Tony Le Tissier - Slaughter at Halbe

The usual order of march was armoured vehicles with combat-ready and willing soldiers in the lead, followed by various vehicles carrying wounded, but many reports also say that staff officers with their luggage were near the front. Last of all came the once vast but now rapidly declining number of stragglers and civilians. [9] Lakowski/Stich, Der Kessel von Halbe 1945 , p. 122.

Several Soviet attacks of divisional size then caused the German groups to split into two pockets; the first contained those still trapped east of Halbe, and a second, large one was in the Staakow Forest between Zesch, Dornswalde and Radeland. Contact had been lost with V SS Mountain Corps’ rearguard, which was fighting desperately to break out of the reinforced Soviet cordon and in so doing not only inflicted heavy casualties on the Soviets but also served to distract attention from the remainder of the escaping 9th Army. Although the rearguard units managed to break out of the Halbe position, they were unable to break through the Soviet cordon and remained under a hail of shell and mortar fire. [10] Ibid ., pp. 123–4.

Late in the afternoon the main group reached the Wünsdorf–Baruth road (Reichsstrasse 96) and railway, coming up against another Russian anti-tank barrier on the same line on which Battlegroups Pipkorn and von Luck had foundered three days previously. SS-Major Hartrampf, who knew the area well from his time at the Wünsdorf Tank School, gave SS-Lieutenant Ulan and his platoon of Tigers precise instructions to block the road from the north at a certain point until 1800 hours.

The troops moved off again across the railway and parallel road, but were fired on from their right flank, where they should have been protected by Ulan’s tanks. What they discovered next day, when Ulan rejoined them, was that he had taken up position at the designated point but had then been ordered further north by a colonel, who had appeared out of nowhere and then threatened him with a court martial when he objected, another Seydlitz ploy.

The main break-out group had closed up to the road and railway, where Russian tanks and anti-tank guns now dominated the crossing point from both north and south. SS-Major Hartrampf, who had meanwhile lost his APC, again took over and organized an assault. Some Tigers were deployed to tackle the opposition coming from the flanks, while others plunged across and took cover in the woods beyond before going on to form a bridgehead around the Wunder forest warden’s lodge. Hartrampf got his unit across intact but other units were broken up in their attempts, the survivors crossing individually or in small groups. [11] Tieke, Das Ende zwischen Oder und Elbe , p. 324.

Rudi Lindner continued his account:

On the afternoon of 29 April we drew near to a Russian cordon with strong defensive positions on the line of the railway and road between Zossen and Baruth.

Our little combat team worked its way forward with other soldiers under cover of the woods to the edge, where happily the equivalent of the strength of a battalion of infantry gradually accumulated. Our spearhead had been brought to a halt by tank and anti-tank gun fire from the flanks. As our tanks spread out right and left along the edge of the woods and engaged the enemy tanks and anti-tank guns with their guns, we attacked on a broad front. We crossed the railway line and road in bounds and forced our way to the other side under cover of the concentrated fire from our rifles, Panzerfausts and hand grenades into the woods opposite. Once we had broken through and overcome the cordon, we thrust through with our tanks to the forest warden’s lodge at Wunder. [12] Lindner in the author’s Death Was Our Companion .

Helmut Jurisch, a radio operator in the Kurmark Panzergrenadier Division’s Brandenburg Panzer Regiment, also reported his experience here:

Of the 14 Panthers surrounded in the Halbe pocket, only nine survived 28 April, including the one in which I served as radio operator. With three other Panthers we crossed the autobahn unscathed in the night, guided by our guardian angel, and that morning reached the railway running alongside Reichsstrasse 96 between Wünsdorf and Baruth. While we were crossing the railway embankment there was an explosion inside the tank and stabbing flames and spraying sparks forced us to bail out. As the Panther rolled back down again it burst into flames; we picked ourselves up, slightly singed. The other Panthers were engaging the anti-tank barrier that had knocked us out. A trick of fate had spared our lives, for, as the tank climbed the embankment, the shell aimed centrally at the front of the tank had passed underneath and exploded against the gearbox located between the driver’s and radio operator’s seats. [13] Helmut Jurisch in correspondence with the author.

SS-Lieutenant Bärmann also fought here:

We were still stuck on the Zossen–Baruth road. The situation was obscure. Some infantry overtook us and we drove on to the south after the infantry. After a few hundred metres we realised that we had fallen into a trap set up by the Seydlitz people. We were met by a belt of anti-tank guns, several T-34s and trees full of snipers, so we drove back to the start point. [14] Tieke, Das Ende zwischen Oder und Elbe , p. 325.

SS-Grenadier Muhs had a similar experience:

An army officer took over command and tried to establish some sort of order in our mob. We followed him, thinking that it would soon be over, home, no more bloodshed. Then I saw some badly camouflaged Russian trucks and tanks in the background, and I realised what the game was. We were in a trap set by Seydlitz-Troops . During a general palaver, I and a few others disappeared into the undergrowth. One has to be prepared for anything! [15] Ibid .

The lead tanks reached the Wunder forest warden’s lodge and SS-Lieutenant Klust reported:

We drove up to the Wunder forest warden’s lodge. A few shells from my Tiger at some T-34s ensured that the Russians left. German soldiers approached from all directions and a heated discussion started. [16] Ibid .

SS-Lieutenant Bärmann continued:

About eighty men and seven SPGs of my battalion reached the Wunder forest warden’s lodge. SS-Lieutenant Hörl took over the command. SS-Second Lieutenant Stachon appeared with his APC, which was filled with our wounded, who were being tended to by SS-Sergeant-Majors Everding and Wahl. I went with Hörl as his gunner. Our radios were all unserviceable, so we had no long-range communication. We set off again at about 1930 hours. Shortly before dark there was an attack by Russian bombers, which fortunately failed to hit us. [17] Ibid ., p. 326.

SS-Grenadier Tag also reached the rendezvous:

Another big group assembled at the Wunder forest warden’s lodge, including Waffen-SS Tigers, members of the Luftwaffe, elements of the Panzergrenadier Division Kurmark with the remains of Second Lieutenant Dahlinger’s 11th Company. During the conference an unidentified colonel appeared and broke into the conversation, imploring those standing around to follow him as he knew a safe way out. And the talking continued. Then came the word Seydlitzmann and some catch questions were asked. There were some shots and the colonel collapsed. Similar incidents occurred elsewhere, where an NCO and a sergeant were identified as Seydlitz people and shot. We now paid more attention to the uniform; good, clean uniforms were a clue to Seydlitz people. [18] Ibid ., p. 325.

SS-Lieutenant Klust was still with the leaders in his Tiger: