Martin Jacques - When China Rules the World

Confucianism should not be seen as a fixed entity, having been through many mutations during its history. Like all philosophies and religions, its longevity has depended in part upon its ability to adapt to changing circumstances and times. [655] [655] Paul A. Cohen, Discovering History in China: American Historical Writing on the Recent Chinese Past (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), p. 32 The fact that Confucianism is a syncretic tradition has served to enhance its flexibility and adaptability. One of the most outstanding examples was the manner in which the Neo-Confucians of the Song period (AD 960-1279) assimilated Buddhism and Taoism, which were then sweeping China. [656] [656] Bell and Chaibong, Confucianism for the Modern World , p. 26. It would be wrong, moreover, to regard Confucianism as entirely inimical to democratic ideas. For example, Sun Yat-sen, the leader of the 1911 Revolution and the founding father of the Republic of China, said: ‘Our three- min principles [nationalism, citizen rights and the welfare of human beings] originate from Mencius… Mencius is really the ancestor of our democratic ideas.’ [657] [657] Ibid., p. 9. The mandate of Heaven, in recognizing the right of the people to rebel if the emperor failed them, was certainly a more democratic idea than its European counterpart, the divine right of kings. [658] [658] Pye, The Spirit of Chinese Politics , p. 17. The emperor was required to rule in a virtuous and benign way according to the ethical strictures that constituted the guidelines for his conduct, while the hierarchical structure demanded a certain degree of reciprocity, suggesting implied rights as well as duties. [659] [659] Wang Gungwu, The Chineseness of China , p. 171. The government was expected to grant society considerable independence from the state, and in important respects this was the case — not least in the economic sphere, as the early development of a sophisticated market illustrates. Although civil society remains very weak in China, there is a powerful tradition of min-jian society, or folk culture, composed of age-old Chinese customs and support systems, which to this day still represents an important area of autonomy from government. [660] [660] Chen Kuan-Hsing, ‘Civil Society and Min-jian: On Political Society and Popular Democracy’, Cultural Studies , 17: 6 (2003), pp. 876-96. In sum, Confucianism certainly lends support and succour to an authoritarian system of government, but it is also imbued with democratic and popular elements. [661] [661] Zheng Yongnian, Will China Become Democratic ? pp. 82-3; Callahan, Contingent States , p. xxxiv.

There are a number of ways in which Confucian ideas are likely to inform a democratic China: [662] [662] For a discussion of Confucian ideas in practice, see ibid., pp. 210-14. Wang Gungwu argues there are three types of Confucian thinking; see China and the Overseas Chinese (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1991), pp. 259-61. the nodal role of the state and its bureaucracy; the centrality of the family, and extended networks like clans (which help, for example, to relieve the state of some of the tasks of social welfare); the importance of guanxi (the web of personal relationships which informs Chinese society); the Confucian preference for resolving conflicts by mediation rather than litigation, suggesting that the resort to law and the judicial process will always be far less significant in China (and Japan) than it is in the West; and the significance that is attached to values and morality as the lodestar of people’s behaviour. [663] [663] Bell and Chaibong, Confucianism for the Modern World , pp. 15–19. These age-old belief systems have a profound effect on the way a society operates. China, like Japan and Korea, has a quite different sense of public order and behaviour compared with the norms that prevail in the West, a situation reflected in the much lower levels of crime in these societies. Indeed, these deeper societal traditions have undoubtedly helped China — and other East Asian societies — to cope with the combined vicissitudes of globalization and modernization, in effect acting as shock absorbers. [664] [664] Ibid., pp. 12–13.

Chinese democracy will share certain universal characteristics with democracies elsewhere, but will also of necessity be highly distinctive, expressive of its roots in Chinese society and traditions. Given the cultural context of Confucianism and Communism, together with the extraordinary demands of governing a continent, the invention and evolution of Chinese democracy will require enormous novelty and ingenuity. [665] [665] For an interesting discussion of some of these issues, see Bell, China ’s New Confucianism , pp. 14–18. There is no reason to believe, in a country which is home to the world’s oldest and most sophisticated statecraft, that this will prove impossible. But there seems little reason to believe that this process is in any way imminent. Nor will innovation in governance be a matter of one-way traffic. Just as China can learn from the American federal system and the European Union (in which it is presently showing growing interest) in governing such a vast country, so China, accounting for one-fifth of the world’s population, can also offer the rest of the world a model for large-scale governance, which is likely to become increasingly important in a globalized world.

