Günter Bischof - The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968

The extremely conciliatory course that Waldheim opted for in his encounter with the Soviet ambassador made the latter remark that the reporting on developments in Czechoslovakia in Austrian media, above all in the ORF, had become less partisan. 58The state visit of the Soviet minister for the gas industry, Aleksei Kortunov, in Austria had contributed noticeably to a consolidation of Soviet-Austrian relations. 59Podtserob thanked Waldheim for the hospitality with which Minister Kortunov and his entourage had been met in Austria and “for the amicable atmosphere.” Waldheim replied by expressing the hope that it would be possible to continue intensifying the economic ties between Austria and the Soviet Union, and somewhat bluntly pointed out to the Soviet diplomat that such a development might strengthen the position of the Austrian government, which was facing increasing pressure to secure the country’s accession to the European Communities (EC) at the earliest possible date. 60According to the ambassador’s notes, Waldheim said, “Some people vociferously complain that the end of Austria’s industry is imminent in case the country does not join the EC. The development of economic ties with the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries would deal a blow to these critics.” In this way, Waldheim clearly conveyed the impression to Moscow that EC accession was not a top priority of the Austrian government for the time being and that, as far as the economy was concerned, Austria was prepared to cooperate more closely with Eastern Europe. 61Finally Waldheim also addressed the issue of South Tyrol and informed the ambassador of the latest developments. He did so presumably in the hope that the Soviet Union’s position on this issue might change one day. Having pointed out that the South Tyrol issue was, after all, a product of World War I, he added that Italy had been allotted South Tyrol for strategic reasons (“The Brenner Pass is now in Italian hands”). Podtserob asserted that the Soviet Union did not want “this controversy to be exploited for objectives that were at odds with the interests of peace in Europe.” 62In this way, the postponement of the trip to the Soviet Union of the president of the Austrian Parliament, Alfred Maleta, was Austria’s only concrete reaction to the invasion of Czechoslovakia. 63Even accusations against Austria in KGB reports that look bizarre in retrospect and that surfaced in part in the “White Book” published in the autumn of 1968 remained without impact on the bilateral level. 64

In his study on the foreign policy of Austria’s Second Republic, Michael Gehler concludes that the hesitant, tactically motivated way in which the Austrian government reacted to the invasion of Czechoslovakia led to a sense of bewilderment in the population and ultimately to a loss of stature for the Klaus government. Whether Austria’s politicians really felt out of their depth is another matter. Yet Gehler is no doubt right when he asks whether history would have taken a different course if the Austrian government had managed to appear more sure of itself and more resolute. 65

Austria’s cautiousness with regard to the invasion of the troops of the Warsaw Pact’s pro-interventionist coalition may ultimately be explained by the absence of a U.S. security guarantee. In 1956, just such an explicit guarantee had existed. At that time, Washington would not have tolerated an infringement of Austrian sovereignty. In the crucial days of August 1968, no such guarantee materialized, presumably because the U.S. government took it for granted that the Warsaw Pact military action was going to remain confined to Czechoslovakia. Austrian diplomats are said to have lobbied for a U.S. guarantee; it is unlikely, however, that in this matter they got much support from the foreign minister. The assessment of the newly created situation that Waldheim made was a sober and unexcited one, and he attempted to make the most of it for Austria. The crisis in Hungary, which occurred barely a year after Austria declared everlasting neutrality, tested that neutrality to the full on the stage of world politics. In 1968, the situation was entirely different. Not only was Austria’s interpretation of neutrality “more comprehensive and more consistent than in 1956,” but the country in general and the Klaus government in particular were pursuing their own interests. 66The intensive shuttle diplomacy between Austria and the countries of the Eastern Bloc was beginning to bear fruit, which exposed the government to opposition criticism for its “Eastern bias.” From a purely economic perspective, Austria could easily have ended up in a cul-de-sac if it had behaved differently toward Moscow. Closing the gap that separated the country from accession to the EC remained a dubious undertaking on account of the issue of South Tyrol.

Against this backdrop, it is understandable that in November 1968 Waldheim, in a diplomatically brilliant, indirect manner, rebutted in Brussels the statement of U.S. secretary of state Dean Rusk that Austria and Yugoslavia touched on U.S. security interests. He did so by pointing out that safeguarding Austrian independence and territorial integrity was an obligation shared by all four signatories of the State Treaty. Waldheim’s words were ultimately greeted with approval in the Soviet press. 67

After the Warsaw Pact invasion of 1968, Austria followed lines similar to those of the major powers in its reactions. Priority was given to avoiding anything that might provoke the “Russian bear.” For this reason, the army was stationed thirty kilometers away from the Austrian border, and units that had originally been deployed in the immediate vicinity of the border were pulled back to avoid the outbreak of border-related hostilities of the kind that had led to the killing of a Soviet soldier during the Hungarian crisis in 1956.

Austria’s policies were politically, if not ideologically, consistent with its neutral status. The Czech and Slovak reformers enjoyed a tremendous reputation in Austria, which was at least partly the result of the reports on Austrian television.

In 1968, most Austrians viewed Czechoslovakia as a country that was being deprived of its legitimate freedom; they were severely criticized for this view by the Soviets. There were also allegations that Austria had veered from its course as a neutral country. These allegations were a cause for considerable concern, especially for people in the gas industry. Would the Soviets still consider themselves bound by their contract to supply Austria with natural gas? They would. On 1 September 1968, gas deliveries started via a pipeline that pierced the Iron Curtain. What had looked like a test of Austria’s neutrality in the crucible of the Cold War left behind no more than a mild sense of irritation, which evaporated in no time.

Translated from German into English by Otmar Binder, Vienna.

1. For further information on the Soviet occupation of Austria, see Die Rote Armee in Österreich: Sowjetische Besatzung 1945–1955 , vol. 1, Beiträge , vol. 2, Dokumente , ed. Stefan Karner et al., Veröffentlichungen des Ludwig Boltzmann-Instituts für Kriegsfolgen-Forschung, Sonderband 4, 5 (Graz: Oldenbourg, 2005).

2. Text of a statement delivered by Federal Chancellor J. Klaus, on Austrian television (ORF), 21 August 1968 (7:00 a.m.), Ktn. 1347, 129.266-6 (Pol.) 68, Austrian State Archives, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vienna (hereafter abbreviated as ÖStA, BMfaA).

3. Podtserob was a long-serving Soviet diplomat. Active in the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs from 1937, he had worked for Molotov from 1943. In 1952, he was promoted to deputy foreign minister, became head of the 1st European Department and ambassador to Turkey and, in 1956, to Austria, where he remained until 1971. For more details, see G. P. Kynin and J. Laufer, SSSR i germanskii vopros: 22 iyunya 1941g.–8 maya 1945, SSSR i germanskii vopros 1941–1949 , Tom I. (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 1996), 750.