Eric Schlosser - Command and Control

alarms went off in an air defense bunker south of Moscow: See Hoffman, Dead Hand , pp. 6–11.

rays of sunlight reflected off clouds: See David Hoffman, “‘I Had a Funny Feeling in My Gut’; Soviet Officer Faced Nuclear Armageddon,” Washington Post , February 10, 1999.

two million people in Europe joined protests: Cited in Joseph B. Fleming, “Anti-Missile Movement Vows to Fight On,” United Press International, October 23, 1983.

serious problems with the World Wide Military Command and Control System: See Pearson, WWMCCS: Evolution and Effectiveness , pp. 315-17; and “JTF Operations Since 1983,” George Stewart, Scott M. Fabbri, and Adam B. Siegel, CRM 94–42, Center for Naval Analyses, July 1994, pp. 23–31.

“a frustrated Army officer used his AT&T credit card”: “JTF Operations Since 1983,” p. 28.

Able Archer 83: See Gates, From the Shadows , pp. 270-73; Hoffman, Dead Hand , pp. 94–95; Fischer, “Cold War Conundrum.”

“the KGB concluded that American forces”: The agent was Oleg Gordievsky. He worked not only for the KGB but also for British intelligence. His quote is from Fischer, “Cold War Conundrum.”

A number of the Soviet Union’s own war plans: See Hoffman, Dead Hand , p. 94.

About 100 million Americans watched The Day After : Cited in Robert D. McFadden, “Atomic War Film Spurs Nationwide Discussion,” New York Times , November 22, 1983.

another B-52 had caught on fire on a runway: See Phyllis Mensing, “5 Die in B-52 Fire at Air Base,” Associated Press, January 27, 1983.

the retrofits were halted… because the program ran out of money: Peurifoy interview.

“The worst probable consequence of continuous degradation”: “‘Hot’ Topic! Nuclear AID [Accidents, Incidents, Deficiencies] Topics,” USAF Nuclear Surety Journal , no. 90–01, p. 5.

“Naturally, this would be a catastrophe”: Ibid.

“follow procedures and give the weapons a little extra care”: Ibid.

A software glitch could launch a Pershing II missile: Peurifoy and Stevens interviews. See also Stevens, “Origins and Evolution of S2C,” pp. 116-18.

Reagan watched red dots spreading across a map: See Reed, At the Abyss , pp. 233-34.

Reagan’s belief in the plan was sincere: Two well-researched books argue persuasively that Reagan hoped to protect the United States from a nuclear attack and rid the world of nuclear weapons. The books suggest that Reagan’s tough Cold War rhetoric hid a warmer, more peace-loving side. And yet both books fail to place Reagan’s subsequent arms control efforts in a wider political context. The massive antinuclear demonstrations in the United States and Western Europe are mentioned on only three of the roughly eight hundred pages in these books — and with disparagement. On October 5, 1982, President Reagan said that the nuclear freeze movement was “inspired… by people who want the weakening of America.” The huge demonstrations that soon followed no doubt influenced his subsequent behavior, as did his wife Nancy, who strongly supported arms control talks. Reagan’s transformation into an outspoken nuclear abolitionist, though heartfelt, followed — and did not lead — American public opinion. Although written without access to many declassified documents, Frances FitzGerald’s Way Out There in the Blue has a broader perspective. See Lettow, Ronald Reagan and His Quest to Abolish Nuclear Weapons; Martin Anderson and Annelise Anderson, Reagan’s Secret War: The Untold Story of His Fight to Save the World from Nuclear Disaster (New York: Crown, 2009); and Rich Jaroslovsky, “Reagan Blasts Nuclear Freeze Movement, Saying Some Seek ‘Weakening of America,’” Wall Street Journal , October 5, 1982.

“impotent and obsolete”: “President’s Speech on Military Spending and a New Defense,” New York Times , January 27, 1983.

The Day After left even him feeling depressed: Thomas Reed, one of Reagan’s national security advisers, thought the film “understated… the horrors of nuclear war.” See Reed, At the Abyss , pp. 250, 255.

“A nuclear war cannot be won”: “Transcript of Statement by President,” New York Times , April 18, 1982.

“The President agreed this could be sorted out”: “Memorandum of Conversation, Hofdi House, Reykjavik, 3:25–6:00, October 12, 1986, United States Department of State (SECRET SENSITIVE declassified), p. 9, in George P. Shultz and Sidney D. Drell, Implications of the Reykjavik Summit on Its Twentieth Anniversary (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2007), p. 210.

The euphoria… didn’t last long: See Ibid., pp. 211-15.

almost half of the weapons in the American stockpile: Peurifoy interview.

Peurifoy wrote to the assistant secretary for defense programs: A more detailed account of the bureaucratic inertia can be found in Stevens, “Origins and Evolution of S2C,” pp. 162-66.

“The potential for a nuclear weapon accident”: Quoted in ibid., p. 164.

The Post ran a series of his articles: See R. Jeffrey Smith, “Defective Nuclear Shells Raise Safety Concerns; U.S. Secretly Repairing Weapons in Europe,” Washington Post , May 23, 1990; “Pentagon Urged to Ground Nuclear Missile for Safety,” Washington Post , May 24, 1990; “Pentagon to Await Missile Safety Study; Weapons Will Remain on ‘Alert’ Bombers,” Washington Post , May 25, 1990.

“weapon meets all our current safety standards”: Quoted in “Pentagon to Await Missile Safety Study.”

“no safety hazards to the public”: Quoted in R. Jeffrey Smith, “A-Missiles Ordered Off Planes; Weapons Grounded Pending Completion of Safety Review,” Washington Post , June 9, 1990.

The Drell Panel on Nuclear Weapons Safety: “Report of the Panel on Nuclear Weapons Safety of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 101st Congress, Second Session,” Sidney D. Drell, Chairman, John S. Foster, Jr., and Charles H. Townes, December 1990. For Drell’s testimony and a discussion of the panel’s findings, see “The Report of the Nuclear Weapons Safety Panel,” Hearing Before the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 101st Congress, Second Session, December 18, 1990.

“a realization that unintended nuclear detonations”: The panel singled out the SRAM as the cause of “greatest concern,” warning a fire could cause “the potential for dispersal of plutonium, or even of the generation of a nuclear detonation.” “Report of the Panel on Nuclear Weapons Safety,” p. 25.

“affirm enhanced safety as the top priority”: Ibid., p. 33.

A separate study on nuclear weapon safety: “Report to the Congress: Assessment of the Safety of U.S. Nuclear Weapons and Related Nuclear Test Requirements,“ R. E. Kidder, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, July 26, 1991.

Three weapons received an A: Ibid., p. 4.

General Colin Powell and Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney: For the decision to change the SIOP and reduce the number of targets in the Soviet Union, see Colin Powell with Joseph E. Persico, My American Journey (New York: Ballantine Books, 1996), pp. 540–41; and Reed, At the Abyss , pp. 278-84, 287-92.

Hundreds of nuclear warheads would hit Moscow: Cited in Reed, At the Abyss , p. 283.

“With the possible exception of the Soviet nuclear war plan”: “Speech to the Canadian Network Against Nuclear Weapons,” George Lee Butler, Montreal, March 11, 1999.