Charles Maynes - The Nature of the Post-Cold War World

Against this backdrop, what can we say about the shape of the future?

In the field of defense, we are likely to see a decline in spending by the great powers and an increase in spending by the small powers. The former will be attempting to lighten the burden they have been carrying throughout the cold war. The latter will be striving to increase the tendency of the larger states to pause before threatening the smaller powers. The great powers will not like the pattern of defense spending by the smaller states but, except in the field of weapons of mass destruction, their own national interest will not be sufficiently affected for them to take decisive action. In particular, they will want the export orders. Many smaller states will seek enhanced defense capabilities for internal reasons.

The United States and Russia are likely to move cautiously toward the concept of a minimum deterrent and no first use of nuclear weapons. Long before the START agreement, expert studies in the United States were concluding that in the new circumstances there is no reason for the United States to have more than approximately 3000 warheads, even allowing a very large measure of insurance needed for defective rockets. Three thousand warheads would permit coverage of all reasonable targets and would permit a credible second strike. Now it seems inevitable that pressure will develop to cut even further. U.S. Government studies have suggested a force as small as a few hundred warheads would be adequate; some arms control experts now believe even a nonnuclear world is possible as precision weapons increasingly give military planners options they never had.

As the superpowers begin to reduce their arsenals, pressure will mount on the other major nuclear powers to join the arms control negotiations. It may become possible to put a cap on the nuclear arms race, and once it is there, it may be more likely that the world will be able to limit the number of nuclear powers.

As this process continues, the nuclear powers will have a much stronger interest in cooperating with one another to prevent nuclear proliferation. One can expect to see, therefore, much more coordinated effort by the nuclear powers to pressure the nonnuclear powers to remain so. In this regard, there will be a third attempt at collective security in this century with the focus on weapons of mass destruction.

We can expect the role of the United Nations in world affairs to grow. International law has been employed in the past more as a justification for policies already decided for other reasons rather than as a guide to policy while it is being shaped. But this approach will change and international law will grow in importance.

In international affairs geoeconomics will begin to vie with geopolitics for importance. This will also increase the role of international institutions and will have profound implications for the role of the various regions of the world. In theory, Europe should become the world’s powerhouse, with Germany united and the European Community breaking down trade barriers. But unless Europe can find a way to integrate Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union into the European system politically and economically, Europe will find its political energies diverted and its finances drained. It will suffer in the competition with the United States or Asia. And in this competition because the United States seems to have so much trouble addressing its domestic affairs, it is a safe prediction that Asia will continue to make gains over other regions in the world.

I am talking about the next 20 years. It is possible that China could disrupt this optimistic outlook for Asia by developing into a major international military power over the next quarter century. Its demographic size permits this. If its economy continues to grow at the current rapid pace and the rest of the world does not succeed in integrating China into the world system successfully and peacefully, China is more likely than any other major state to pose a challenge to international stability. This is one reason why the principal task of the international community in the coming years is to find ways to include China in the international system that is developing. It must not be allowed to isolate itself.

If the role of economics continues to grow, then the importance of Asia in world affairs can be expected to increase steadily. This area already has several of the world’s most successful economies. China, North Korea, and Vietnam seem poised to join and to give a fillip to the region’s economy that most other areas of the world will lack. Ironically, the European Communist states are disadvantaged compared to the Asian Communist states precisely because the former are more advanced and have a large, antiquated industrial infrastructure that is hard to discard quickly. Paradoxically, Asian Communist states may be in a position to industrialize more quickly because they are further behind.

If security concerns continue to decline in importance, the bargaining power of the United States in Asia will steadily decrease. The United States will need the area as a source of capital, yet its main trading currency, its role in the region’s defense, will be depreciated. Throughout the world we are likely to see a struggle between finance and trade. The former is increasingly globalized, and the latter is becoming regionalized. Despite trends of a universal trading system, it seems likely that the world will move increasingly into trading blocks. The United States is moving to put into place the possibility of such a system in its hemisphere. Europe will be driven by political concerns to create such a bloc in Europe. Otherwise it will fear social disorder in Eastern Europe and a flood of refugees westward. Meanwhile, this year, for the first time since the end of World War II, Japan’s trade with Asia will be greater than its trade with the United States. In other words, national interest and natural forces are dividing the world up into major trading blocs. These trends will be difficult to reverse. They can be managed, and in this regard the globalization of finance should soften somewhat the effects of creating trading blocs. The United States, for example, will need Asian capital too much to take too many counterproductive measures in the field of trade. Asia needs the U.S. market too much to place too many onerous conditions on U.S. access to Asian capital.

Politically, the trend of the coming 20 years will be for power to flow away from the central government both down and up. For the last 150 years technology and economic development favored the nation state. Rail lines and air nets pulled countries together. Radio stations propagated a single form of the dominant language. The costs of communication were so high that there were limited radio and television channels so that only the dominant political forces could make use of them. The prevailing patterns of economic development also favored centralization. Economies of scale favored large firms, which created national networks of suppliers and distributors. Demands for protection from natural or economic disaster also favored the creation of the nation state.

But now technology has moved to the point where it is weakening the nation state. Communications are an example. The real cost of hardware has decreased steadily over four decades by an average of 20 percent, according to a study recently completed by Sheldon Annis, a senior research associate at the Overseas Development Council. A meter of optic fiber cable cost $3.50 in 1972 but only $.25 today. Instead of a few limited TV channels, which the central government can easily control, cable TV opens up hundreds of channels.

International travel and trade are breaking down barriers. The international elite is still only a small portion of any national population, but it is extremely important and growing in size.