Brian Williams - Predators

This last point was challenged on September 3, 2008, when the United States shocked Pakistan by launching a helicopter-borne special operations raid on the village of Musa Nika in the Angoor Ada region of South Waziristan. The village of Musa Nika was a well-known cross-border sanctuary for Taliban insurgents who infiltrated into Afghanistan and attacked U.S. and Coalition troops. 45

According to the New York Times , just prior to the September 3 night raid, U.S. and Afghan troops had pursued a group of Taliban fighters that had attacked them in Afghanistan. The enemy escaped by retreating across the border to the village of Musa Nika. 46There they were safe in their sanctuary—until 3:00 a.m. on September 3. At that time three to five Black Hawk helicopters roared over the village and began to disgorge U.S. Navy SEALs into the target. In the ensuing mayhem, between nine and twenty people were killed, including women and children. The troops in the helicopters killed or captured several suspected Taliban militants and then disappeared into the night. The attack lasted no more than an hour.

The following day U.S. officials sounded upbeat and hinted that the raid might be a sign of things to come. 47One U.S. military officer said, “You can’t allow a haven. You have to get the areas that they rest, relax and train.” 48A senior U.S. official commented, “The situation in the tribal areas is not tolerable. We have to be more assertive. Orders have been issued.” It later emerged that President George Bush himself had approved the orders calling for a new policy of conducting raids in Pakistan without notifying the Pakistanis. 49

As word spread in Pakistan that Pakistani women and children had been killed by U.S. troops on Pakistani soil, there were howls of outrage from Pakistani leaders across the board. One senior Pakistani official called the night raid a “cowboy action” and criticized it for not targeting anyone “big.” 50The Pakistani Foreign Ministry condemned the attack, calling it “unacceptable” and “a grave provocation… which has resulted in immense loss of civilian life.” 51The following day the Pakistani parliament passed a resolution condemning the raid, and the foreign minister told the National Assembly, “There is no high-value target or known terrorist among the dead…. Only innocent civilians, including women and children, have been targeted.” 52U.S. Ambassador Anne Patterson was also summoned to hear a “very strong protest” at the Foreign Ministry.

The Pakistani military raised the biggest objection. Using bellicose terms more suited for an enemy than an ally, the new head of Pakistan’s army, Gen. Pervez Kayani, said that Pakistan’s territorial integrity would be “defended at all cost” and that “reckless actions only help the militants and further fuel the militancy in the area.” 53Lest there be any ambiguity, Kayani added, “There is no question of any agreement or understanding with the coalition forces whereby they are allowed to conduct operations on our side of the border…. No external force is allowed to conduct operations inside Pakistan.” 54

Although the Pakistanis were willing to countenance the occasional civilian death or attacks on militants if they were administered by unmanned drones, U.S. troops landing on Pakistani territory was essentially construed as an act of war. Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) had grand dreams of commencing a “hot pursuit” targeting campaign against Taliban insurgents operating from safe havens in Pakistan, but clearly the hunt would have to be left to the unmanned drones if the Pakistanis were to be placated.

In fact a drone strike was launched the following day, September 4. The strike was again in North Waziristan, this time hitting a house whose owner was “known to host foreigners,” according to locals who spoke to the Agence France-Presse (AFP) news service. 55Four people were killed in that strike on territory said to be under the control of Jalaludin Haqqani. None of the slain were reported to be civilians.

A drone launched another attack one day later on a village near the Afghan border of North Waziristan known as Al Must. One report claimed that six to twelve people were killed in the strike, including “men of Arab descent,” two women, and three children. According to a local source, “Three missiles hit the two compounds, which he said belong to two residents of Al Must, Hakeem Khan and Arsala Khan. It is common for families in these areas to rent part of their compound to foreigners, especially Arabs who are involved in planning attacks against NATO forces in Afghanistan, residents said.” 56Once again the rule seemed to be that Arabs were lightning rods for drone strikes and those who rented rooms to them or were related to them ran the real risk of being killed by a Predator or Reaper.

The next strike, on September 8, 2008, was against the aforementioned Afghan Taliban leader Jalaludin Haqqani, whose terrorist insurgents had killed more than fifty people in a suicide attack on the Indian embassy in Kabul just two months earlier. The drone strike targeted a madrassa in the North Waziristan town of Dande Darpakhel, which was the Haqqani Network’s Pakistani headquarters. Although the strike aimed to kill Jalaludin Haqqani, or his son Sirajuddin, who was gradually taking control of operations from his aging father, it missed both men. Instead twenty-three people, including one of Jalaludin’s two wives, his sister, his sister-in-law, and eight of his grandchildren, were killed. 57Four al Qaeda operatives were also said to have been killed in the attack. 58A large number of civilians were killed in this attack, which raises the question, Why would Haqqani house al Qaeda Arabs who could attract drone attacks near his wife and grandchildren? Also, did the CIA know there were civilians present at the time and decide to carry out the attack with the aim of killing the notorious Haqqani, despite the risk of civilian casualties?

Another strike took place in a suburb of Miranshah just four days later on September 12, 2008. 59One source reported twelve “rebel fighters” killed in the strike, whereas another source claimed “seven Taliban” were killed. 60Reports from the strike on two buildings said that once again it appeared that civilians had been killed as well. 61

Five days later a drone strike killed Abu Ubaydah al Tunisi, a Tunisian al Qaeda leader, and between four and six other men in the Bangar Cheena region of South Waziristan. There were no reports of civilian deaths on this occasion, and Dawn claimed that the Tunisian leader and his men were “delivering rockets to a militant camp near the Afghan border.” 62This appeared to be a clean strike on a person who could be described as an enemy combatant.

That same day, September 17, 2008, the Pakistani news site Geo.TV reported, “The Pentagon has claimed that U.S. led coalition forces carried out another drone strike on an ammunition storage facility of Taliban, in which one al-Qaeda member and 3 Taliban militants were killed. The U.S. authorities said they shared the news with Pakistani officials after conducting the strike.” 63This intriguing Pentagon statement can be interpreted in several ways. One interpretation is that the Pentagon (and not the CIA) chose to inform the Pakistanis of a military drone strike on Taliban and al Qaeda that occurred inside Afghanistan. This alternative seems strange, however, for the U.S. military had no reason to share with Islamabad an after-action report on a rather limited drone engagement in a neighboring country. The Pentagon report of a drone strike is also strange in that the military is primarily allowed to operate in recognized combat zones, but not in civilian areas in a country where the United States is not officially at war. The other interpretation is that the U.S. military launched a cross-border drone strike on an undisclosed location in Pakistan in what can best be described as a force protection role and then informed the Pakistanis. This scenario in which the U.S. military attacked an ammunition dump in Pakistan seems more plausible as the CIA had, and still has, a policy of not officially discussing its individual drone strikes.