Charles Maynes - The Nature of the Post-Cold War World

It is not enough simply to invoke or rely on slogans about America’s responsibilities. It would be a tragedy if the first post-cold war president sought refuge in reshaping the past. The best service President Clinton can provide the nation is to force an examination of the longer term national interest of the United States, measured against the new international landscape. Why the United States should want to bear the primary burden for creating a new world order is not clear in light of its internal problems.

In any case, the first term for President Clinton is likely to be a transitional period, if only because it is clearly a transitional era in the history of international politics. After 50 years of war and cold war, it will take at least 4 years, and probably more, to work out the so-called new world order.

Economics . There is much talk about the changes brought by the end of the cold war. The change most remarked on is the “new” primacy of economics. The current conventional wisdom is that economics will replace geopolitics. The dreary litany of American economic ills is familiar: deficits, underinvestment, lack of competitiveness, etc. During the election campaign, candidate Clinton went so far as to proclaim: “In this new era our first foreign priority and our domestic priority are one and the same: reviving our economy.”

In a broad sense this is a truism: a country cannot conduct a strong foreign policy based on a weak economy or a weak society. And a misguided foreign policy can indeed weaken a nation’s economy and its social fabric. This nexus led some in the past decade to speculate that America had entered a period of strategic decline, brought on by “imperial overstretch.” Others stoutly refuted this notion, insisting that America was still “bound to lead.” The unexpected collapse of the Communist structures in the USSR and Eastern Europe left this debate suspended, but unresolved.

It will have to be revisited; perhaps not in the stark terms of “imperial decline,” but in the more practical terms of what a nation with limited resources needs to do, and what it can do. In the past the American national interest was supported by a massive dose of resources from the Marshall plan through the Reagan military buildup. Those days are past: a national security crisis of cold war magnitude is not likely, at least for a decade. But if by chance a serious security crisis were to arise, the means available to deal with it will, for same period, be sharply constrained. We are back to Walter Lippmann’s admonition that a nation’s ambitions must match it resources, including some reserve.

In the Iraq crisis, for example, the United States undertook a major military campaign, as the leader of an international coalition. The effort was quite costly; so costly, in fact, that we proceeded to “beg” for assistance, to such a degree that in the end the operation even turned a “profit.” This was a disgraceful display for a superpower, but nevertheless symptomatic.

In plain terms, America can no longer do whatever if wants; even if it is the only superpower. This is a major strategic change, and its implications pervade all other issues. Specifically it requires a rethinking of America’s foreign commitments, setting more precise priorities among them, a reformulation of military strategy and on that basis restructuring the shape and size of our armed forces.

Beyond the basic question of resource allocation, the most immediate economic security issues involve trade and competitiveness. America has never had free trade. This pristine doctrine exists only in theory. America’s real policy has been managed trade. The new dimension is whether even a rough international system can be maintained in the face of pressures for regionalization and protectionism.

The decline of America’s trading position has led to a new growing belligerence toward our trading partners, and to a revival of protectionism. The Bush and early Clinton administrations have displayed an unusual aggressiveness. Indeed, the Clinton officials sound even more bombastic on trade issues. The new trade negotiator in the Clinton administration said recently, “The days when we could subordinate our economic interests to foreign policy or defense concerns are long past. ” This may be cheap tactics to create negotiating leverage, but the frustrations with America’s declining position may be leading to a growing insularity.

A significant portent is the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA). This is surely not free trade, nor is it international in its design. Indeed, it is based on a regional discrimination, as is the European Economic Community (EC). It is even justified as a counterweight to the EC, and the EC’s response has been to reinforce its own insularity. This conflict occurs at a time when the prospects for the GATT are not particularly bright.

In a world in which the overriding common security interests of the cold war have dissipated, the emergence of large trading blocs can only accelerate international fragmentation. NAFTA thus runs counter to geopolitical efforts at the U.N. and elsewhere to create new broader international coalition and a new international consensus. Is the development of regional economic blocs a trend this country wishes to strengthen?

A case can be made for moving toward a Western Hemisphere political-economic zone, a sort of modern version of the Monroe Doctrine. If the United States itself is evolving toward a society with a strong Latin element, then such a foreign policy might seem more rational than more Eurocentrism. But if so, it has yet to be articulated or thought through. Meanwhile, our trade policies contribute to international fragmentation.

Democracy . The end of the cold war is frequently portrayed as a golden opportunity to provide stronger support for democracies. Candidate Clinton called for a “pro-democracy foreign policy,” charging that Bush embraced stability at the expense of democracy. This reflects an age-old debate in America, starting with Jefferson and Hamilton: whether the United States should conduct its foreign policy to advance certain liberal goals abroad, or be content, as John Quincy Adams advised, not to go abroad searching for monsters to slay. The current issue, however, is not realpolitik versus idealism. There has always been a broad consensus in the United States that America should use its influence and weight to promote democratic practices. The core issues have always been how, when and where.

At this practical level the consensus breaks down. For example, should the United States intervene in Haiti? It is a prime challenge in an area in close proximity. The elected government was overthrown. The United States has applied economic sanctions, but there the matter has rested. What message can be derived from this record?

Or, to take a different example, what is the democratic rationale for supporting Saudi Arabia or Kuwait? The answer, of course, is the national interest defined in terms of security. Our intervention in DESERT STORM was aimed at preventing Iraqi domination of the Arabian peninsula, the Persian Gulf and the international oil market. In other words power politics, not idealism.

Ironically, despite the obvious but cold-blooded rationale for DESERT STORM, the sweeping military victory has led to a revival of old liberal internationalism, i.e., it was a victory over aggression and an example of the new collective security. Thus, some overtones of Wilsonianism are creeping back into American policy. Recently, a group of American notables, assembled by the Carnegie Endowment for Peace, offered advice to the new administration; its report concluded: “we are free to move” away from a peace that rests on a balance of terror between two armed camps toward a peace based on trust and shared interests.” (emphasis added). As was the case for Wilson, the practical result of such a revitalization of liberal doctrines, such as international “trust,” will be that the gap between rhetoric and action will increase, thus creating a new crisis of credibility. This has been already evident in the reluctance to intervene with force in Bosnia. Clearly, “shared interests” have not been found. Unless a more realistic attitude is adopted in Washington, the United States will find itself embarked on endless crusades to make the world safe for democracy.