Eric Schlosser - Command and Control

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Command and Control: краткое содержание, описание и аннотация

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The New Yorker “Excellent… hair-raising
is how nonfiction should be written.” (Louis Menand)
Time
“A devastatingly lucid and detailed new history of nuclear weapons in the U.S…. fascinating.” (Lev Grossman)
Financial Times
“So incontrovertibly right and so damnably readable… a work with the multilayered density of an ambitiously conceived novel… Schlosser has done what journalism does at its best."
Los Angeles Times
“Deeply reported, deeply frightening… a techno-thriller of the first order.” Famed investigative journalist Eric Schlosser digs deep to uncover secrets about the management of America’s nuclear arsenal. A ground-breaking account of accidents, near-misses, extraordinary heroism, and technological breakthroughs,
explores the dilemma that has existed since the dawn of the nuclear age: how do you deploy weapons of mass destruction without being destroyed by them? That question has never been resolved — and Schlosser reveals how the combination of human fallibility and technological complexity still poses a grave risk to mankind.
Written with the vibrancy of a first-rate thriller,
interweaves the minute-by-minute story of an accident at a nuclear missile silo in rural Arkansas with a historical narrative that spans more than fifty years. It depicts the urgent effort by American scientists, policymakers, and military officers to ensure that nuclear weapons can’t be stolen, sabotaged, used without permission, or detonated inadvertently. Schlosser also looks at the Cold War from a new perspective, offering history from the ground up, telling the stories of bomber pilots, missile commanders, maintenance crews, and other ordinary servicemen who risked their lives to avert a nuclear holocaust. At the heart of the book lies the struggle, amid the rolling hills and small farms of Damascus, Arkansas, to prevent the explosion of a ballistic missile carrying the most powerful nuclear warhead ever built by the United States.
Drawing on recently declassified documents and interviews with men who designed and routinely handled nuclear weapons,
takes readers into a terrifying but fascinating world that, until now, has been largely hidden from view. Through the details of a single accident, Schlosser illustrates how an unlikely event can become unavoidable, how small risks can have terrible consequences, and how the most brilliant minds in the nation can only provide us with an illusion of control. Audacious, gripping, and unforgettable,
is a tour de force of investigative journalism, an eye-opening look at the dangers of America’s nuclear age.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?&v=h_ZvrSePzZY http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F2wR11pGsYk

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“There were three Jupiters setting there”: Ibid, p. 66.

“Non-Americans with non-American vehicles”: Ibid, p. 47.

“The prime loyalty of the guards, of course”: “Report on U.S. Policies Regarding Assignment of Nuclear Weapons to NATO,” p. 33.

French officers sought to gain control of a nuclear device: I first learned about the attempt from Thomas Reed, a former secretary of the Air Force and adviser to President Ronald Reagan. Reed briefly mentions the episode in a book that he wrote with Danny B. Stillman, a former director of the Los Alamos Technical Intelligence Division: The Nuclear Express: A Political History of the Bomb and Its Proliferation (Minneapolis: Zenith Press, 2009), pp. 79–80. The story is told in much greater detail by Bruno Tertrais in “A Nuclear Coup? France, the Algerian War and the April 1961 Nuclear Test,” Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique , Draft, October 2, 2011.

“Refrain from detonating your little bomb”: Quoted in Tetrais, “A Nuclear Coup?” p. 11.

“the dumping ground for obsolete warheads”: “Report on U.S. Policies Regarding Assignment of Nuclear Weapons to NATO,” p. 45.

Holifield estimated that about half of the Jupiters : Transcript, Executive Session, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Meeting No. 87-1-4, p. 82.

The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff admitted: See Nash, Other Missiles of October, p. 56.

“It would have been better to dump them in the ocean”: Quoted in ibid., p. 3.

The Mark 7 atomic bombs carried by NATO fighters: Agnew, Stevens, Peurifoy interviews.

amazed to see a group of NATO weapon handlers pull the arming wires out: Agnew interview. The bombs lacked trajectory-sensing switches and therefore could detonate without having to fall from a plane. Senator Anderson noted that at Vogel Air Base in the Netherlands “a safety wire designed to keep the firing switch open had been accidentally pulled from a nuclear weapon and that device, if dropped, would have exploded.” See Anderson, Outsider in the Senate , p. 172. “Letter, From Harold M. Agnew,” p. 8; “Report on U.S. Policies Regarding Assignment of Nuclear Weapons to NATO,” p. 37.

A rocket-propelled version of the Mark 7 was unloaded, fully armed: See “Incidents and Accidents,” Incident #3, p. 21.

“During initial inspection after receipt”: See ibid., Incident #1, p. 52.

