Carl Clausewitz - The Strategy of Warfare – Boxed Set

Not so, says Kautilya, a large number of effete persons is better, inasmuch as they can be employed to do other kinds of works in the camp: to serve the soldiers fighting in battlefields, and to terrify the enemy by its number. It is also possible to infuse spirit and enthusiasm in the timid by means of discipline and training.

Of mines, whoever exploits with less labour and expenditure a mine of valuable output and of easy communication overreaches the other.

Which is better of the two, a small mine of valuable yield, or a big mine productive of commodities of inferior value?

My teacher says that the former is better inasmuch as valuable products, such as diamonds, precious stones, pearls, corals, gold and silver, can swallow vast quantities of inferior commodities.

Not so, says Kautilya, for there is the possibility of purchasing valuable commodities by a mass of accumulated articles of inferior value, collected from a vast and longstanding mine of inferior commodities.

This explains the selection of trade-routes:

My teacher says that of the two trade-routes, one by water and another by land, the former is better, inasmuch as it is less expensive, but productive of large profit.

Not so, says Kautilya, for water route is liable to obstruction, not permanent, a source of imminent dangers, and incapable of defence, whereas a land-route is of reverse nature.

Of water-routes, one along the shore and another in mid-ocean, the route along, and close to the shore is better, as it touches at many trading port-towns; likewise river navigation is better, as it is uninterrupted and is of avoidable or endurable dangers.

My teacher says that of land-routes, that which leads to the Himalayas is better than that which leads to the south.

Not so, says Kautilya, for with the exception of blankets, skins, and horses, other articles of merchandise such as, conch-shells, diamonds, precious stones, pearls and gold are available in plenty in the south.

Of routes leading to the south, either that trade-route which traverses a large number of mines which is frequented by people, and which is less expensive or troublesome, or that route by taking which plenty of merchandise of various kinds can be obtained is better.

This explains the selection of trade-routes leading either to the east or to the west.

Of a cart-track and a foot-path, a cart-track is better as it affords facilities for preparations on a large scale.

Routes that can be traversed by asses or camels, irrespective of countries and seasons are also good.

This explains the selection of trade-routes traversed by men alone (amsa-patha, shoulder-path, i.e., a path traversed by men carrying merchandise on their shoulders).

It is a loss for the conqueror to undertake that kind of work which is productive of benefits to the enemy, while a work of reverse nature is a gain. When the benefits are equal, the conqueror has to consider that his condition is stagnant.

Likewise it is a loss to undertake a work of less out-put and of a greater outlay, while a work of reverse nature is a gain. If the out-put and outlay of a work are at par, the conqueror has to consider that his condition is stagnant.

Hence the conqueror should find out such fort-building and other works as, instead of being expensive, are productive of greater profit and power. Such is the nature of agreements for undertaking works.

[Thus ends Chapter XII, "Agreement for Undertaking a Work," in the section of "Agreement for the Acquisition of a Friend, Gold, or Land and Agreement for Undertaking a Work"' in Book VIII, "The End of the Six-fold Policy” of the Arthasástra of Kautilya. End of the hundred and tenth chapter from the beginning.]

Table of Contents

WHEN the conqueror and his enemy simultaneously proceeded to capture the rear of their respective enemies who are engaged in an attack against others, he who captures the rear of one who is possessed of vast resources gains more advantages (atisandhatte); for one who is possessed of vast resources has to put down the rear-enemy only after doing away with one's frontal enemy already attacked, but not one who is poor in resources and who has not realised the desired profits.

Resources being equal, he who captures the rear of one who has made vast preparations gains more advantages for one who has made vast preparations has to put down the enemy in the rear only after destroying the frontal enemy, but not one whose preparations are made on a small scale and whose movements are, therefore, obstructed by the Circle of States.

Preparations being equal, he who captures the rear of one who has marched out with all the resources gains more advantages; for one whose base is undefended is easy to be subdued, but not one who has marched out with a part of the army after having made arrangements to defend the rear.

Troops taken being of equal strength, he who captures the rear of one who has gone against a wandering enemy gains more advantages; for one who has marched out against a wandering enemy has to put down the rear-enemy only after obtaining an easy victory over the wandering enemy; but not one who has marched out against an entrenched enemy, for one who has marched out against an entrenched enemy will be repelled in his attack against the enemy's forts and will, after his return, find himself between the rear-enemy, and the frontal enemy who is possessed of strong forts.

This explains the cases of other enemies described before.

Enemies being of equal description, he who attacks the rear of one who has gone against a virtuous king gains more advantages, for one who has gone against a virtuous king will incur the displeasure of even his own people, whereas one who has attacked a wicked king will endear himself to all.

This explains the consequences of capturing the rear of those who have marched against an extravagant king or a king living from hand to mouth, or a niggardly king.

The same reasons hold good in the case of those who have marched against their own friends.

When there are two enemies, one engaged in attacking a friend and another an enemy, he who attacks the rear of the latter gains more advantages: for one who has attacked a friend will, after easily making peace with the friend, proceed against the rear-enemy; for it is easier to make peace with a friend than with an enemy.

When there are two kings, one engaged in destroying a friend, and another an enemy, he who attacks the rear of the former gains more advantages; for one who is engaged in destroying an enemy will have the support of his friends and will thereby put down the rear-enemy, but not the former who is engaged in destroying his own side.

When the conqueror and his enemy in their attack against the rear of an enemy mean to enforce the payment of what is not due to them, he whose enemy has lost considerable profits and has sustained a great loss of men and money gains more advantages; when they mean to enforce the payment of what is due to them, then he whose enemy has lost profits and army, gains more advantages.

When the assailable enemy is capable of retaliation and when the assailant's rear-enemy, capable of augmenting his army and other resources, has entrenched himself on one of the assailant's flanks, then the rear-enemy gains more advantages; for a rear enemy on one of the assailant's flanks will not only become a friend of the assailable enemy, but also attack the base of the assailant, whereas a rear-enemy behind the assailant can only harass the rear.

Kings, capable of harassing the rear of an enemy and of obstructing his movements are three: the group of kings situated behind the enemy, and the group of kings on his flanks.

He who is situated between a conqueror and his enemy is called an antardhi (one between two kings); when such a king is possessed of forts, wild tribes, and other kinds of help, he proves an impediment in the way of the strong.