Günter Bischof - The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968

Much information came from a very dubious source: Major Ladislav Bittman, employed at the Czechoslovak embassy in Vienna since 1966 and formerly of the disinformation department of the ČSSR secret service. 48Many of Bittman’s pieces of information, which were taken at face value in 1968, turned out to be false. On 7 September 1968, for instance, more than a fortnight after the invasion, the head of the Military Secret Service, Peterlunger, informed Federal Chancellor Klaus on the basis of information passed on by Bittman on the intention of the Soviet Army to blockade the Austrian-Czechoslovak border in order to dislodge armed ČSSR troops and push them onto Austrian territory. An outbreak of hostilities was to serve as a pretext for the occupation of eastern Austria. The so-called Polarka plans, which were supposed to serve the Soviet army as it crossed eastern Austria en route to Yugoslavia, also belonged under the heading “ Deza ” (disinformation).

On 31 August 1968, the Soviet ambassador paid a call on Josef Klaus at his country refuge in Wolfpassing near Vienna in order to hand him a note from the Soviet government. The note repeated that the invasion of Czechoslovakia was “an act of fraternal help to the Czechoslovak people that would have suffered no delay” and that the intervention was not directed against any other state. 49The Soviet envoy informed Klaus on the conclusion of the “negotiations” a few days earlier between the government delegations of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. After a lengthy explanation of the agreement achieved on the “normalization” of the situation in Czechoslovakia, the Soviet envoy launched into an open criticism of Austria. Previously, as we have already seen, it was reporting in the Austrian media that had provoked Soviet criticism; now Podtserob openly accused the Austrian government of having breached the country’s policy of neutrality. The fact that “Austrian TV, which was state controlled, as well as the Austrian press” had become vehicles of an anti-Soviet and antisocialist position was in “direct and open contrast to Austria’s status as a neutral country…. This could not but damage Austria’s foreign policy.” 50The Soviet ambassador, however, also stressed that the USSR had taken note of Austria’s repeated official statements affirming its neutrality and pointed out that it was in Austria’s interest “that the policy of European states be built on the unshakable acceptance of existing borders in Europe and the rejection of attempts to undermine the principles of European security.” Klaus affirmed again in his reply that Austria was irrevocably committed to its neutrality policy. “Having said that,” Klaus added, “it is equally clear that the Austrian government cannot remain indifferent to the fate of a neighboring country that Austrians feel close to on account of historical and kinship grounds. This is the reason why Austria, motivated by purely humanitarian considerations, has provided material help to those Czechoslovaks who are at present on Austrian soil due to the recent developments.”

The federal chancellor rebutted the Soviet ambassador’s charge that the press was under the control of the government, saying that “in view of the legal situation… the government… was unable to control the press,” despite the fact that he had recently been holding “almost daily meetings with the heads of radio and TV” in order to “instruct them to take the government’s neutral position as the basis from which to report on events in Czechoslovakia.” Klaus committed himself to continuing to exert this kind of influence on the media and shared with the Soviet ambassador the story of how he himself had become the butt of criticism in a recent Presse editorial, even though he had been on friendly terms with the writer of the article for twenty years. The federal chancellor also addressed the topic of Soviet press reports on Austria—without explicitly mentioning the Literaturnaya Gazeta article—and called them devoid of any factual basis.

Klaus explicitly mentioned the Soviet charges that Austria had supported “counterrevolutionary forces” in the ČSSR with radio transmitter stations and stated emphatically “that the government was not aware of any actions whatsoever that might have infringed Austria’s neutrality and the State Treaty.” The Soviet ambassador, who had been prepared for this reply as part of his briefing by the Politburo of the Central Committee (CC) of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union ( Kommunisticheskaya Partiya Sovetskogo Soyuza or CPSU), was quick to use this cue and suggested that the Austrian government might possibly “not be aware of such developments even though they did exist.” There might, after all, be “dishonest individuals among Austrian customs officials.” 51Klaus took this as a facetious remark. 52

Generally speaking, the Soviet ambassador’s call on Chancellor Klaus fell short of a downright “protest” on the part of Moscow against the course taken by the Austrian government. On the previous day, the Moscow Politburo had charged Soviet ambassadors all over the world to communicate clearly the Soviet point of view “regarding the latest developments centering on Czechoslovakia.” Some indication of how important it was in Moscow’s eyes that Austria should maintain its neutral position in 1968 derives from the fact that in the distribution schedule of this brief, which comprised dozens of countries, Austria ranked in fifth place, after the United States, France, Great Britain, and West Germany. 53

Austria’s avowals of intending to keep to a strictly neutral course amounted to more than empty words during the following weeks. At the UN Conference of Nuclear-Free States in Geneva, Waldheim reiterated on 6 September 1968 that “Austria has always asserted its special interest in the creation of a climate of détente and international cooperation that is free from the dangers of armed conflict and confrontation.” “Austria,” Waldheim went on to say, “deplores any acts of violence as they jeopardize the order which is the foundation of security for all of us. We condemn these acts in the most categorical manner.” 54Diplomatic words like these were apt to meet with all around approval. In the West, they could be interpreted as a condemnation of the invasion of Czechoslovakia, even though Waldheim was not explicitly referring to the Czechoslovak crisis, and there was no need for Moscow to feel incriminated since the Soviet government was painting the invasion as a means of enhancing security in Europe. A “counterrevolutionary” victory would have endangered that security by impinging on the USSR’s vital interests. Waldheim was already positioning himself for the role of UN secretary-general, the post that he assumed on 1 January 1972, and was able in this manner to grow in stature in the Kremlin’s eyes. That Waldheim managed in this crucial phase of Austrian foreign politics to build a good relationship with the Soviets without having much explicit knowledge of internal Soviet deliberations that have only recently become apparent and intuitively to steer the correct course—correct also in light of the principles of Austrian neutrality which were not even hammered out yet—is evidenced by the confidential talk he had with the Soviet ambassador on 28 September, immediately before his trip to Yugoslavia as a member of the entourage of Federal President Franz Jonas. 55Waldheim explained to Podtserob that the forthcoming visit was a purely ceremonial one and only served for Vienna to reciprocate Tito’s visit. 56Podtserob, in turn, professed that while the peoples of the USSR entertained special feelings for the peoples of Yugoslavia on account of the war in which they had fought side by side against National Socialism and while Moscow was interested in good relations with Belgrade, these feelings only made sense on a basis of reciprocity. Waldheim, appearing immediately to have spotted a role for himself as a mediator, underlined the significance of his partner’s utterances, particularly because “rumors were being circulated by the media as regards Soviet military measures against Yugoslavia.” 57The Soviet ambassador disclaimed any such rumors. He and Waldheim agreed that it must be Yugoslavia that was spreading such rumors. Waldheim also mentioned the report circulated by the Deutsche Presse Agentur about a hypothetical demand put forward by Moscow to be granted the right to march through Austria to Yugoslavia. He claimed he had denied the existence of such a demand in the strongest of terms, which had even provoked the expression of a certain uneasiness toward him on the part of several West German politicians.