Martin Jacques - When China Rules the World

Finally, we should bear in mind that China is the home of Confucian thought and practice, and consequently has experienced Confucianism in a more complete and doctrinaire form than Japan and Korea, where it was a Chinese import and therefore never enjoyed quite the same degree of overweening influence as in China. As a result, it was easier for these countries to embrace democracy by, in effect, adding a new political layer to coexist along with the older Confucian traditions and practices. It will certainly be possible for China to do the same, but the weight of what might be described as Confucian orthodoxy is likely to make it more difficult. [642] [642] Zheng Yongnian, Will China Become Democratic? , pp. 79–80.

In the long run it seems rather unlikely, given the underlying pressures for democracy that exist within increasingly sophisticated, diverse and prosperous societies, that China will be able to resist the process of democratization. The interesting question is what democracy might look like in China. There is a strong tendency in the West to view democracy in terms of a ‘one size fits all’ approach. In fact, the form of democracy varies greatly according to the history, traditions and culture of a society. There is no reason to believe, except on grounds of Eurocentrism, that the very specific conditions that shaped European society (and European-derived nations like the United States), and therefore European democracy, will result in the same kind of democratic structures elsewhere. [643] [643] The characteristics of the major Western countries that helped to shape their democracies include, amongst other things, that they were the first to industrialize, had colonial possessions and were relatively ethnically homogeneous. This is abundantly clear in the case of Japan. It certainly possesses some of the trappings of democracy that we are familiar with in the West — not surprisingly, given that the US authored Japan ’s post-war constitution following its defeat — most notably universal suffrage and a multi-party system. Yet it is immediately evident that in practice the system works very differently. The Liberal Democrats have been almost continuously in power since the mid fifties. The other parties, apart from the occasional period of coalition government, have found themselves in permanent opposition and wield rather less power and enjoy rather less importance in the political life of the country than the various factions within the Liberal Democrats. Moreover, as Karel van Wolferen has observed, much of the real power is vested in the civil service, especially in particular ministries, rather than in the government itself: in other words, in that part of the state that is permanently constituted rather than in that part that is elected. The cabinet, for example, barely meets and when it does its business is largely ceremonial. [644] [644] Karel van Wolferen, The Enigma of Japanese Power: People and Politics in a Stateless Nation (New York: Vintage, 1990), Chapters 1–3, 5, 8, 16. Given these underlying continuities, the significance that attaches to elections — and, therefore, popular sovereignty — is much less than in the Western case. Reflecting the hierarchical character of society and Confucian influence, power has a permanent and unchanging quality that is relatively unaffected by the electoral process.

Whatever democratic political system evolves in China will bear the heavy imprint of its Confucian past. It is more difficult to judge the longer-term impact of Communism because its duration will have been far more limited. There are, though, important continuities between Confucianism and Communism — for example, in the notion of a special caste of political leadership, Confucian in the one case, Leninist in the other. [645] [645] Pye, The Spirit of Chinese Politics , p. ix. In North-East Asia — for these purposes, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam — the continuing influence of the Confucian tradition is palpable in the emphasis on education, the structure of the family, the central role of the bureaucracy and the commitment to harmony. [646] [646] Bell and Chaibong, Confucianism for the Modern World , pp. 7, 356-9, 368. Because of the presence of a Communist government, this was, until 1978, perhaps less apparent in China, but there has been a marked revival in Confucian influence since then, a process initiated by the government during the nineties, [647] [647] Zhao, A Nation-State by Construction , pp. 228-9. but which has increasingly acquired a momentum of its own. [648] [648] Callahan, Contingent States , p. 41. Reflecting Confucian influence, an editorial in the People’s Daily argued that in order to build a market economy, it was necessary to promote ‘the rule of virtue while developing the rule of law’. [649] [649] 1 February 2001, quoted in Zheng Yongnian, Will China Become Democratic? , p. 95; also Callahan, Contingent States , pp. 31-2. In March 2007 the prime minister Wen Jiabao remarked: ‘From Confucius to Sun Yat-sen, the traditional culture of the Chinese nation has numerous precious elements, many positive aspects regarding the nature of the people and democracy. For example, it stresses love and humanity, community, harmony among different viewpoints, and sharing the world in common. ’ [650] [650] Quoted in Daniel A. Bell, China’s New Confucianism: Politics and Everyday Life in a Changing Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), p. 9. Communist Party officials in Henan province are now, amongst other things, assessed on the basis of Confucian values such as filial piety and family responsibility, while secondary school children are once more being taught the Confucian classics [651] [651] Raymond Zhou, ‘Let Sages Enrich Us, Not Polarize Us’, China Daily , 10–11 December 2005. and Confucius’s birthday is again being celebrated. [652] [652] Interview with Kang Xiaoguang, Beijing, 1 December 2005. On a practical level, the Party is now placing a new kind of emphasis on the importance of the obligations and duties shown by its cadres towards the people they represent. As part of their training, they are given test cases in which they are expected not just to consult their superiors as before, but also, more importantly, to listen to the people. This new attitude has been reflected in the way in which public officials have apologized for their failures in the Sichuan earthquake and milk scandal — in a manner reminiscent of the behaviour of shamed Japanese government and corporate leaders — and resigned. Significantly, the government has chosen to use the name Confucius Institutes for the numerous Chinese cultural and language centres which it has been establishing around the world. With the decline of Marxism, the turn towards Confucius in a country so steeped in its ethical and moral discourse is predictable. [653] [653] Zheng Yongnian, Will China Become Democratic? , p. 91; and interview with Kang Xiaoguang, Beijing, 1 December 2005. Kang was the first to propose the idea of the Confucius Institute to the government. He has suggested that Confucianism should replace Marxism in education. It can be argued, in any case, that those parts of Marxism that have had most impact in China were the ones that most chimed with the Confucian tradition — for example, self-criticism (mirroring the Confucian idea that one should direct criticism at oneself before others), the idea that rulers should be morally upright and the invoking of model workers as an example to others; by the same token, those Marxist ideas that failed were those that were most inimical to Confucianism. Even the fact that Chinese political leaders dye their hair black can be traced back to the Mencian proposition that white-haired people should be cared for rather than engaged in heavy work. Most importantly of all, Confucian ideas remain embedded in the fabric of the culture: filial piety is still widely practised and endorsed, including the legal requirement that adult children care for their elderly parents. A favourite theme of Chinese soaps concerns relationships with elderly parents. An obvious and striking characteristic of Chinese restaurants, in contrast to Western ones, is the frequency with which one sees the extended family eating together, a tradition reflected in the ubiquity of the large circular table. [654] [654] Bell, China’s New Confucianism , pp. 9- 12.