Charles Maynes - The Nature of the Post-Cold War World

The U.S. role as the world’s leader or as a catalyst for international action is becoming a tired cliche. It is not persuasive to argue that because only the United States can accomplish certain missions, we should therefore undertake them. This line of reasoning is something of a fraud. Obviously, American leadership in practice is exercised selectively: thus, it has not been exercised in Burma or Cambodia, for obvious reasons; it was invoked assertively in the Gulf, but only after great hesitation in Somalia.

American leadership cannot be an end in itself, as it is currently portrayed. It was a result of several factors: the Communist challenge was perceived to be global, and the United States was the only global power; our allies were weak, their resources limited; our own resources were seemingly endless. And, above all, our vital interests were threatened. All of that is all changed.

Europe . American interests are clearest in Europe. There is no reason to abandon the alliance with Western Europe. But it is far less important than it was, and the United States should not make concessions, political or otherwise in the name of the alliance as such. The Europeans will have to do more for themselves, without American leadership or participation. The number of American ground troops ought to be reduced to a minimum.

Three stunning geopolitical changes in Europe overshadow all others at the end of the cold war: the emergence of Germany, the liberation of Eastern Europe (and breakup), and the severe weakening of the former Soviet Union. Few changes of such importance have occurred so quickly in peacetime.

The impact of the end of the cold war, however, is quite different from what we may have imagined. The rise of Germany and the decline of Russia has changed the balance of power, and as a consequence ended the dream of Monett’s Europe. The old European Community was designed as a counterweight to the USSR; but it was not only based on the continuing division of Germany, some measure to limit German influence and power.

Now one of Europe’s oldest issues is back: how to cope with German power? This question permeates any reexamination of the future of Europe or its military alliance with the United States. There is already some apprehension— probably unjustified—over internal events in Germany. But after an interim period of consolidation after unification, the new Germany will inevitably assert its own interests: German unilateral action in recognizing Croatia and pressuring its European partners is a disconcerting example. It illustrates the potential geopolitical power of Germany in Central and Eastern Europe.

In any case, it seems clear that American influence in Europe is declining, whether we like it or not, and German influence is rising. American involvement in Europe will be thinner and weaker. Selective disengagement by both sides of the Atlantic has already begun.

Europe itself is in decline. The revival of nationalism threatens the concept of Europe. Maastricht is almost dead as a strategic plan. Indeed, it is no longer clear what is meant by Europe.

This creates a new dilemma for the United States. For 3 decades, Washington has supported the Europeans though the Europeans have often been irritating to America. After 30 years Europe has turned out to be weak and self-centered, the beneficiary of American protection, unable to act on its own even on the continent itself. Now that a fundamental weakening is at hand, the failure of Europe threatens to create a power vacuum that only Germany can fill. America must be careful not to be used by Britain and France as a counterweight to Germany.

The weakening of Western Europe aggravates another real danger—the isolation of Eastern Europe. Instability there is already spreading in the breakdown of two post-Versailles states, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. Further east in such areas as Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova there is a similar disintegration. The new rump states are not likely to be viable units, either economically or politically. Further disintegration is thus probable, and therefore new conflicts. Even in those states where territorial integrity has been maintained, there is a danger that they will eventually be dominated by Germany, and thus become a potential source of conflict with Russia.

Russia . The future of Russia is still the most fundamental issue for this country; Russia still the only country capable of destroying the United States. Thus far, American policy has been improvised because the situation has been so volatile. The new president ought to devise a basic politicalstrategy and stick to it, whatever the ups and downs of economic reform.

The new states of the former Soviet Union are in an evolutionary stage for which there is no historical precedent. After 70 years of Stalinist rule in which a strong central government maintained control, the region is divided into 15 separate entities of varying degrees of viability. Many areas are undergoing tremendous upheaval. It is likely that there will be turmoil in Russia as well as in the other new states throughout the next decade. The role of outside powers in this situation will be limited; they may have some influence, but barring military intervention it will not be decisive.

Given the disparate nature of the new states, it is difficult to define the effects on U.S. interests posed by the current situation. We need a more coherent analytical framework. Without such a policy framework, there is a danger of going from one fad to another.

Some insist, for example, that economic assistance should be the cutting edge of U.S. diplomacy toward the former Soviet Union. This is based in part on the fear that, if the West fails to help Yeltsin, Russia will face a threat from either the radical right or the radical left. For its part, America then will be subjected to another divisive debate over who lost Russia. There is a gap, however, between this rationale and what is actually happening in Russia. Nationalist forces are becoming stronger, and Yeltsin has accommodated them. If Yeltsin survives politically, it will be as a Russian nationalist. This ought to be a cause for caution.

Yeltsin’s foreign policy in its pro-Western orientation is already under attack. The United States will have to be tolerant of tactical posturing to accommodate these political forces inside Russia. It is already evident in the Russian government’s caution over further intervention in Iraq and especially in Bosnia. Yet it seems inevitable that traditional Russian security concerns will reassert themselves, if not now, then over the long term. These concerns are bound to conflict with American interests in some important areas.

Political and long-term security considerations should therefore be given priority over short-term economic issues. U.S. policy should focus on political realities—not on such abstract objectives as creation of a free-market system; the prospects for the emergence of a capitalist market are dubious in any case, and the emphasis on economic reform gives influence to the wrong institutions—specifically, the World Bank and IMF. These are not the institutions that should be setting conditions on assistance; conditions should be political, not economic.

U.S. policy should be to tie Russia (and Ukraine) into Europe. This might require creation of a new European organization because the existing institutions are ungainly and inadequate. The United States should take the lead in drawing Russia and Ukraine into Europe. The objective is to attain Russian agreement to the territorial status quo and to reassure the smaller states of the region that they will have support for their independence. The argument for a new institution rests ultimately on the need for the European process to receive a psychological boost.