Euan Sinclair - Positional Option Trading

Next, behavioral finance has largely limited itself to the study of cognitive errors. There are many other types of nonrational behavioral inputs into decision-making, including emotion, testosterone levels, substance abuse, and the quest for status.

And behavioral finance gives no coherent alternative theory to the EMH. A catalog of biases and heuristics—the mistakes people make—is not a theory. A list of facts does not make a theory. Of course, sometimes observations are necessary before a theory can be formulated. Mendeleev drew the periodic table well before the atomic structure of matter was understood. We knew species existed well before we understood the process of speciation by natural selection. Still, to be scientific, behavioral finance eventually needs to lead to a unifying theory that gives explanations of the current observations and makes testable predictions.

Behavioral finance can still help. Whenever we find something that looks like a good trading idea we need to ask, “Why is this trade available to me?” Sometimes the answer is obvious. Market-makers get a first look in exchange for providing liquidity. Latency arbitrage is available to those who make the necessary investments in technology. ETF arbitrage is available to those with the capital and legal status to become authorized participants. But often a trade with positive edge is available to anyone who is interested. Remembering the joke about the economists, “Why is this money sitting on the ground?” Risk premia can often be identified by looking at historical data, but behavioral finance can help to identify real inefficiencies. For example, post-earnings announcement drift can be explained in terms of investor underreaction. Together with historical data, this gives me enough confidence to believe that the edge is real. The data suggest the trade, but the psychological reason gives a theoretical justification.

Technical analysis is the study of price and volume to predict returns.

Aronson (2007) categorized technical analysis as either subjective or objective. It is a useful distinction.

Subjective technical analysis incorporates the trader's discretion and interpretation of the data. For example, “If the price is over the EWMA, I might get long. It depends on a lot of other things.” These methods aren't wrong. They aren't even methods. Subjectivity isn't necessarily a problem in science. A researcher subjectively chooses what to study and then subjectively chooses the methods that make sense. But if subjectivity is applied as part of the trading approach, rather than the research, then there is no way to test what works and what doesn't. Do some traders succeed with subjective methods? Obviously. But until we also know how many fail, we can't tell if the approach works. Further, the decisions different traders who use ostensibly the same method make won't be the same or even based on the same inputs. There is literally no way to test subjective analysis.

Some things that are intrinsically subjective are Japanese candlesticks, Elliot waves, Gann angles, trend lines, and patterns (flags, pennant, head, and shoulders, etc.). These aren't methods. In the most charitable interpretation, they are a framework for (literally) looking at the market. It is possible that using these methods can help the trader implicitly learn to predict the market. But more realistically, subjective technical analysis is almost certainly garbage. I can't prove the ideas don't work. No-one can. They are unfalsifiable because they aren't clearly defined. But plenty of circumstantial evidence exists that this analysis is worthless. None of the large trading firms or banks has desks devoted to this stuff. They have operations based on stat arb, risk arb, market-making, spreading, yield curve trading, and volatility. No reputable, large firm has a Japanese candlestick group.

As an ex-boss of mine once said, “That isn't analysis. That is guessing.”

Any method can be applied subjectively, but only some can be applied objectively. Aronson (2007) defines objective technical analysis as “well-defined repeatable procedures that issue unambiguous signals.” These signals can then be tested against historical data and have their efficacy measured. This is essentially quantitative analysis.

It seems likely that some of these approaches can be used to make money in stocks and futures. But each individual signal will be very weak and to make any consistent money various signals will need to be combined. This is the basis of statistical arbitrage. This is not within the scope of this book.

However, we do need to be aware of a bad classic mistake when doing quantitative analysis of price or return data: data mining.

This is where we sift through data using many methods, parameters, and timescales. This is almost certain to lead to some strategy that has in-sample profitability. When this issue is confined to choosing the parameters of a single, given strategy it is usually called overfitting . If you add enough variables, you can get a polynomial to fit data arbitrarily well. Even if you choose a function or strategy in advance, by “optimizing” the variables you will the get the best in-sample fit. It is unlikely to be the best out of sample. Enrico Fermini shared that the mathematician and economist John von Neumann said, “With four parameters I can fit an elephant , and with five I can make him wiggle his trunk” (Dyson, 2004).

This mistake isn't only made by traders. Academics also fall into the trap. The first published report of this was Ioannidis (2005). Subsequently, Harvey et al. (2016) and Hou et al. (2017) discussed the impact of data mining on the study of financial anomalies.

There are a few ways to avoid this trap:

The best performer out of a sample of back-tested rules will be positively biased. Even if the underlying premise is correct, the future performance of the rule will be worse than the in-sample results.

The size of this bias decreases with larger in-sample data sets.

The larger the number of rules (including parameters), the higher the bias.

Test the best rule on out-of-sample data. This gives a better idea of its true performance.

The ideal situation is when there is a large data set and few tested rules.

Even after applying these rules, it is prudent to apply a bias correcting method.

The simplest is Bonferroni's correction. This scales any statistical significance number by dividing by the number of rules tested. So, if your test for significance at the 95% confidence level (5% rejection) shows the best rule is significant, but the rule is the best performer of 100 rules, the adjusted rejection level would be 5%/100 or 0.005%. So, in this case, a t -score of 2 for the best rule doesn't indicate a 95% confidence level. We would need a t -score of 2.916, corresponding to a 99.5% level for the single rule. This test is simple but not powerful. It will be overly conservative and skeptical of good rules. When used for developing trading strategies this is a strength.

A more advanced test is White's reality check (WRC). This is a bootstrapping method that produces the appropriate sampling distribution for testing the significance of the best strategy. The test has been patented and commercial software packages that implement the test can be bought. However, the basic algorithm can be illustrated with a simple example.

We have two strategies, A and B, which produce daily returns of 2% and 1% respectively. Each was developed by looking at 100 historical returns. We can use WRC to determine if the apparent outperformance of strategy A is due to data mining: