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Günter Bischof - The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968

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Название:
The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968
Автор:
Günter Bischof
Издательство:
Lexington Books
Жанр:
История / Политика / на английском языке
Год:
2010
Город:
Lanham
ISBN:
978-0-7391-4304-9
Рейтинг книги:
4 / 5. Голосов: 1
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The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968: краткое содержание, описание и аннотация

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On August 20, 1968, tens of thousands of Soviet and East European ground and air forces moved into Czechoslovakia and occupied the country in an attempt to end the “Prague Spring” reforms and restore an orthodox Communist regime. The leader of the Soviet Communist Party, Leonid Brezhnev, was initially reluctant to use military force and tried to pressure his counterpart in Czechoslovakia, Alexander Dubcek, to crack down. But during the summer of 1968, after several months of careful deliberations, the Soviet Politburo finally decided that military force was the only option left. A large invading force of Soviet, Polish, Hungarian, and Bulgarian troops received final orders to move into Czechoslovakia; within 24 hours they had established complete military control of Czechoslovakia, bringing an end to hopes for “socialism with a human face.”
Dubcek and most of the other Czechoslovak reformers were temporarily restored to power, but their role from late August 1968 through April 1969 was to reverse many of the reforms that had been adopted. In April 1969, Dubchek was forced to step down for good, bringing a final end to the Prague Spring. Soviet leaders justified the invasion of Czechoslovakia by claiming that “the fate of any socialist country is the common affair of all socialist countries” and that the Soviet Union had both a “right” and a “sacred duty” to “defend socialism” in Czechoslovakia. The invasion caused some divisions within the Communist world, but overall the use of large-scale force proved remarkably successful in achieving Soviet goals. The United States and its NATO allies protested but refrained from direct military action and covert operations to counter the Soviet-led incursion into Czechoslovakia.
The essays of a dozen leading European and American Cold War historians analyze this turning point in the Cold War in light of new documentary evidence from the archives of two dozen countries and explain what happened behind the scenes. They also reassess the weak response of the United States and consider whether Washington might have given a “green light,” if only inadvertently, to the Soviet Union prior to the invasion.

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4. Cf. the instructions for the Soviet ambassadors in different countries prepared by the Politburo of the CC CPSU. Politburo resolution of the CC CPSU P 96 (V), “On the declarations of the government of the USSR addressed to foreign governments concerning the events in Czechoslovakia,” 19 August 1968, F. 3, op. 72, d. 198, pp. 4, 20–30, Russian State Archives of Contemporary History, Moscow (hereafter abbreviated as RGANI), reprinted in Karner et al., Dokumente , #165.

5. At the beginning of August, a group of Czechoslovak Communists loyal to Moscow around Vasil Bil’ak handed a “request” written in Russian to Leonid Brezhnev in Bratislava asking the Soviet leadership for “assistance.” For details, see the Prozumenshchikov chapter in this volume.

6. From the official log of the ambassador of the USSR in Austria, B. F. Podtserob, 21 August 1968, F. 66, op. 47, p. 100, d. 6, pp. 163–64, Archives of the Foreign Ministry of Affairs, Moscow (hereafter abbreviated as AVP RF). In his 1968 Krisen an Österreichs Grenzen , Reiner Eger concluded that on the basis of the sources available at the time it was impossible to say with certainty whether on 21 August the Soviet ambassador had already given Chancellor Klaus “an assurance… that no Soviet moves of any kind would be taken against Austria,” but he inferred quite correctly that this must have been the case. See Reiner Eger, Krisen an Österreichs Grenzen: Das Verhalten Österreichs während des Ungarnaufstandes 1956 und der tschechoslowakischen Krise 1968. Ein Vergleich (Vienna: Herold Verlag, 1981), 90–91.

7. ÖStA, BMfaA, Ktn. 1350, 124.434-6 (Pol.) 68.

8. ÖStA, BMfaA, Ktn. 1350, 124.434-6 (Pol.) 68.

9. ÖStA, BMfaA, Ktn. 1350, 124.434-6 (Pol.) 68; From the official log of the ambassador of the USSR in Austria, B. F. Podtserob, 21 August 1968, AVP RF, F. 66, op. 47, p. 100, d. 6, pp. 163–64. The transcript was made on 25 August 1968 and dispatched to Moscow by the Soviet embassy on 31 August 1968.

10. From the official log of the ambassador of the USSR in Austria, B. F. Podtserob, 21 August 1968, AVP RF, F. 66, op. 47, p. 100, d. 6, pp. 163–64. In the afternoon of the previous day, the first demonstrations outside the Soviet embassy occurred, which had resulted in two Molotov cocktails being thrown against the door of the embassy. One man was arrested. Arbeiter-Zeitung , 22 August 1968, p. 1 and 4.

11. Minutes no. 91a of the extraordinary session of the Austrian Council of Ministers, 21 August 1968 (1:25 p.m.). ÖStA, BMfaA, Ktn. 1347, 129.266-6 (Pol.) 68.

12. ÖStA, BMfaA, Ktn. 1347, 129.266-6 (Pol.) 68, official communiqué on the session of the Council of Ministers, 21 August 1968. Owing to the visit of the Soviet ambassador, the beginning of the session of the Council of Ministers was delayed until 1:30 p.m. Arbeiter-Zeitung , 22 August 1968, p. 1.

