Günter Bischof - The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968

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On August 20, 1968, tens of thousands of Soviet and East European ground and air forces moved into Czechoslovakia and occupied the country in an attempt to end the “Prague Spring” reforms and restore an orthodox Communist regime. The leader of the Soviet Communist Party, Leonid Brezhnev, was initially reluctant to use military force and tried to pressure his counterpart in Czechoslovakia, Alexander Dubcek, to crack down. But during the summer of 1968, after several months of careful deliberations, the Soviet Politburo finally decided that military force was the only option left. A large invading force of Soviet, Polish, Hungarian, and Bulgarian troops received final orders to move into Czechoslovakia; within 24 hours they had established complete military control of Czechoslovakia, bringing an end to hopes for “socialism with a human face.”
Dubcek and most of the other Czechoslovak reformers were temporarily restored to power, but their role from late August 1968 through April 1969 was to reverse many of the reforms that had been adopted. In April 1969, Dubchek was forced to step down for good, bringing a final end to the Prague Spring. Soviet leaders justified the invasion of Czechoslovakia by claiming that “the fate of any socialist country is the common affair of all socialist countries” and that the Soviet Union had both a “right” and a “sacred duty” to “defend socialism” in Czechoslovakia. The invasion caused some divisions within the Communist world, but overall the use of large-scale force proved remarkably successful in achieving Soviet goals. The United States and its NATO allies protested but refrained from direct military action and covert operations to counter the Soviet-led incursion into Czechoslovakia.
The essays of a dozen leading European and American Cold War historians analyze this turning point in the Cold War in light of new documentary evidence from the archives of two dozen countries and explain what happened behind the scenes. They also reassess the weak response of the United States and consider whether Washington might have given a “green light,” if only inadvertently, to the Soviet Union prior to the invasion.

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35. ÖStA, BMfaA, Ktn. 1350, 124.545 (Pol. 6) 68.

36. Michael Gehler, Österreichs Außenpolitik der Zweiten Republik: Von der alliierten Besatzung bis zum Europa des 21. Jahrhunderts (Innsbruck: Böhlau, 2005), 342.

37. Waldheim’s report to the Executive Committee of Austria’s parliament, 29 August 1968, ÖStA, BMfaA, Ktn. 1347, 129.266-6 (Pol.) 68.

38. On this occasion, the Soviet embassy counselor pointed out that the Czechoslovak ambassador had been given the opportunity to appear on Austrian television while in 1967 the request of the Soviet ambassador to be allowed to speak on TV on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the October Revolution had been denied. What prompted this meeting was the latest edition of the Deutsche Nationalzeitung destined for sale in Austria, which in the words of the Soviet diplomat, “was brimful of highly insulting statements about the Soviet Union.” The Austrian Foreign Ministry followed up on the matter and came to the conclusion that the Austrian edition of the periodical was produced entirely in Munich. See the file memo about a call paid to the Foreign Ministry by the Soviet embassy counselor, Bushmanov, 29 August 1968, ÖStA, BMfaA, Ktn. 1349, 124.904 (Pol. 6) 68.

39. File memo, 29 August 1968, ÖStA, BMfaA, Ktn. 1349, 124.904 (Pol. 6) 68.

40. File memo, 29 August 1968, ÖStA, BMfaA, Ktn. 1349, 124.904 (Pol. 6) 68.

41. Washington lodged an official protest with the Soviet Union regarding the “absurd claim” that the United States was violating Austrian neutrality. For details, see the article by Günter Bischof, “‘No Action’: Die USA und die Invasion in die Tschechoslowakei,” in Karner et al., Beiträge , 340.

42. Folder “8/28/68,” cable of the secretary of state, D. Rusk, to the U.S. embassies in Vienna, Moscow, Prague, all NATO capitals, CINCEUR and USEUCOM, 28 August 1968, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files 1967–1969, POL 27-1 COM BLOC-Czech, Box 1995, NARA, reprinted in Karner et al., Dokumente , #180; for details see Günter Bischof, “‘No Action,’” in Karner et al., Beiträge , 319–54.

43. From the official log of the ambassador of the USSR in Austria, B. F. Podtserob, 29 August 1968, AVP RF, F. 66, op. 47, p. 100, d. 6, pp. 177–78. The transcript was made on 30 August 1968 and dispatched to Moscow by the Soviet embassy on 31 August 1968.

44. Kurt Waldheim, Im Glaspalast der Weltpolitik (Düsseldorf: Econ, 1985), 64; Waldheim told the story also in an interview. See Gehler, Österreichs Außenpolitik der Zweiten Republik , 342, 346; AVP RF, F. 66, op. 47, p. 100, d. 6, pp. 177–78 (cf note 43).

45. Minutes of a meeting of the leadership of the CC CPSU with the leaders of the Communist parties of Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, and Poland, 8 May 1968, KC PVAR, p. 193, t. 24, Archivum Akt Nowych, Warsaw (hereafter abbreviated as AAN), reprinted in Karner et al., Dokumente , #77.

46. For details, see also report on the visit paid by the Soviet ambassador in Austria, Podtserob, to Austrian federal chancellor Klaus, 31 August 1968, AVP RF, F. 66, op. 47, p. 100, d. 6, 179–83, reprinted in Karner et al., Dokumente , #182.

