Charles Maynes - The Nature of the Post-Cold War World

This focus on democracy also ignores, or conflicts with what is probably the strongest new trend—nationalism, both in its old- fashioned European version as evident in the Balkans, and in its religious manifestation, evident in Muslim fundamentalism. Those who argue that the purpose of American policy is to safeguard democracies and democratic practices, also have to confront its handmaiden—self determination.

This principle immediately complicates the effort to support democracy. Do the Serbs in Bosnia have any right to an independent existence? If so, do they have the right to fight for their independence? Is the United States obligated to support, with military means if necessary, self-determination? Or does it have an obligation to support the territorial integrity of a state such as Bosnia? How would such principles be applied in the former Soviet Union?

One ominous by-product of the Bosnian debate is the emergence of a “nascent” doctrine that claims America has an obligation to protect ethnic minorities. Thus William Safire in The New York Times argued that: “Collective security is no longer limited to defending national borders; a nascent understanding grows that ethnic minorities are entitled to international protection.” Rather than adopting such broad principles of Wilsonianism, the United States would be better served by a pragmatic approach: examining the issues created by the resurgence of nationalism on a case-by-case basis.

A related issue arises from the Iraq crisis. What is the American interest in this region? While there is no reason to conciliate Saddam, Iraq does illustrate the kind of problem that the new administration will have to deal with. What are the longer term power relationships in the Gulf? Since the overthrow of the Shah, this has been an area in extreme turmoil. Iraq was a threat, but it has been reduced to more of an irritant. At the same time, the United States and the U.N. are virtually partitioning Iraq. Moreover, the coalition that opposed Iraq in DESERT STORM is breaking up, as do all coalitions when the common enemy is weakened. And more important, it is a good bet that 4 years from now the problem will be Iran—a potentially far stronger, more aggressive country. Iraq is manageable, a nuclear-armed Iran would be another story. In short, America needs to put the Iraqi crisis into a broader perspective: how to maintain a balance of power in the Gulf region.

Nonproliferation . The Iraq crisis bears on the third “new” issue that is in fact an old one: nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and longer range delivery systems. The shocking lesson of Iraq is how easy it was to obtain technology and to hide the various nuclear processes. Both the United States and the world community are in disarray on the issues related to nonproliferation. It cuts across many American departments, and many competing U.S. economic and strategic interests, including the much maligned Star Wars defense against third country attacks. It must be straightened out. The issue is how to stop proliferation? By closer monitoring and more intrusive inspection regimes. How would they be enforced? By economic sanctions or military intervention?

The U.N.’s involvement in the inspection of Iraq is a valuable precedent, but such collectivity could turn into a limiting factor as well. As the DESERT STORM coalition breaks up, will the United States have to act alone? Will the United States be prepared to act against the wishes of the Security Council?

Nonproliferation concerns also impact specifically on geopolitics, namely our alignment with Pakistan. The deterioration in relations with Pakistan over nonproliferation has reached the point where America ought to consider switching our alignment to India. Supporting Pakistan in the name of regional balance no longer seems necessary with the Soviets out of Afghanistan; and the price of Pakistani support in the Muslim world is becoming too high if it means tolerating the proliferation of nuclear powers.

Other New Issues . Finally, a number of other “new” but important issues have been treated haphazardly, as far as their international dimension is concerned: refugees, population, and the environment. Many argue that the environment is the primary threat to the world. Others see the environment, as well as the other such issues, as simply another round in the conflict between the wealthy north and the impoverished south. Drugs are an example: there is no international consensus, mainly because the United States is affected far more than other countries. The United States finds itself virtually paying bribery for international cooperation. At the same time Washington is expected to make concessions in the name of the new environmentalism. The United States has thus far been more reluctant than other countries to act in support of a radical regime to control the international environment. The Clinton-Gore administration supposedly will lead to a change. But at what cost? Within this agenda there ought to be some trade-offs that serve American interest and not just sacrifices in the name of a new internationalism.

Underlying these newly emerging issues are the changes in the broad international structure. The U.N. has enjoyed a surprising revival. It is now closer to Roosevelt’s original visions—world policemen formed by the Great Powers in the Security Council. But the Security Council does not reflect international reality. It does not reflect the real power structure, because it excludes key countries. Should the Security Council be expanded to include Japan and Germany? If so, why retain Britain and France as permanent members: why not a European and an Asian seat?

The next question is should there be a permanent peacekeeping force? If so would American troops serve under a non-American U.N. commander in combat? Would this be constitutional?

Is the current revival of the U.N. an aberration? It is likely, indeed almost certain, that the interests of the Great Powers will once again diverge? Sooner or later the United States will have to act against the desires of the U.N.

In short, much of what appears to be new, in the aftermath of the cold war, has not been thoroughly examined. Clearly there are conflicts between a national and an international approach to both specific issues and broad concepts. For America, the problem may be one of balance: the “new” agenda seems to call for an activist policy, at a time when other indicators suggest that the nation wishes to turn inward.

Turning now to the “old” agenda: during the cold war some of the major underlying geopolitical premises of American policy were (1) that the United States had global interests and responsibilities; (2) that to carry them out the alliance with Europe was necessary; the United States would provide the required military protection and Europe for its part should continue to unite; (3) that an alliance with Japan could be created based on common interests that would transcend the common threat; and (4) that Washington could and should maintain friendly relations with China, in the name of the balance of power, regardless of that country’s internal organization.

These premises are questionable. True, the United States remains a global power, perhaps the only one. But most of its global responsibilities were a function of the cold war. The claim that these interests still require certain commitments abroad is questionable. It has been drastically undercut by the ease with which the United States withdrew from the Philippines. If there ever was a symbol of America’s rise to global power it was the naval base at Subic Bay.

Thus far, however, there has been a reluctance to undertake a fundamental examination of the residual of requirements still necessary to protect our global interests as opposed to those situations that can be left to regional or local forces. Clearly, with the end of the cold war, such a reappraisal is in order. Surely some disengagement will be both possible and desirable.