13. Andreas Steiger, “‘zum Schutz der Grenze bestimmt’? Das Bundesheer und die CSSR/Krise 1968,” ÖMZ 5 (1998): 540–41.

14. From the official log of the ambassador of the USSR in Austria, B. F. Podtserob, 21 August 1968, AVP RF, F. 66, op. 47, p. 100, d. 6, pp. 165–66. The transcript was made on 29 August 1968 and dispatched to Moscow by the Soviet embassy on 31 August 1968. Waldheim had not lodged a formal protest, as Eger claims. Cf. Eger, Krisen an Österreichs Grenzen , 91.

15. For details, see the article by Horst Pleiner and Hubert Speckner, “Das österreichische Bundesheer und die ČSSR-Krise,” in Karner et al., Beiträge , 1007–23; the Federal Army was prepared for an emergency and ready for deployment at 8:00 a.m. The marching order was not given until 4:00 p.m. See Eger, Krisen an Österreichs Grenzen , 108–9.

16. From the official log of the ambassador of the USSR in Austria, B. F. Podtserob, 21 August 1968, AVP RF, F. 66, op. 47, p. 100, d. 6, pp. 165–66.

17. From the official log of the ambassador of the USSR in Austria, B. F. Podtserob, 21 August 1968, AVP RF, F. 66, op. 47, p. 100, d. 6, pp. 165–66.

18. Cable of the Czechoslovak ambassador in Austria, P. Novotný, on the reaction of the Austrian government to Czechoslovakia’s invasion by Warsaw Pact troops, Tlg. došlé, 7764/1968, Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Prague (hereafter abbreviated as A MZV), reprinted in Karner et al., Dokumente , #174.

19. Text of the statement made by Chancellor J. Klaus on Austrian television (ORF) on 21 August 1968 (evening news), ÖStA, BMfaA, Ktn. 1347, 129.266-6 (Pol.) 68.

20. See Eger, Krisen an Österreichs Grenzen , 194–96.

21. The words “serious setback” ( schweren Rückschlag ) were added by hand, with the word “serious” being crossed out again.

22. The word “fortunately” was added by hand.

23. File memo and circular note on Waldheim’s communiqué to APA, ÖStA, BMfaA, Ktn. 1350, 124.435-6 (Pol.) 68; Text of the APA report, 22 August 1968, ÖStA, BMfaA, Ktn. 1347, 129.266-6 (Pol.) 68.

24. Ibid.

25. Stenographic transcript of a meeting of the Communist and Workers’ Parties of Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland, and the USSR in Moscow, 18 August 1968, reprinted in Karner et al., Dokumente , #87. For details, see Silke Stern, “Die tschechoslowakische Emigration: Österreich als Erstaufnahme-und Asylland,” in Karner et al., Beiträge , 1025–42.

26. Stern, “Die tschechslowakische Emigration,” in Karner et al., Beiträge , 1025–42.

27. For details, see the Jakovina chapter in this volume.

28. Report of the head of the Central British Fund for Jewish Relief and Rehabilitation, 10 September 1968, UNHCR Archives, Geneva, 1.AUS.CZE/4, reprinted in Karner et al., Dokumente , #184; Report of the regional office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees to Geneva, 9 September 1968, UNHCR Archives, Geneva, 1.AUS.CZE/2, reprinted in Karner et al., Dokumente , #183.

29. From the official log of the ambassador of the USSR in Austria, B. F. Podtserob, 23 August 1968, AVP RF, F. 66, op. 47, p. 100, d. 6, pp. 167–68. The transcript was made on 30 August 1968 and dispatched to Moscow by the Soviet embassy on 31 August 1968.

30. From the official log of the ambassador of the USSR in Austria, B. F. Podtserob, 23 August 1968, AVP RF, F. 66, op. 47, p. 100, d. 6, pp. 167–68; ÖStA, BMfaA, Ktn. 1350, 124.545 (Pol. 6) 68.

31. From the official log of the ambassador of the USSR in Austria, B. F. Podtserob, 23 August 1968, AVP RF, F. 66, op. 47, p. 100, d. 6, pp. 167–68.

32. The following words presumably led to irritation on the Soviet side: “In view of its strictly observed policy of neutrality the Federal Government can only express its disappointment that the events of the last 48 hours should call such a policy in doubt.” From the official log of the ambassador of the USSR in Austria, B. F. Podtserob, 23 August 1968, AVP RF, F. 66, op. 47, p. 100, d. 6, 167–68; Chancellor J. Klaus’s statement in the ORF evening news, 22 August 1968, ÖStA, BMfaA,., Ktn. 1347, 129.266 (Pol. 6) 68.

33. From the official log of the ambassador of the USSR in Austria, B. F. Podtserob, 23 August 1968; AVP RF, F. 66, op. 47, p. 100, d. 6, pp. 167–68. Kirchschläger had been recalled to Vienna from Yugoslavia, where he was on holiday, and was subsequently dispatched to Prague. See Klaus Eisterer, “The Austrian Legation in Prague and the Czechoslovak Crisis of 1968,” in Neutrality in Austria , vol. 9, Contemporary Austrian Studies , ed. Günter Bischof et al. (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2001), 225.

34. From the official log of the ambassador of the USSR in Austria, B. F. Podtserob, 23 August 1968. The transcript was made on 30 August 1968 and dispatched to Moscow by the Soviet embassy on 31 August 1968, AVP RF, F. 66, op. 47, p. 100, d. 6, p. 171.