47. See the article by Dieter Bacher and Harald Knoll, “Österreich als Drehscheibe ausländischer Geheimdienste?” in Karner et al., Beiträge , 1063–74.

48. For details on Ladislav Bittman, see Pavel Žaček, “Vzestupy a pády Bohumíra Molnára. Kariéra generála Státní bezpečnosti,” in Oči a uši strany: Sedm pohled do života StB , ed. Petr Blažek et al. (Šenov, Ostrava: Nakl. Tilia, 2005), 95–99; Wendell L. Minnick, Spies and Provocateurs: A Worldwide Encyclopedia of Persons Conducting Espionage and Covert Action 1946–1991 (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 1992), 17–18; Ladislav Bittman, Zum Tode verurteilt: Memoiren eines Spions (Munich: Roitman, 1984); Ladislav Bittman, Geheimwaffe D (Bern: SOI, 1973); on the basis of these two publications, Bittman’s activities were analyzed in Harald Irnberger, Nelkenstrauß ruft Praterstern, Am Beispiel Österreich: Funktion und Arbeitsweise geheimer Nachrichtendienste in einem neutralen Staat (Vienna: Verlag Promedia, 1983), 112–14.

49. From the official log of the ambassador of the USSR in Austria, B. F. Podtserob, 31 August 1968, AVP RF, F. 66, op. 47, p. 100, d. 6, pp. 179–83. The transcript was made on 2 September 1968 and dispatched to Moscow on the same day by the Soviet embassy.

50. From the official log of the ambassador of the USSR in Austria, B. F. Podtserob, 31 August 1968, AVP RF, F. 66, op. 47, p. 100, d. 6, pp. 179–83. Decidedly more inclined to criticism than Chancellor Klaus was Secretary for Information Karl Pisa in an interview he gave to the Austrian Press Agency (APA) on 28 August 1968 on the topic of the events in Czechoslovakia. He noted that there was no need for him to “hold forth” on the “nature of communism” now as he had “criticized both the communist idea and the encroachments of the Soviet occupying forces repeatedly even during Austria’s occupation.” ÖStA, BMfaA, Ktn. 1347, 129.266-6 (Pol.) 68.

51. From the official log of the ambassador of the USSR in Austria, B. F. Podtserob, 31 August 1968, AVP RF, F. 66, op. 47, p. 100, d. 6, pp. 179–83.

52. Transcript of a conversation between the Soviet ambassador B. F. Podtserob and Chancellor Klaus, 31 August 1968, reprinted in Eger, Krisen an Österreichs Grenzen , 213.

53. RGANI, F. 3, op. 72, d. 201, pp. 22, 41–55.

54. Excerpt from a statement by Kurt Waldheim at the UN Conference of NuclearFree States in Geneva, 6 September 1968, ÖStA, 129.266-6 (Pol.) 68.

55. Jonas was in Yugoslavia from 30 September to 5 October 1968. For details, see Eger, Krisen an Österreichs Grenzen , 103, and Gehler, Österreichs Außenpolitik der Zweiten Republik , 341.

56. Tito had paid Austria a state visit from 13 to 17 February 1967.

57. From the official log of the ambassador of the USSR in Austria, B. F. Podtserob, 28 September 1968, AVP RF, F. 66, op. 47, p. 100, d. 6, pp. 195–98. The transcript was made on 30 September 1968 and dispatched to Moscow on the same day by the Soviet embassy. See also Tvrtko Jakovina, “Tito, the Bloc-Free Movement, and the Prague Spring” in this volume, and Bischof, “‘No Action,’” in Karner et al., Beiträge , 319–54.

58. From the official log of the ambassador of the USSR in Austria, B. F. Podtserob, 28 September 1968 (cf. note 56). A discussion on Austrian television (ORF) on 12 September 1968 was even mentioned in a report to the CC CPSU. According to its report, the Soviet embassy was reasonably pleased with the program. See the report of the deputy chairman of APN, V. Larin, to the Propaganda Department of the CC CPSU, RGANI, F. 5, op. 60, d. 38, p. 107, reprinted in Karner et al., Dokumente , #187.

59. For details, see Eger, Krisen an Österreichs Grenzen , 101.

60. In the 1966 declaration of its program, Austria’s new federal government gave top priority to speeding up its negotiations for the country’s accession to the EC. By linking the South Tyrolean question to the EC negotiations, Rome compromised these negotiations. Paris subsequently adopted Moscow’s proposal, which provided for Vienna to conclude a trade treaty with the EEC’s member states. The USSR considered Austria’s potential EC membership as incompatible with the State Treaty (on the basis of the interdiction of the Anschluß with Germany). Similar fears surfaced in Moscow before Austria’s accession to the European Union. For details, see Gehler, Österreichs Außenpolitik der Zweiten Republik , 310–58, and Robert Kriechbaumer, “Die Ära Klaus: Aufgeklärter Konservatismus in den ‘kurzen’ sechziger Jahren in Austria,” in Gehler and Kriechbaumer, eds., Die Ära Josef Klaus: Austria in den ‘kurzen sechziger Jahren , vol. 1, Document , Schriftenreihe des Forschungsinstitutes für politisch-historische Studien der Dr.Wilfried-Haslauer-Bibliothek, vol. 7/1 (Vienna: Böhlau, 1998), 63.

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