Bruce Mesquita - The Logic of Political Survival

Thucydides

Tilak, Bal Gangadhar

Time

hazard rate and

institution change and

term limits and

Tocqueville, Alexis de

Torture

Totalitarians

Transition

equilibrium and

payoffs and

Transparency

Transparency International

Treaties

Paris Peace Treaty

Treaty of Utrecht

Treaty of Versailles

Tsendenbal, Yumjaagiyn

Ulema

Umayyad dynasty

United Nations

United States

Afghanistan and

challengers and

Civil War and

Congressional Budget Office

Cuban Missile Crisis and

electoral system of

GDP and

Gulf War and

House of Representatives

immigration and

kleptocracy and

naturalization and

revolution and

Senate

stability and

State Department

wealth and

Universal suffrage

Utility function

Utrecht, Treaty of

Vatican

Versailles, Treaty of

Vichy France

Violence

coups d’état and

Khmer Rouge and

Leopold II and

massacres

moral law and

oppression and

private goods and

purges and

Saddam Hussein and

security and

Stalin and

torture

war and( see also War)

Voting

artificial scarcity and

civic-mindedness and

no confidence

reselection and

Sparta and

Tammany Hall and

War

aims of

autocratic/democratic peace and

Battle of Mansura

Churchill and

civil

civil liberties and

coalition size and( see also Coalition size)

colonial

compliance issues and

compromise agreements and

controversy over

Correlates of War Project and

cost of

democracy and

diversionary

domestic change and

dyadic selectorate model and ( see also Dyadic selectorate model)

effort levels and

empirical assessment of

equilibrium and

fighting value and

Franco and

guerilla

Hannibal and

Iran invasion and

leadership removal and

Leopold II and

loyalty norm and

Mansura and

militarized interstate disputes and

modeling of

moral law and

motivation and

Mussolini and

nation building and

negotiation and

normative accounts and

outcomes of

Paris Peace Treaty and

political payoffs of

postwar treaties and

private/public goods and

Punic

puppet leaders and

reselection and

residents and

settling crises by

Seven Weeks

Sparta and

Sun Tzu and

territorial revision and

victory probability and

Weinberger Doctrine and

winning the peace and

Ward, Michael D.

Washington, George

Wealth. See also Private goods; Public goods

antigovernment actions and

Arab system and

Cameroon and

democracy and

Greece and

guerilla war and

high-income democracies and

Hobbes Index and

kleptocracy and( see also Kleptocracy)

Romans and

Sparta and

Thailand and

Web sites

Fischer data and

oppression issues

Penn World Tables

Zarate’s Political Collection

Weibull model

Weinberger, Caspar

Weingast, Barry

Welfare. See also Public goods; Wealth

autocracy and

bailout money and

coups d’état and

education and

federalism and

GDP and

health care and

high-income democracies and

Hobbes Index and

Leopold II and

mortality rates

oppression and

security and

social security and

war and ( see also War)

Winning coalitions

affinity and

Arab system and

Belgium

bloc leaders and

China

choice of

civic-mindedness and

communism and

corruption and

defection and

defined

Delian League

democracy and

deposition rule and

disenfranchisement and

equilibrium and

Great Terror and

Hobbes Index and

institutional preferences and ( see also Institutional preferences)

Kenya and

King John and

kleptocracy and( see also Kleptocracy)

leisure and

Leopold II and

lineage and

loyalty norm and( see also Loyalty norm)

military juntas and

monarchies and

oppression and

payoff and( see also Payoffs)

protests and

reselection and

selectorate and( see also Selectorate)