Eric Schlosser - Command and Control

as urgently needed… as intercontinental ballistic missiles: See “History of the XW-51 Warhead,” SC-M-67-683, AEC Atomic Weapon Data, January 1968 (SECRET/RESTRICTED DATA/declassified), p. 10.

“appear to be unreasonably high”: The document that the Army submitted as a reply to McNamara’s questions has been heavily censored, and yet the justification for seeking so many nuclear weapons seems clear. The Army wanted to defeat the Soviets on the ground in Western Europe, using “quick kill, quick response weapons.” And the author of the report was aware that the request might seem unreasonable. The full quote reads: “At the first reading, the number of weapons suggested appear to be unreasonably high.” In any event, the Army’s arguments failed to be persuasive. See “Requirements for Tactical Nuclear Weapons,” Special Studies Group (JCS), Project 23, C 2379, October 1962 (TOP SECRET/RESTRICTED DATA/declassified), p. 55.

“if the enemy does”: Taylor criticized the “emotional resistance in some quarters” to providing American troops in Europe with tens of thousands of small nuclear weapons. See “Memorandum from the President’s Military Representative (Taylor) to President Kennedy, May 25, 1962 (TOP SECRET/declassified), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VIII, National Security Policy , pp. 299–300. The quote is on page 300.

Air Force Intelligence had warned: According to the Air Force, the Soviet Union would have as many as 950 long-range missiles by mid-1964 and 1,200 by mid-1965. Instead, the Soviets never had more than 209 long-range missiles until the late 1960s. Cited in Raymond L. Garthoff, “Estimating Soviet Military Intentions and Capabilities,” in Gerald K. Haines and Robert E. Leggett, eds., Watching the Bear: Essays on CIA’s Analysis of the Soviet Union (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2003), p. 141.

only four missiles that could reach the United States: Cited in ibid.

the Soviet program had secretly endured a major setback: A leading Soviet rocket designer wrote the most authoritative account of what came to be known as the “Nedelin Catastrophe.” See Boris Chertok, Rockets and People, Volume II: Creating a Rocket Industry (Washington, D.C.: NASA History Series, 2006), pp. 597–641.

Tass… announced that Nedelin had been killed in a plane crash: See Osgood Caruthers, “Chief of Rockets Killed in Soviet,” New York Times , October 26, 1960.

“it would be premature to reach a judgment”: See “Transcript of the Kennedy News Conference on Foreign and Domestic Matters,” New York Times , February. 9, 1961.

Eisenhower had thought that twenty to forty would be enough: Cited in “The Ballistic Missile Decisions,” Robert L. Perry, The RAND Corporation, October 1967, p. 14.

Jerome Wiesner advised President Kennedy that roughly ten times that number: Wiesner thought that about two hundred missiles would be enough. See Ball, Politics and Force Levels, p. 85.

General Power wanted… ten thousand Minuteman missiles: Cited in Herbert F. York, Race to Oblivion: A Participant’s View of the Arms Race (New York: Simon Schuster, 1970), p. 152.

it was “a round number”: The adviser was Herbert F. York. Quoted in Herken, Counsels of War, p. 153.

“a matter of transcendent priority”: “Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Subject: Command and Control,” Robert S. McNamara, August 21, 1961 (TOP SECRET/declassified), NSA, p. 1.

“The chain of command from the President down”: “Letter, From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Kennedy,” February 20, 1961 (TOP SECRET/declassified), in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VIII, National Security Policy , p. 39.

“classify the attack, as large or small”: Wainstein, et al., “Evolution of U.S. Strategic Command and Control,” p. 292.

“The first duty of the command and control system”: Paul Baran, “On a Distributed Command and Control System Configuration,” U.S.A.F. Project RAND, RM-2632, Research Memorandum, December 31, 1960, p. 19.

Messages would be broken into smaller “blocks”: See Paul Baran, “On Distributed Communications Networks,” The RAND Corporation, P-2626, September 1962.

a “logical, survivable node in the control structure”: “Memorandum for the President, Subject: National Deep Underground Command Center as a Key FY 1965 Budget Consideration,” Robert S. McNamara, November 7, 1963 (TOP SECRET /declassified), NSA, p. 2, 4.

“austere” version or one of “moderate size”: Ibid., p. 3.

“withstand multiple direct hits of 200 to 300 MT: Ibid., p. 1.

While heading a committee on the risk of war by accident: Thomas Schelling described his concern about the lack of secure communications between the White House and the Kremlin, his role in creating the “hot line,” and his admiration for the novel Red Alert in an e-mail exchange with me.

“Mankind must put an end to war”: “Text of President Kennedy’s Address to the United Nations General Assembly,” New York Times , September 26, 1961.

“Today, every inhabitant of this planet”: Ibid.

“peace race”… “general and complete disarmament”: Ibid.

“Such a plan would not bring a world free from conflict”: Ibid.

“Together we shall save our planet”: Ibid.

“If a general atomic war is inevitable”: Quoted in “Memorandum of Conference with President Kennedy,” September 20, 1961 (TOP SECRET/declassified), in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VIII, National Security Policy , p. 130.

Kennedy had just received a memo: …summarizing how an American first strike: See “Memorandum from the President’s Military Representative (Taylor) to President Kennedy,” September 19, 1961 (TOP SECRET/declassified), in ibid., pp. 126–29.

“There are risks as well as opportunities”: ibid., p. 128.

once again, Berlin was at the center of the crisis: For the events in Berlin during the Kennedy years, see McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York: Random House, 1988), pp. 358–90; Vladislav M. Zubok, “Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis (1958–1962),” Cold War International History Project — Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 6, Washington, D.C., May 1993; Trachtenberg, Constructed Peace , pp. 251–351; Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, Khrushchev’s Cold War: The Inside Story of an American Adversary (New York: W. W. Norton, 2006), pp. 338–408; and Frederick Kempe, Berlin 1961: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Most Dangerous Place on Earth (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 2011).

“It is up to the United States to decide”: Quoted in Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchev’s Cold War , p. 364.

“Then it will be a cold winter”: Quoted in ibid.

the Joint Chiefs of Staff seemed to have few options: The historian Marc Trachtenberg suggests that Eisenhower’s nuclear strategy may have been more “flexible” than was later claimed. But the pressure to launch a full — scale nuclear attack on the Soviet Union — once American and Soviet troops were fighting on a battlefield in Europe — would have been enormous. See Trachtenberg, Conflict & Stragegy , pp. 209–12.

It would be “explosive”: Quoted in Trachtenberg, Constructed Peace , p. 289.