The coincidence of the collapse of Soviet Communism with the suppression in Tiananmen Square persuaded most Western observers that the Chinese Communist Party would meet a similar fate. They could not have been more wrong. In contrast to Soviet Communism, which suffered from a growing state of paralysis and ossification, the Chinese party, under Deng Xiaoping, displayed great creativity and flexibility, responding to the crisis it inherited from Mao by initiating a process of reform that has transformed the living standards of the great majority of the people. The rule of the Communist Party is no longer in doubt: it enjoys the prestige that one would expect given the transformation that it has presided over. The feel-good factor, and a concomitant mood of confidence that has been engendered, is clear from Figure 22. The uncertainties of 1989 are now a distant memory. The nature of the Party’s support and legitimacy has changed in the process: this is no longer primarily a function of ideology but depends increasingly on its ability to deliver economic growth. In that sense, China has come to resemble other East Asian developmental states, though in all these cases, as discussed in Chapter 5, the nature of governmental authority is also deeply embedded in the culture. Even though support for the Communist Party is now more contingent, there is little cause to believe that it is fragile or vulnerable. On the contrary, it is reasonable to presume that its rule is rather more secure than it has been at any time since the death of Mao, which is not surprising given its success as a governing party, and is reflected in the fact that over the last decade 20 million people have applied to join annually, even though only 2 million have been admitted each year. There is pressure for more radical political reform, as illustrated by the Charter 08 manifesto, but it remains relatively isolated and heavily policed by the state.

If the reform process has been characterized by the boldness of its economic measures, it has also been distinguished by the relative conservatism of the political changes. This is not to underestimate them. There has been the gradual spread of competitive elections to the great majority of villages and to some towns, for example in Guangdong and Fujian, where mayoral elections have been held. [666] [666] Zheng Yongnian, Will China Become Democratic? , p. 140; and interview with Yu Zengke, Beijing, 22 May 2006. There has been reform of the civil service, the decentralization of power to local government, and a limited rejuvenation of national and local parliaments. There has been a growing trend, largely as a result of economic necessity, towards rule by law (that is, the determination of issues according to a legal code) and, to a far lesser extent, towards the rule of law (that the law applies irrespective of the view of government), [667] [667] Zheng Yongnian, Will China Become Democratic? , pp. 48–70; Wang Zhengxu, ‘Understanding Democratic Thinking in China ’, seminar paper, East Asia Institute, National University of Singapore, 28 April 2006. which, according to one Chinese expert, applies in only 10–20 per cent of instances. [668] [668] Interview with Yu Zengke, Beijing, 22 May 2006. Given that the latter would require the Party’s power to be constitutionally limited, thereby necessitating a fundamental change in its role, its significant extension remains both problematic and unlikely. There has been a formalization of procedures such that, for example, the president can now only serve for two terms. Relations between the military and civil power have been normalized. Compared with the pre-reform period, there is far greater political space for open discussion and serious critique, [669] [669] Jude Howell, ed., Governance in China (Oxford: Roman and Littlefield, 2004), pp. 3, 8, 9. with the internet now the most important arena for public debate, greatly exceeding what is possible in the conventional media. [670] [670] In 2006 China had 132 million internet users, the second largest number after the US.See Christopher R. Hughes and Gudrun Wacker, eds, China and the Internet: Politics of the Digital Leapforward (London: Routledge, 2003), Chapter 3; and Wang Xiaodong, ‘Chinese Nationalism under the Shadow of Globalisation’, lecture at the London School of Economics and Political Science, 7 February 2005. There have also been major reforms within the Party. Leaders are now required to retire rather than being allowed to die in office. The Sixteenth Congress in 2002 saw the first orderly transfer of power, from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao. Contested elections for delegates to the Party congress take place in some provinces. [671] [671] Interview with Yu Zengke, Beijing, 22 May 2006. The Party has broadened its membership, most notably, following Jiang Zemin’s Three Represents reform, to include private capitalists. And the party leadership at all levels, including the top, is more professional and better educated than it was previously. [672] [672] Zheng Yongnian, Will China Become Democratic? , pp. 198-9, 212.