Eric Schlosser - Command and Control

“Nobody wins a suicide pact”: “Summary of Major Strategic Considerations for the 1960–70 Era,” CNO Personal Letter No. 5, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, July 30, 1958, NSA, p. 1.

“the public mind”… “the professional military mind”: “The Operational Side of Air Offense,” remarks by General Curtis E. LeMay to the USAF Scientific Advisory Board, at Patrick Air Force Base, May 21, 1957 (TOP SECRET/declassified), NSA, p. 2.

“the most humane method of waging war”: “The Air Force and Strategic Deterrence 1951–1960,” George F. Lemmer, USAF Historical Division Liaison Office, December 1967, (SECRET/RESTRICTED DATA/declassified), NSA, p. 57.

“weapons must be delivered with either very high accuracy”: “Operational Side of Air Offense,” p. 4.

a hydrogen bomb with a yield of 60 megatons: LeMay argued that such a bomb would have enormous value as a deterrent — and, if used, could wipe out several targets at once. He and General Power wanted to equip SAC’s B-52s with these Class A weapons. But Eisenhower refused to test or build them. See “History of the Strategic Air Command, 1 January 1958 — 30 June 1958,” pp. 85–88.

Until 1957 the Strategic Air Command refused to share: See Ball and Richelson, Strategic Nuclear Targeting , p. 50.

hundreds of “time over target” conflicts: See Wainstein, et al., “Evolution of U.S. Command and Control,” p. 182.

“atomic coordination machinery”: See ibid., p. 179.

“It was fatuous to think that the U.S.”: Quoted in Richard M. Leighton, Strategy, Money, and the New Look, 1953–1956 (Washington, D.C.: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2001), p. 663.

“an all-out strike on the Soviet Union”: The quote is Kistiakowsky’s paraphrase of what Eisenhower said. See Kistiakowsky, A Scientist at the White House , p. 400.

the “optimum mix”: For the origins of the term, see Desmond Ball, “The Development of the SIOP, 1960–1983,” in Ball and Richelson, Strategic Nuclear Targeting , p. 61.

“atomic operations must be pre-planned”: See “Target Coordination and Associated Problems,” memorandum from General Nathan F. Twining, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to Neil H. McElroy, Secretary of Defense, JSC 2056/131, August 17, 1959 (TOP SECRET/declassified), NSA, p. 1147.

“exactly the same techniques”: See “Conversation Between Admiral Arleigh Burke, Chief of Naval Operations, and William B. Franke, Secretary of the Navy,” transcript, August 12, 1960 (TOP SECRET/declassified), NSA, p. 17. It is not clear who recorded the conversation — or whether Burke knew the conversation was being taped.

“The systems will be laid”: Ibid., p. 8.

“The grooves will be dug”: Ibid.

“This whole thing has to be”: Quoted in Ball and Richelson, Strategic Nuclear Targeting , p. 54.

as rational, impersonal, and automated as possible: My account of the SIOP’s creation is largely based on “Development of the SIOP”; Scott C. Sagan, “SIOP-62: The Nuclear War Plan Briefing to President Kennedy,” International Security , vol. 12, no. 1 (Summer 1987), pp. 22–51; “SIOP-62 Briefing: The JCS Single Integrated Operational Plan—1962 (SIOP-62), (TOP SECRET/declassified), Ibid., pp. 41–51; “History of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff: Background and Preparation of SIOP-62,” History and Research Division, Headquarters, Strategic Air Command, 1963 (TOP SECRET/declassified), NSA; “History of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff: Preparation of SIOP-63,” History and Research Division, Headquarters, Strategic Air Command, January 1964 (TOP SECRET/declassified), NSA; and “Strategic Air Planning and Berlin (Kaysen Study),” memorandum for General Maxwell Taylor, Military Representative to the President, from Carl Kaysen, Special Assistant to McGeorge Bundy, National Security Adviser , September 5, 1961 (TOP SECRET/declassified), NSA.

the Air Force’s Bombing Encyclopedia: For the origins and the nomenclature of this unusual reference book, see Lynn Eden, Whole World on Fire: Organizations, Knowledge & Nuclear Weapons Devastation (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), pp. 107–9.

a compendium of more than eighty thousand potential targets: Cited in “SIOP-62 Briefing,” p. 44.

twelve thousand candidates in the Soviet Union, the Eastern bloc: Cited in “Preparation of SIOP-63,” p. 18.

A “target weighing system”: See “Background and Preparation of SIOP-62,” p. 19.

total value of five million points: Cited in “Strategic Air Planning and Berlin,” Annex B, p. 2.

the “clobber factor”: See “Preparation of SIOP-63,” p. 34.

the odds of a target being destroyed… at least 75 percent: Cited in “Strategic Air Planning and Berlin,” Annex B, p. 2.

a Jupiter missile, a Titan missile, an Atlas missile: See ibid., p. 4.

The “alert force”… the “full force”: Ibid.

“Tactics programmed for the SIOP”: “SIOP-62 Briefing,” p. 48.

attack the Soviet Union “front-to-rear”: For a description of the “‘front-to-rear’ policy,” see “Air Force and Strategic Deterrence,” p. 56.

a tactic called “bomb as you go”: See “SIOP-62 Briefing,” p. 48.

nuclear weapons solely for city busting: The quote is from Air Marshal Sir George Mills, who made clear in 1955 that the British much preferred destroying “morale targets” — Soviet cities, not air fields. “Our aim in retaliation,” Mills wrote, “is to hit him where it really hurts.” See Ken Young, “A Most Special Relationship: The Origins of Anglo-American Nuclear Strike Planning,” Journal of Cold War Studies , vol. 9, no. 2, 2007, pp. 5–31. The quotes are from pages 11 and 24.

three air bases, six air defense targets, and forty-eight cities: Cited in ibid., p. 27.

“unnecessary and undesirable overkill”: Quoted in Ball and Richelson, Strategic Nuclear Targeting, p. 55.

enough “megatons to kill 4 and 5 times over”: Quoted in Ibid.

“just one whack — not ten whacks”: Quoted in ibid., p. 56.

“I believe that the presently developed SIOP”: “Annex: Extract from Memorandum for the President from the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, dated 25 November 1960,” in “Note by the Secretaries to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Strategic Target Planning,” January 27, 1961 (TOP SECRET/declassified), NSA, p. 1913.

“a 100 percent pulverization of the Soviet Union”: Quoted in “Discussion at the 387th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, November 20, 1958” (TOP SECRET/declassified), NSA, p. 5.

“There was obviously a limit”: Ibid., p. 5.

3,729 targets: …more than 1,000 ground zeros: Cited in “Strategic Air Planning and Berlin,” Annex B, p. 2.

3,423 nuclear weapons: Ibid., p. 4.

About 80 percent were military targets: Cited in “SIOP-62 Briefing,” p. 50.

295 were in the Soviet Union and 78 in China: See “Strategic Air Planning and Berlin,” Annex B, p. 2.

54 percent of the Soviet Union’s population and about 16 percent of China’s: See Ibid., Annex A, p. 2; Annex B, p. 12.

roughly 220 million people: The population of the Soviet Union was about 210 million at the time; the population of China about 682 million.

Eisenhower agreed to let high-ranking commanders decide: For the best account of how the military gained the authority to initiate the use of nuclear weapons, see Roman, “Ike’s Hair-Trigger,” pp. 121–164.