Günter Bischof - The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968

69. AJ, 507, III/134, records of the XI joint meeting of the presidencies of the Executive Committee and the presidency of the CK SKJ, 21 August 1968 (Brioni, 8 p.m.).

70. Simić, Tito, svetac i magle , 212.

71. AJ, 507, III/135, conversation of the president of the republic with the U.S. ambassador to Yugoslavia, B. Elbrick, 23 August 1968.

72. AJ, 507, III/135, Conversation of the president of the republic with the U.S. ambassador to Yugoslavia, B. Elbrick, 23 August 1968.

73. AJ, 507, III/135, minutes of the talk of the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs M. Nikezić with U.S. ambassador to Yugoslavia B. Elbrick in Belgrade, 30 August 1968. U.S. secretary of defense Clark M. Clifford explained: “[T]he best policy is to permit the Soviets and the Czechs to adjust their differences. We have a number of items going with the Soviet Union and it would be an exceedingly unfortunate time to get involved.” NARA, secretary of defense staff meeting, 15 July 1968.

74. Pirjevec, Jugoslavija , 276; AJ, 507, III/134, Romanian position; excerpts from the conversation of Ambassador Petrić with the member of the Executive Committee and the secretary of the CK KPR, in Bucharest, 30 August 1968.

75. Tripalo, Hrvatsko proljecé , 123; Stephen Clissold, ed., Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, 1939–1973: A Documentary Survey (London: Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1975), 81; Pirjevec, Jugoslavija , 276.

76. Russian State Archives for Contemporary History, Moscow (hereafter RGANI) F. 5, op. 60, d. 271, 4 September 1968. (Report from the embassy of the People’s Republic of Hungary on the meeting between Tito and Ceaus¸escu on 24 August 1968). Hungarians got the report from Romanian sources, while the Soviets were informed through the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

77. RGANI, F. 5, op. 60, d. 271, 4 September 1968.

78. KPR, I-2, 63/J:1107–12, Br.kutije 82, excerpts from the conversation with the Polish chargé Stičinski, Prague, 29 August 1968.

79. Simić, Tito, svetac i magle , 212–13; Vuković, Od deformacija SDB do maspoka i liberalizma , 222–23. For example, Ambassador Dobriovje Vidić was stopped by the Soviet police on his way to Kaluga on 17 August 1968. He was kept for forty minutes without explanation and then ordered to return to Moscow. Yugoslav journalists in Moscow were asked to stop reporting on 23 August. KPR, I-2, 63/J:1107–12, Br.kutije 82, conversation between Babić and Benediktov, 24 August 1968.

80. KPR, I-2, 63/J:1107–12, Br.kutije 82, bulletin on the developments in the ČSSR, br.1, 24 August 1968.

81. PRO, PREM 2638 (Foreign Policy), 5 September 1968.

82. PRO, PREM 2638 (Foreign Policy), 31 August 1968.

83. PRO, FCO 46/262, “Chiefs of Staff Committee, Defense Policy Staff, Allied Reactions to Possible Soviet Moves in Eastern Europe,” 27 August 1968.

84. PRO, FCO 28/560, “Yugoslavia: Defense: Security against External Aggression,” 15 October 1968.

85. PRO, FCO 28/559, Downing Street 10, 6 September 1968 and PREM 2638 (Foreign Policy), 5 October 1968.

86. PRO, FCO 28/559, 5 October 1968.

87. PRO, FCO, 28/559, 23 September 1968

88. PRO, FCO 28/560, “Yugoslavia: Defense: Security against External Aggression,” 15 October 1968.

89. PRO, FCO 49/240, “Permanent Undersecretary’s Planning Committee: Long-term Prospects for East-West Relations after the Czechoslovak Crisis.”

90. PRO, FCO 49/240, “Permanent Undersecretary’s Planning Committee.” “In the light of all the trends of the last eighteen months or so it seems clear that the main objective of the Soviet leaders will be the maintenance of their own model for Communism in the Soviet Union itself and in Eastern Europe. They will prefer to do so without embroiling themselves in a major quarrel with the West.”

91. Charles Gati, Failed Illusions: Moscow, Washington, Budapest, and the 1956 Hungarian Revolt (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center/Stanford University Press, 2006), 70. Although there were some similarities between Yugoslavia and Albania, Tirana represents another, and different, Stalinist aberration.

92. Schwartz, Lyndon Johnson and Europe , 214.

93. Gati, Failed Illusions , 6. That line was especially visible vis-à-vis Hungary in 1956.

94. Schwartz, Lyndon Johnson and Europe , 215. As written in Jaromir Navratil et al., The Prague Spring, 1968 (Budapest: CEU, 1998). For different view, see, for example, Andrew and Mitrokhin, Mitrokhin Archive , 322–41.

