Günter Bischof - The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968

At 7 a.m. on 21 August 1968, a few hours after the troops of the “Warsaw Five” had invaded Czechoslovakia, Josef Klaus, Austria’s federal chancellor at the head of an ÖVP single-party government since 1966, issued a communiqué on the tragic events that were unfolding in the country with which Austria shares a border in the north and northeast. Klaus lost no time; in the very first sentence, he underlined Austria’s commitment to a policy of neutrality and independence, which rightly served as the basis of “the trust in Austria of all the four signatories of the State Treaty as well as… of the trust of its neighbors.” 2The chancellor went on to say that the country was “far from indifferent to the fate of other nations and peoples.” These words were attuned almost perfectly to the occasion. On one hand, Klaus had to bear in mind, in the interest of his country, that sending a wrong signal or striking—in Moscow’s ears—a wrong note might cause the crisis to leap over Austria’s border; on the other, his words were an unambiguous token of empathy with the Czechoslovak people, even though they stopped short of condemning the invasion as such.

A few hours later, at 12:30 p.m., the Soviet ambassador in Vienna, Boris F. Podtserob, 3called on the chancellor in his capacity of representative of the Soviet government in Austria to explain the reasons for the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Pact troops. 4The ambassador stated that the turn events had recently taken in Czechoslovakia had impinged on “vital interests of the Soviet Union” and “the threat to the construction of the Czechoslovak state jeopardized at the same time the principles of European peace and international security.” Using the Kremlin’s official diction, the ambassador interpreted the invasion as no more than the Soviet reaction to the calls for help that had come from Czechoslovak comrades loyal to Moscow. 5Podtserob ended his remarks to the Austrian chancellor with the assurance that the invasion of Czechoslovakia was not going to reflect adversely on Soviet-Austrian relations. Podtserob said:

We want the Chancellor to be quite clear about what is happening. Our actions are not directed against any state and do not violate any state interests. They are dictated solely by the desire to safeguard peace in the face of a dangerous rise in tensions that left the Socialist countries with no alternative. We take it for granted that these events will not in any way damage Soviet-Austrian relations, whose cultivation continues to be of great importance to the Soviet government. 6

The Austrian federal chancellor responded to this by saying that “Austria was committed to unambiguously abiding by its policy of neutrality, as it had been in the past; however, Austrians were not indifferent to the fate of their neighbors.” 7Klaus went on to say:

On the basis of reports by the Federal Chancellor and the Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Federal Government has formulated a declaration in an extraordinary session of the Council of Ministers that it will strictly observe the commitment to neutrality it entered into of its own accord in 1955. In the same manner the Austrian government will observe its obligations in the area of asylum law, as it has always done. 8

Klaus also pointed out that Austria “had no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of other sovereign nations, for the simple reason that we ourselves would have to reject most categorically any such attempt, should it be forthcoming. As a small neutral country, Austria is particularly sensitive in matters concerning sovereignty and non-interference.” 9Klaus asked Podtserob to make sure Austrian tourists were free to leave Czechoslovakia as they saw fit and also brought the border violations by Soviet aircraft to the ambassador’s attention without, however, protesting them. Podtserob entered the following note in his official log:

During last night and this morning there were several incidents in which Soviet aircraft and helicopters violated Austrian airspace in a minor way. The Chancellor suggested that there were technical reasons for these incidents and he was trying to prevent these violations from being made public. He was, however, quick to modify this statement by adding that this was rather difficult to do, given the constraints imposed by democracy. He urged the Soviet Military Command to make sure such violations did not occur again.

The Soviet ambassador assured Klaus that “his statement” would duly be passed on to the Soviet government and expressed his regret at the violation of Austria’s airspace by Soviet forces. He added “that these incidents had not been intentional.” At the end of the fifteen-minute conversation, the Soviet ambassador asked the head of the Austrian government to discourage potentially violent demonstrations outside the offices of Soviet diplomats, which Klaus agreed to do. 10

Shortly afterwards, the Council of Ministers was convened for another extraordinary session at the Chancellery, 11in which Klaus informed the members of his government about his meeting with the Soviet ambassador. 12This meant that within hours after the invasion it was clear that the events in Czechoslovakia were not going to affect Austria directly. The Kremlin was not going to call the country’s neutrality into question; there was no immediate danger. During the day, several more violations of Austria’s airspace occurred; over the following days, the incursions began increasingly to look like reconnaissance flights. 13On the evening of 21 August, Minister for Foreign Affairs Kurt Waldheim asked the Soviet ambassador to call on him. He, too, pointed out the violations of Austrian airspace but, like Klaus before him, did not enter a formal protest. Speaking in the name of Austria’s federal government, Waldheim expressed “his concern” at the incidents and requested that “the Soviet side undertake all measures to prevent future violations of Austria’s borders.” If there were no end to the incursions, which Waldheim also presumed to be due to “technical reasons,” the Austrian government would be forced to lodge a formal protest. 14Ambassador Podtserob assured Waldheim that planning did not include further incursions. Waldheim for his part informed Moscow’s representative “that according to a decision taken by the Austrian government today” there would be “a troop redeployment with a view to strengthening the garrisons north of the Danube.” 15Waldheim was astonishingly frank in explaining the rationale behind this decision: “This redeployment of troops did not mean that troops were amassed near the border; the sole objective was to reassure the population.” Podtserob took note of Waldheim’s statement and assured him that Moscow would be duly informed. 16

Waldheim also cautiously signaled to the Soviet ambassador the Austrian government’s lack of information on the actual position of the Czech government because contradictory statements were emerging from Prague. Podtserob pointed out that official statements were often made by people who were not authorized to do so. 17In the evening, the Czechoslovak ambassador, Pavel Novotný, called on Waldheim and informed the Austrian minister for foreign affairs of the positions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and of the Presidium of the National Assembly. Novotný subsequently reported to Prague that “the Austrian population” had expressed “concern and sympathy for us in general terms.” 18

In an Austrian Television (ORF) evening news bulletin, Federal Chancellor Klaus stated once again that “the State Treaty and the Neutrality Law… are the unalterable foundations on which our state rests” and that “we… will not meddle in the internal affairs of other states.” 19This was the end to an eventful day that had had a hectic beginning for the Austrian federal government. It was the holiday season, and the federal chancellor had been staying at his house in Wolfpassing, which was not even connected to the telephone network. The armed forces, meanwhile, followed a coordinated contingency plan that had already been worked out on 23 July together with the Ministry for the Interior and were ready for deployment within hours; the first meeting at the Chancellery did not start until 7:45. 20