Bruce Mesquita - The Logic of Political Survival

Clans

Cleisthenes

Cleombrotos

Clinton, Bill

Coalition size. See also Winning coalitions

affinity and

antigovernment actions and

bailout money and

Cameroon and

competence and

coups d’état and

defection and

democracy and

deposition and

disenfranchised and

dyadic selectorate model and ( see also Dyadic selectorate model; Selectorate)

economic issues and

empirical assessment of

hazard rate for

Hobbes Index and

immigration and

institutional preferences and ( see also Institutional preferences)

leadership removal and

Mamluks and

migration and

negotiation and

oppression and

performance effects and

policy effects and

preservation of

private goods and

protest and

purges and

reselection and

revolution and

survival curves for

tenure and

Thailand and

war and ( see also War)

Weinberger Doctrine and

Colonial wars

Communism

black market and

China and

Great Terror and

Mussolini and

torture and

Comoro Islands

Competence

Compromise agreements

Confirmatio Cartarum

Congo

Congressional Budget Office

Congress Party

Construction projects

Coordination issues

Correlates of War Project

dispute outcomes and

militarized interstate issues and

Corruption. See Kleptocracy

Costa Rica

Count, Henry fitz

Coups d’état

Cox, Gary

Cramer’s rule

Cronyism

Cuba

Cultural Revolution

Cyprus

Czarism

Defection

coalition size and

institutional preferences and

Delian League

Democracy

authoritarianism and

bailout money and

civic-mindedness and

civil liberties and

coalition size and

competence and

compromise agreements and

distribution issues and

education and

effort levels and

electoral systems and

high-income

Hobbes Index and

institutional preferences and ( see also Institutional preferences)

kleptocracy and

loyalty norm and

mortality risk and

Nehru and

oppression and

peace and

private goods and( see also Private goods)

public goods and

revolutions and

rivalry and

selectorate peace and

stability and

tenure and

term limits and

Thailand and

war and( see also War)

winning coalition and

Democratic peace

criteria for

dyadic selectorate model and ( see also Dyadic selectorate model)

effort levels and

empirical assessment of

negotiations and

normative accounts and

selectorate peace and

Deposition

risk of

rule

Dexler, Anton

Dictators

Disenfranchised. See also Kleptocracy

antigovernment actions and

children and

consequences of

coups d’état and

guerilla war and

institutional preferences and

oppression and

passivity and

population migration and

protests and

purges and

size of

war and( see also War)

Distribution issues

Diversionary war

Dixon, William

Domestic challenges

Dominican Republic

Downs, Anthony

Due process

Dyadic selectorate model

autocratic/democratic peace and

colonial wars and

compromise agreements and

diversionary war and

effort levels and

empirical assessment of

equilibrium and

fighting value and

motivation and

negotiation and

normative accounts and

Punic Wars and

reselection and

structure of

Eadgar

Earls

Economic issues

activity level and

antigovernment actions and

artificial scarcity and

bailout money and

black market and

budget constraint and

Cameroon and

civic-mindedness and

coalition size and

deficit spending and

distortion of

education and

equilibrium and

financial crisis and

government expenditures and

growth and

guerilla war and

high-income democracies and

kleptocracy and( see also Kleptocracy)

Leopold II and

Markov perfect equilibrium and ( see also Equilibrium)

mercantilism and

migration and

Napoleon and

oppression and

payoffs and( see also Payoffs)

performance effects and

private goods and( see also Private goods)

public goods and( see also Public goods)