95. Paulin Kola, The Search for Greater Albania (London: Hurst, 2003), 128–32.

96. PRO, FCO, “Yugoslav/Albanian Relations” (UK Ambassador Julian Bullard i Jakša Petrić, assistant state secretary at the Foreign Ministry), 27 January 1971; AJ 507, III/136, stenographic notes of the XIII joint meeting of the presidencies of the Executive Committee and the presidency of the CK SKJ, 14 November 1968.

97. PRO, FCO 28/2122, “Yugoslav/Albanian Relations,” 21 May 1971; Crampton, The Balkans , 162–63.

98. Vuković, Od deformacija SDB do maspoka i liberalizma , 546.

99. Rendulić, General Avnojske Jugoslavije , 283, 288–89; Vuković, Od deformacija SDB do maspoka i liberalizma , 526, 542.

100. AJ, 507, III/135, initiative of Ethiopia for an extraordinary conference on the ČSSR, 28 August 1968.

101. AJ, 507, III/135, “Position of the Government of United Arab Republic—Excerpts of Our Chargé in Cairo with the Undersecretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” UAR, 28 August 1968.

102. RGANI, F. 3, op. 72, d. 215, pp. 50–52, Politburo decision of the CC CPSUP 106 (48), “To all Soviet ambassadors, to the Soviet representative in Wellington, to all representatives of the USSR at international organizations,” 23 October 1968, reprinted in Karner et al., Dokumente , #171.

103. KPR I-2; 54/j:1050–55; Br. kutije 73, note on the meeting of the leaders of the KP and heads of states or governments of the socialist countries held in Moscow on 9–10 June 1967, 91. Mandić, Tito u dijalogu sa svijetom , 293–444; Vjekoslav Cvrlje, Vatikanska diplomacija: Pokoncilski Vatikan u međunarodnom odnosima (Zagreb: Školska knjiga/Kršćanska sadašnjost, 1992), 116–26.

104. Mandić, Tito u dijalogu sa svijetom , 293–444; Vjekoslav Cvrlje, Vatikanska diplomacija: Pokoncilski Vatikan u međunarodnom odnosima (Zagreb: Školska knjiga/Kršćanska sadašnjost, 1992), 116–26.

105. Mandić, Tito u dijalogu sa svijetom , 173.

106. AJ 507, III/135, authorized stenographic notes from the XII joint meeting of the presidencies of the Executive Committee and the presidency of the CK SKJ, 2 September 1968.

107. The change in the defense doctrine turned out to be essential for the break up of Yugoslavia two decades later. However, similar ideas with the armed people were adopted in Albania and Romania at the same time. Crampton, The Balkans , 162. Mark Kramer, in his paper “The Soviet-Romanian Split and the Crisis with Czechoslovakia: Context, Reverberations and Fallout,” presented at the conference in Dobiacco, Italy (26–28 September 2002), talked of the doctrine of “Total People’s War for the Defense of the Homeland.”

108. CIA intelligence report, 20 November 1970. Dabčević-Kučar, ’ 71-hrvatski snovi i stvarnost , 600.

109. See Dabčević-Kučar, ’ 71-hrvatski snovi i stvarnost .

The situation with which Austria found itself confronted in 1968 recalled in an uncanny way the one that had prevailed after the crushing of the Hungarian uprising. Even though the Soviet Union had respected Austria’s neutral status in 1956, fears arose again in 1968 that the invasion of the Warsaw Pact troops might not be limited to Czechoslovakia and could spill over to Yugoslavia and Romania, with collateral damage being inflicted on Austria. It became obvious again how close Austria was to the fault lines created by the Cold War. The military invasion of Czechoslovakia took place against a political and economic backdrop that was characterized in Austria by the country’s increasingly successful efforts to intensify its economic contacts with Comecon countries. These efforts were due in part to the way Austria’s negotiations for membership in the European Economic Community (EEC) developed or rather failed to develop: Rome blocked any progress because of the persistent South Tyrolean problem. Central and Eastern Europe played an increasingly important role in the economic policy of the Austrian federal government. On 1 June 1968, Austria became the first Western country to clinch a long-term deal with the Soviet Union regarding gas supplies; a pipeline via Bratislava was scheduled to come online on 1 September 1968 and to pump natural gas to Austria and the West across the Iron Curtain, which had shown its first signs of being lifted during the “Prague Spring.” The invasion of the Warsaw Pact troops put the policies of détente and rapprochement to the test and awakened in Austria memories of the country’s Soviet occupation (1945–1955). 1At the same time, Austria had to fulfill its self-imposed duties of playing host to Czechoslovak refugees and informing the world via its media about the events in the neighboring country. This was the backdrop for Austria’s policies in 1968.