Bruce Mesquita - The Logic of Political Survival

SAVAK

Schofield, Norman

Selectorate

affinity and

age and

Arab system and

birthplace and

challengers and

civic-mindedness and

civil liberties and

coalition size and( see also Coalition size)

corruption and

defined

deposition rule and

dictators and

disenfranchised and

dyadic model and( see also Dyadic selectorate model)

economic issues and

equilibrium and

game theory and

gender and

guerilla war and

incumbents and

institutional preferences and

kleptocracy and( see also Kleptocracy)

Leadership Hall of Fame and

leisure-and-labor decision and

limiting cases and

lineage and

loyalty norm and( see also Loyalty norm)

Markov perfect equilibrium and

military juntas and

military prowess and

monarchies and

oppression and

payoffs and ( see also Payoffs)

peace and( see also Peace)

policy and

population migration and

public goods and( see also Public goods)

residents and

risk and

robustness and

Romanovs and

Sparta and

special proficiency and

spending and

taxes and

tenure and

term limits and

time line for

universal suffrage and

war and( see also War)

winning coalition and( see also Winning coalitions)

Seow, Francis

Seven Weeks War

Shah of Iran

Sidi Barrani

Singapore

Skills

Slavery

Smith, AL

Snyder, Jack

Social security

Society. See also Welfare

affinity and

alternate approaches and

bailout money and

Catholicism and

civic-mindedness and

civil liberties and( see also Civil liberties)

coups d’état and

domestic change and

education and

guerilla war and

health care and

Hobbes Index and

human nature and

hunter-gatherer

Leopold II and

moral law and

mortality rates and

oppression and

protests and

public goods and

revolution and( see also Revolution)

selectorate model and( see also Selectorate)

social security and

theocracies and

war and( see also War)

Sokoloff, Kenneth

Somalia

South Africa

South Korea

Sovereignty. See also Leaders; Winning coalitions

affinity and

blocs and

challengers and

disenfranchisement and

private interests and

selectorate and

transition and

Soviet Union. See Russia

Spain

Sparta

heredity and

loyalty norm and

male population decline of

Peloponnesian War and

private goods and

syssition and

violence and

voting and

wealth and

Spending

budget constraint and

coalition size and

economic activity and

equilibrium and

institutional preferences and

kleptocracy and( see also Kleptocracy)

loyalty norm and

Markov perfect equilibrium and

resource allocation and

surplus and

tenure and

Sri Lanka

Stalin, Joseph

State variables

Stiglitz, Joseph

Sultan system

Suñer, Ramon Serrano

Sun Tzu

Support groups

Syria

syssition

Taiwan

Tamil Tigers

Tammany Hall

Tate. Neal

Taxes

budget constraint and

challengers and

civil liberties and

coalition size and

economic growth and

equations for

equilibrium and

incumbents and

institutions and

kleptocracy and ( see also Kleptocracy)

leisure/effort level and

payoffs and( see also Payoffs)

private goods and

resource redistribution and

transparency and

Taylor, Hannis

Tenure. See also Political survival

affinity and

coalition size and

competence and

defection and

economic issues and

empirical assessment of

hazard rate for

Leadership Hall of Fame and

mortality risk and

performance effects and

policy effects and

shape parameter and

spending and

survival curves for

term limits and

Term limits

China and

democracy and

Greeks and

Romans and

Territorial revision

Thailand

Thegns

Theocracies

Theory. See also Models

alternative approaches and

incompleteness of

institutional preferences and

Machiavelli on

oppression and

selectorate( see also Selectorate)