Eric Schlosser - Command and Control

Peurifoy didn’t like hearing that bit of information: My account of the accident response and render safe procedures at Damascus is based on interviews with Bob Peurifoy, William H. Chambers, Matt Arnold, and other EOD technicians.

None of the work at Los Alamos and NEST had made Chambers feel anxious: Chambers interview.

About a dozen people in Guy, Arkansas: See Art Harris, “Residents Near Site of Missile Explosion Complain of Illness,” Arkansas Democrat , September 26, 1980.

“The Air Force wouldn’t tell us a damn thing”: Quoted in “Air Force Says ‘No’ to Plea for Inspection,” Arkansas Democrat , September 21, 1980.

Gary Gray… said that he learned more from the radio: See Lamar James, “Civilians ‘Got Cold Shoulder’ from Military, Deputy Says,” Arkansas Gazette , September 21, 1980.

security police stopped Tatom on the access road: See “Air Force says ‘No’ to Plea for inspection.”

doing “the best they could”: Quoted in Don Johnson, “Clinton to Talk to Air Force Officials,” Arkansas Democrat , September 21, 1980.

“I assume they’re armed”: Quoted in “Mondale Avoids Admitting Missile Armed with Warhead,” Arkansas Gazette , September 20, 1980.

“I believe that the Titan missile system is a perfectly safe system”: “Transcript, News Conference by Secretary of the Air Force Hans Mark, Friday, September 19, 1980, 4:00 P.M., the Pentagon,” David H. Pryor Papers, University of Arkansas, Fayetteville.

“Accidents happen”: Ibid.

“pretty much the worst case”: Ibid.

“the emergency teams whose job it is”: Ibid.

“the emergency procedures worked properly”: Ibid.

the Titan II accident… was its first big, breaking story: CNN was the only national news network with a live camera at the sight. See Reese Schonfeld, Me Against the World: The Unauthorized Story of the Founding of CNN (New York: Cliff Street, 2001), pp. 182–86.

“as a means of reducing or preventing widespread public alarm”: Quoted in Ellen Debenport, “Air Force Could Have Confirmed Warhead’s Presence,” United Press International , September 26, 1980.

A newspaper cartoon depicted three Air Force officers: See “The Air Force on Nukes,” Arkansas Gazette , September 24, 1980.

“If you’re on the military’s side”: Art Buchwald, “Arrivederci, Arkansas,” Los Angeles Times , October 2, 1980.

“a nuclear conflict”: Quoted in “Russians Say Accidental Nuclear Explosion Could Touch Off War,” Associated Press , September 21, 1980.

“If it’s not safe and effective”: Quoted in “Congressman Wants Inquiry of Missile Silos,” Arkansas Democrat , September 20, 1980.

“Hey, Colonel, is that what you won’t confirm or deny?”: Quoted in “Titan Warhead Taken to Air Base,” Arkansas Gazette , September 23, 1980.

Reagan soundly defeated Jimmy Carter: Reagan got about 51 percent of the popular vote and 489 electoral votes; Carter about 41 percent, and 49 electoral votes. For a contemporary view of the political implications, see David S. Broder, “A Sharp Right Turn: Republicans and Democrats Alike See New Era in ’80 Returns,” Washington Post , November 6, 1980.

“Peace through strength”: Quoted in Lou Cannon, “Reagan Assures VFW He’ll Restore Defenses,” Boston Globe , August 19, 1980.

America’s defense budget would almost double: In 1980, the United States spent about $134 billion on defense; it spent about $253 billion in 1985. And the following year, it spent about $273 billion. Cited in “National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2013,” Table 7–1, p. 247.

Reagan opposed not only détente: For the origins of Reagan’s anti-Communism and his opposition to arms control agreements with the Soviet Union, see Paul Lettow, Ronald Reagan and His Quest to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (New York: Random House, 2005), pp. 10–18.

“motivated by fear of the bomb”: Quoted in ibid., p. 15.

“the most evil enemy”: Quoted in ibid., p. 17.

Iklé was still haunted: Iklé interview.

“assured genocide”: Iklé, “Can Nuclear Deterrence Last Out the Century?” p. 281.

a “form of warfare universally condemned”: Ibid., p. 281.

“an auto-da-fé”: Fred C. Iklé, “The Prevention of Nuclear War in a World of Uncertainty,” Policy Sciences, vol. 7, no. 2 (1976), p. 250.

Two Air Force reports on the Titan II: “Report of Missile Accident Investigation: Major Missile Accident, 18–19 September 1980, Titan II Complex 374-7, Assigned to 308th Strategic Missile Wing, Little Rock Air Force Base, Arkansas,” Conducted at Little Rock Air Force Base, Arkansas, and Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana, December 14–19, 1980, Eighth Air Force Missile Investigation Board, December 1980; and “Titan II Weapon System: Review Group Report,” December 1980.

destroyed by three separate explosions: See “Report, Major Missile Accident, Titan II Complex 374-7,” pp. 18–20; Tab I-8, pp. 1–4.

“It may not be important whether the immediate cause”: Ibid., Tab I-8, pp. 2–3.

the vapor detectors… were broken 40 percent of the time: Cited in “Titan II Review Group Report,” pp. 16, B–7, C-25.

the portable vapor detectors rarely worked: Ibid., pp. 17, B-8.

the radio system… was unreliable: Ibid., pp. B-8, B-9, C-29.

missile combat crews should be discouraged from evacuating: Ibid., pp. B-9, B-10.

the shortage of RFHCO suits often forced maintenance teams: Ibid., p. C-28.

the suits and helmets were obsolete: Ibid., pp. 17, C-40.

the air packs were obsolete: Ibid., p. C-40.

some of the missile’s spare parts were either hard to obtain: Ibid., p. C-35.

security police officers should always be provided with maps: Ibid., pp. E-73, E-74.

“modern safing features” should be added to the W-53 warhead: Ibid., p. D-4.

“modern nuclear safety criteria for abnormal environments”: Ibid.

a warning siren at every launch complex might be useful: Ibid., p. 33.

“potentially hazardous”… but “basically safe”: Ibid., p. 1.

“supportable now and in the foreseeable future”: Ibid., p. x.

Jeff Kennedy was angered by both of the reports: Kennedy interview.

guidance in the medical literature was scarce: One of the few good studies on the danger of the oxidizer happened to be published during the same week as the explosion at Launch Complex 374-7. It was written by Air Force physicians. See “The McConnell Missile Accident: Clinical Spectrum of Nitrogen Dioxide Exposure,” Lieutenant Colonel Charles C. Yockey, MC, USAF; Major Billy M. Eden, MC, USAF; Colonel Richard B. Byrd, MC, USAF, Journal of the American Medical Association , vol. 244, no. 11 (September 12, 1980).

nobody from the Air Force would speak to him, for three days after the accident: Anderson later told Morley Safer, a correspondent for 60 Minutes, that the Air Force didn’t share information about how to treat victims of oxidizer exposure until “three or four days” after the Damascus accident. Anderson was interviewed for “Titan,” 60 Minutes , November 8, 1981.

“Do not operate the switch”: “Report, Major Missile Accident, Titan II Complex 374-7,” Statement of Michael A. Hanson, Tab U-30, p. 7.