote is on page 355. For concerns about Nixon’s finger on the button, see also Janne E. Nolan’s fine book, Guardians of the Arsenal: The Politics of Nuclear Strategy (New York: New Republic Book, 1989), pp. 122–23. A number of the Joint Chiefs thought Schlesinger’s remark was a warning that Nixon might attempt a coup d’état. See Mark Perry, Four Stars: The Inside Story of the Forty-Year Battle Between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and America’s Civilian Leaders (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1989), pp. 257–59.