A screwdriver was found inside one of the bombs; an Allen wrench was somehow left inside another: See ibid., Incident #1, p. 70.

the training and operating manuals for the Mark 7: See “Letter, from Harold M. Agnew,” p. 2.

“In many areas we visited”: “Report on U.S. Policies Regarding Assignment of Nuclear Weapons to NATO,” p. 38.

“far from remote”: Ibid., p. 2.

a mishap on January 16, 1961: See ibid. and “Incidents and Accidents,” Incident #3, p. 38. I was able to confirm where the accident occurred.

the current “fictional” custody arrangements: “Report on U.S. Policies Regarding Assignment of Nuclear Weapons to NATO,” p. 39.

A lone American sentry… was bound to start “goofing off”: See ibid., p. 32.

Agnew brought an early version of the electromechanical locking system: Agnew interview.

The coded switch… weighed about a pound: A weapon often contained two of these switches as a redundancy, to ensure that at least one would work. See “Command and Control Systems for Nuclear Weapons,” p. 13.

the decoder weighed about forty: Ibid., p. 14.

anywhere from thirty seconds to two and a half minutes to unlock: Ibid., p. 13.

“No single device can be expected to increase”: Quoted in “Subject: Atomic Stockpile, Letter, From John H. Pender, Legal Adviser, Department of State, To Abram J. Chayes, Legal Adviser, Department of State,” July 16, 1961 (TOP SECRET/declassified), NSA, p. 4.

“adequately safe, within the limits”: Quoted in ibid.

“all is well with the atomic stockpile program”: Ibid.

Wiesner was deeply concerned about the risk: See Carl Kaysen, “Peace Became His Profession,” in Walter A. Rosenblith, ed., Jerry Wiesner: Scientist, Statesman, Humanist (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003), p. 102.

the locks might help “to buy time”: The quote comes from “Memorandum for the President, From Jerome B. Wiesner, May 29, 1962,” in “PAL Control of Theater Nuclear Weapons,” p. 84.

“individual psychotics”: Ibid.

prevent “unauthorized use by military forces”: Ibid.

Known at first as “Prescribed Action Links”: See Stein and Feaver, Assuring Control of Nuclear Weapons, pp. 36–37.

the broad outlines of his defense policies: “The decisions of March 1961,” Desmond Ball has written, “determined to a very large extent the character of the U.S. strategic-force posture for the next decade.” The most important decisions had been made during the first two weeks of the month. See Ball, Politics and Force Levels , pp. 107–26. The quote is from page 121.

five of them would inflict more damage: The comparison was made between five 1-megaton weapons and one 10-megaton — with the larger number of small weapons achieving more blast damage. See Enthoven, How Much Is Enough? pp. 179–84.

the Navy had requested a dozen Polaris subs: See Ball, Politics and Force Levels , pp. 45–46.

Kennedy decided to build 41: See ibid., pp. 46–7, 116–17.

about half of SAC’s bomber crews, if not more: Cited in “Statement of Robert S. McNamara on the RS-70,” Senate Armed Services Committee, March 14, 1962 (TOP SECRET/declassified), NSA, p. 12. This document somehow escaped the black pen of a Pentagon censor — it discloses the nuclear yield and accuracy of the major strategic weapon systems at the time. That information can be found on page 18.

“pipe-smoking, tree-full-of-owls type”: I first encountered this quote in Fred Kaplan’s superb Wizards of Armageddon: The Untold Story of the Small Group of Men Who Have Devised the Plans and Shaped the Policies on How to Use the Bomb (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), p. 255. It comes from an article by White about the whiz kids running the Pentagon, “Strategy and the Defense Intellectuals, Saturday Evening Post , May 4, 1963.

the proportion of SAC bombers on ground alert… on airborne alert: Policies that Eisenhower had strongly resisted became routine early in the Kennedy administration. During the presidential campaign, Kennedy had promised that SAC would have a round-the-clock airborne alert. For the details of SAC’s new alert policies, see “History of Headquarters Strategic Air Command, 1961,” SAC Historical Study No. 89, Headquarters, Strategic Air Command, Offutt AFB, Nebraska, January 1962 (TOP SECRET/declassified), NSA, pp. 58–65. For Kennedy’s campaign promise, see Ball, Politics and Force Levels, p. 18.

“one defense policy, not three”: Quoted in Jack Raymond, “M’Namara Scores Defense Discord,” New York Times , April 21, 1963. McNamara had made his opposition to interservice rivalry clear from the start.

the Army was now seeking thirty-two thousand nuclear weapons: Cited in “Memorandum from Secretary Defense McNamara to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Lemnitzer),” May 23, 1962 (TOP SECRET/declassified), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VIII, National Security Policy, p. 297.

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