Eric Schlosser - Command and Control

“something foolish down the chain of command”: Quoted in ibid., p. 156.

“very fearful of having written papers on this matter”: The quote is a paraphrase by the author of the memo and can be found in “Memorandum of Conference with the President, June 27, 1958,” A. J. Goodpaster (TOP SECRET/declassified), NSA, p. 3.

“It is in the U.S. interest to maintain”: The quote is a paraphrase by the author of the memo and can be found in “Memorandum of Conference with the President, December 19, 1958,” John S. D. Eisenhower (TOP SECRET/declassified), NSA, p.1.

Colonel John T. Moser and his wife: Interview with Colonel John T. Moser.

The two had to rendezvous at a precise location: For the details of this tricky but essential procedure, see Richard K. Smith, Seventy-Five Years of Inflight Refueling: Highlights, 1923–1998 (Washington, D.C.: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1998), pp. 38–9.

Leavitt made it clear: Interview with General Lloyd R. Leavitt.

Of the 119 West Pointers who graduated from flight school: Cited in Lloyd R. Leavitt, Following the Flag: An Air Force Officer Provides an Eyewitness View of Major Events and Policies During the Cold War (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2010), p. 57.

“Landing the U-2,” Leavitt wrote: Ibid., p. 175.

Of the thirty-eight U-2 pilots… eight died flying the plane: See ibid., p. 185.

“ordered everyone to evacuate the control center”: Moser interview.

When Ben Scallorn first reported to Little Rock: Interview with Colonel Ben G. Scallorn.

4.5 million pounds of steel: About 2,255 tons of steel were used. Cited in Stumpf, Titan II , p. 112.

30 million pounds of concrete: About 7,240 cubic yards of concrete were used — and a cubic yard of concrete weighs about two tons. Cited in ibid.

a management practice known as “concurrency”: The great advantage of concurrency was that it allowed new weapon systems to be developed quickly; the main disadvantage was that those weapons tended to be unreliable and often didn’t work. See Stephen Johnson, The United States Air Force and the Culture of Innovation: 1945–1965 (Washington, D.C.: Air Force History and Museums Program, 2002), pp. 19–22, 89–94.

one of the largest construction projects ever undertaken by the Department of Defense: For details of how the silos and launch complexes were built, see Joe Alex Morris, “Eighteen Angry Men: The Hard-Driving Colonels Who Work Against Crucial Deadlines to Ready Our Missile Launching Sites,” Saturday Evening Post , January 13, 1962; John C. Lonnquest and David F. Winkler, To Defend and Deter: The Legacy of the United States Cold War Missile Program (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, Legacy Resource Management Program, Cold War Project, 1996), pp. 77–88; and Stumpf, Titan II , pp. 99–127.

an area extending for thirty-two thousand square miles: The launch sites of the 91st Strategic Missile Wing at Minot Air Force Base were set amid 8,500 square miles — about 12 percent of the land in North Dakota. And the sites of the 341st Strategic Missile Wing at Malmstrom Air Force Base were spread out across 23,500 square miles of Montana. See “Fact Sheet,” 91st Missile Wing — Minot Air Force Base, April 14, 2011; and “Fact Sheet,” 341st Missile Wing — Malmstrom Air Force Base, August 2, 2010.

a population of about ten thousand: Cited in “History of Air Research and Development Command, July — December 1960” Volume III, Historical Division, Air Research & Development Command, United States Air Force (n.d.), (SECRET/RESTRICTED DATA/declassified), p. 19.

“Like any machine… they don’t always work”: Quoted in “USAF Ballistic Missile Programs, 1962–1964,” Bernard C. Nalty, USAF Historical Division Liaison Office, April 1966 (TOP SECRET/declassified), NSA, p. 47.

the Snark: For a wonderful account of this illfated missile, see Kenneth P. Werrell, The Evolution of the Cruise Missile (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1985), pp. 82–96.

missed by an average of twenty miles or more: More important, only one out of three Snarks were likely to get off the ground. See ibid., pp. 95–96.

a Snark that was supposed to fly no farther than Puerto Rico: For the story of the runaway missile, see J. P. Anderson, “The Day They Lost the Snark,” Air Force Magazine , December 2004, pp. 78–80.

The Army’s Redstone missile: Although its range was short, the missile was so reliable that it was used by NASA to launch America’s first astronaut into space. See “History of the Redstone Missile System,” John W. Bullard, Historical Division, Army Missile Command, AMC 23 M, October 15, 1965.

Launched from NATO bases in West Germany: Bob Peurifoy told me about the mismatch between the yield of the Redstone’s warhead and the distance that it could fly.

It would take at least fifteen minutes to launch any of the missiles: For the technical and operational details of the Thor, see Stephen Twigge and Len Scott, Planning Armageddon: Britain, the United States and the Command of Western Nuclear Forces, 1945–1964 (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 2000), pp. 109–12.

as much as two days to complete its mission: Ibid., p. 111.

useful for a surprise attack: For an excellent summary of the inherent flaws of Thor and Jupiter missiles, the intermediate-range missiles that the United States shared with its NATO allies, see Philip Nash, The Other Missiles of October: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the Jupiters, 1957–1963 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina, 1997), pp. 80–85.

the Atlas missile loomed as America’s great hope: For the definitive account of the Atlas program, cowritten by one of its managers, see Chuck Walker, with Joel Powell, ATLAS: The Ultimate Weapon by Those Who Built It (Ontario, Canada: Apogee Books Production, 2005).

a “fire waiting to happen”: For the dangers of the Atlas and Titan propellants, see Charlie Simpson, “LOX and RP1 — Fire Waiting to Happen,” Association of Air Force Missileers Newsletter, vol. 14, no. 3 (September 3, 2006). Colonel Simpson is the executive director of the Association of Air Force and worked with Titan I missiles.

a temperature of -297 degrees Fahrenheit: Cited in Walker, ATLAS , Appendix D, p. 281.

the odds of an Atlas missile hitting a target… no better than fifty-fifty: The estimate was sheepishly offered by Major General Thomas P. Gerrity, Commander, Ballistic Systems Division, Air Force Systems Command. Another officer optimistically predicted that the reliability of the Atlas would reach 85 percent. Instead, all of the missiles were deactivated and removed from service within a few years. For the reliability estimates, see “Missile Procurement, Air Force,” pp. 529–30.

General Thomas Power: …thought the odds were closer to zero: See Jacob Neufeld, The Development of Ballistic Missiles in the United States Air Force, 1945–1960 , (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1990), p. 216.

During a test run of the first Titan silo: For more details of the accident, see Stumpf, Titan II , pp. 23–26.

about 170,000 pounds of liquid oxygen and fuel: The missile was fully loaded with propellants.

Donald Quarles was one of the leading skeptics: A few months before his death, Quarles was strongly attacked by the columnist Joseph Alsop for opposing new missile programs and allowing the United States to fall behind the Soviets. See Joseph Alsop, “Mister Missile Gap,” Washington Post , April 24, 1959.