Алистер Смит - The Spoils of War - Greed, Power, and the Conflicts That Made Our Greatest Presidents

Very much in keeping with the ambition addressed in the Declaration of Independence to rid “our frontiers” of the British and the Indians, at the outset, the president and the War Hawks created an intentionally inaccurate rendering of the war’s true purpose in the hopes of creating bipartisan support. When that effort failed, then, like any group of self-interested politicians, they unabashedly followed policies designed both to satisfy their quest for territorial gains and to secure, through the war effort and war propaganda, electoral advantage at the expense of their Federalist opponents. The war failed in its expansionist purpose, but it was a great success for those whose partisan interests were tied to the War Hawk faction in Congress, including President Madison. The Federalists’ opposition to the declaration of war proved a short-lived boon followed by the collapse of their party and a realignment of American political competition along lines favored by the War Hawks.

To begin, what was the War of 1812 ostensibly about? We say “ostensibly” because the causes of the war have been much debated and seem to us only partially related to the causes offered up by the president and Congress at the time. On June 1, 1812, President Madison wrote to Congress, outlining the disagreements between the United States and Britain. Although he did not explicitly call for a declaration of war, the purpose of the letter quite clearly could have been none other. But then, the pressure on him to declare war was well established and already long argued in Congress before he sent his list of grievances. Those advocating war were, in fact, a faction within Madison’s own political party, sometimes known today as the Democrat-Republican Party but then known as Republican (albeit unrelated to the Republican Party of today that came into existence in 1854). This faction, called the War Hawks, was led by two freshman congressmen who would go on to remarkable careers: Henry Clay of Kentucky and John C. Calhoun of South Carolina.

The grievances Madison highlighted fell into four categories: that the British were violating the rights of American sailors; that the British were unlawfully, and solely for their own economic and political purposes, infringing the right to free trade; that the British, in a reprise of the Declaration of Independence’s complaint, were working with the Indian tribes on the northwestern frontier of the new nation to foment war against American settlers to the benefit of Indian and British traders; and finally, that the British lacked seriousness and good faith in dealing with US proposals for a peaceful settlement of their differences, thereby precluding diplomacy as a solution to the problems. It is useful to quote the most critical portions of Madison’s message to Congress, as we will draw a sharp distinction between the complaints he leveled as the ostensible cause of war and the reality behind the war and Congress’s interest in it:

British cruisers have been in the continued practice of violating the American flag on the great highway of nations, and of seizing and carrying off persons sailing under it, not in the exercise of a belligerent right founded on the law of nations against an enemy, but of a municipal prerogative over British subjects. . . .

The practice, hence, is so far from affecting British subjects alone that, under the pretext of searching for these, thousands of American citizens, under the safeguard of public law and of their national flag, have been torn from their country and from everything dear to them. . . .

British cruisers have been in the practice also of violating the rights and the peace of our coasts. They hover over and harass our entering and departing commerce.

It has become, indeed, sufficiently certain that the commerce of the United States is to be sacrificed, not as interfering with the belligerent rights of Great Britain; not as supplying the wants of her enemies, which she herself supplies; but as interfering with the monopoly which she covets for her own commerce and navigation. . . .

In reviewing the conduct of Great Britain toward the United States our attention is necessarily drawn to the warfare just renewed by the savages on one of our extensive frontiers, a warfare which is known to spare neither age nor sex and to be distinguished by features peculiarly shocking to humanity. It is difficult to account for the activity and combinations . . . among tribes in constant intercourse with British traders and garrisons without connecting their hostility with that influence and without recollecting the authenticated examples of such interpositions heretofore furnished by the officers and agents of that government. . . .

Our moderation and conciliation have had no other effect than to encourage perseverance and to enlarge pretensions. . . .

We behold, in fine, on the side of Great Britain, a state of war against the United States, and on the side of the United States a state of peace toward Great Britain.

Whether the United States shall continue passive under these progressive usurpations and these accumulating wrongs, or, opposing force to force in defense of their national rights . . . is a solemn question which the Constitution wisely confides to the legislative department of the government. In recommending it to their early deliberations I am happy in the assurance that the decision will be worthy the enlightened and patriotic councils of a virtuous, a free, and a powerful nation. . . . 2

Congress had been discussing the possibility of and justifications for war for many months before receiving the president’s letter. It declared war less than three weeks later. As John C. Calhoun argued on the floor of Congress in response to the call to arms,

If a long forbearance under injuries ought ever to be considered a virtue in any Nation, it is one which peculiarly becomes the United States. . . . But the period has now arrived, when the United States must support their character and station among the Nations of the Earth, or submit to the most shameful degradation. Forbearance has ceased to be a virtue. War on the one side, and peace on the other, is a situation as ruinous as it is disgraceful. The mad ambition, the lust of power, and commercial avarice of Great Britain . . . have left to Neutral Nations—an alternative only, between the base surrender of their rights, and a manly vindication of them. Happily for the United States, their destiny, under the aid of Heaven, is in their own hands. . . . 3

The “injuries” were clearly set forth both by the president and his party’s leaders in Congress. Yet, before we can properly assess how these grievances fit into what the war really was about, we must first reflect on the way the dispute was framed in Madison’s letter (and equally, in Calhoun’s reinforcement of it) and how that framing sat against the established understanding of the purpose of a war declaration under the international law of the time. As we will see, while the true purpose of the war indeed did require a constitutional declaration, the ostensible purposes of the war, as set out by the president, did not; those reasons for war could easily have been addressed within the legitimate and exclusive powers of the president as commander in chief. Madison, however, having been reluctant to wage war and understanding what the true objectives of the War Hawks were and deferring to them, chose—in today’s parlance—to kick the can down the road and let the congressional leadership take responsibility for their ambition. His decision to do so was, arguably, the great tragic decision of that period in US history.

When to Declare War

PRESIDENT MADISON STATED IN HIS LETTER TO CONGRESS THAT BRITAIN was acting aggressively in impressing American sailors into the British navy; blockading American ports and restricting American commerce; and fomenting Indian tribes to commit aggression against American settlers. He summarized all of this in the telling defensive phrase, “We behold, in fine, on the side of Great Britain, a state of war against the United States, and on the side of the United States a state of peace toward Great Britain.” That is, he turned to Congress in the hope of eliciting a declaration of war because, in his opinion, Britain was already at war with the United States despite the state of peace that the United States was pursuing vis-à-vis Britain.