Günter Bischof - The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968

72. At the October plenary session of the CC CPSU, Brezhnev said that in order to make the position of the USSR clear regarding the Czechoslovak crisis “the members of the Politburo and the Secretaries of the CC CPSU conducted more than fifty meetings and talks with leading figures of the fraternal parties.” RGANI, F. 2, op. 3, d. 130, p. 20, from the stenographic notes on the plenum of the CC CPSU. Speech of the secretary-general of the CC CPSU, Brezhnev, “On the Foreign Political Activities of the Politburo of the CC CPSU,” 31 October 1968, reprinted in Karner et al., Dokumente , #122.

73. RGANI, F. 3, op. 68, d. 852, p. 23, materials on the resolution of the Politburo of the CC CPSU, “On the Answer to Comrade W. Rochet,” 19 July 1968.

74. RGANI, F. 3, op. 68, d. 852, p. 10, materials on the resolution of the Politburo of the CC CPSU, “On the Briefing of the Soviet Ambassadors in Connection with the Publication of the Five Fraternal Parties’ Letter to the Central Committee of the KSČ,” 19 July 1968.

75. RGANI, F. 3, op. 68, d. 860, pp. 44–45, materials on the resolution of the Politburo of the CC CPSU, “On the Telegram to the Ambassador of the USSR in the ČSSR,” 26 July 1968.

76. It took Moscow’s threat to move the meeting to Chop, a border town on Soviet territory, for the KSČ leaders to issue a guarantee that the press would be kept away from the negotiations in Čierná nad Tisou. RGANI, F. 3, op. 68, d. 860, p. 97, materials on the resolution of the Politburo CC CPSU, “On the Brief Given to the Ambassador of the USSR in the ČSSR,” 26 July 1968.

77. RGANI, F. 3, op. 72, d. 189, pp. 3, 5, Politburo resolution of the CC CPSU P 92 (III), “On the Meeting of the Leaders of the Socialist Countries’ Fraternal Parties,” 20 July 1968.

78. A good indicator of the mood in which the participants were looking forward to the meeting is the note of the Soviet ambassador to the GDR, Pyotr Abrasimov, to the CC CPSU of 28 July 1968, stating that Walter Ulbricht and his entourage were prepared to be in Moscow “on 30 July at 5 or 6 p.m.” for a discussion of options concerning Czechoslovakia, including “a collective strike.” Vondrová and Navrátil, Mezinárodní souvislosti československé krize , 33–34. An indirect corroboration of the fact that the beginning of the interventions had been scheduled for the end of July or the beginning of August is to be found in a note in Valerij Vartanov, “Die militärische Niederschlagung des ‘Prager Frühlings,’” in Karner et al., Beiträge , 661–71. Vartanov states that “in the night of 29/30 July 1968, the squadrons of the Soviet air force, which were dispersed across the entire Soviet Union, were unexpectedly ordered, under the pretext of a drill, to leave the barracks and report at the assembly points” (p. 663).

79. In addition to the negotiations between the entire delegations in Čierná nad Tisou, there were other small-scale meetings. Brezhnev talked with Dubček tête-àtête, and in negotiations with four participants on each side, the teams consisted of Brezhnev, Kosygin, Podgornyi, and Suslov on the Soviet side and of Dubček, Svoboda, Smrkovský, and Černík on the side of the Czechoslovaks. This is corroborated not only by the fact that no minutes of the negotiations in Čierná nad Tisou of any kind are to be found in Russian archives, but also by another piece of evidence, namely that the Soviet leaders subsequently accused Dubček during the negotiations in Moscow of not honoring the obligations into which he had entered, but were unable to produce a single document to prove to the KSČ leader precisely what kind of obligations he had, in fact, assumed.

80. RGANI, F. 2, op. 3, d. 130, pp. 2–3, stenographic minutes of the plenary session of the CC CPSU, speech of the secretary-general of the CC CPSU, L. I. Brezhnev, “On the Foreign Political Activities of the Politburo of the CC CPSU,” 31 October, 1968. The most important topics are the dismissals of František Kriegel from his post as a member of the Presidium of the CC KSČ and as chairman of the National Front, of Česimír Císar from his post as the secretary of the CC KSČ, and of Jiří Pelikán from his post as head of the television company.

81. Shortly afterwards, Brezhnev pointed out to Dubček in a telephone conversation that there had been no need for the Soviet delegation during the negotiations in Čierná nad Tisou to raise certain topics themselves: “You raised these questions at the time, without any arm twisting on our part, of your own accord and quite independently, and you yourselves promised to come up quickly with solutions.” RGANI, F. 89, op. 76, d. 75, p. 5, Brezhnev on the phone to Dubček, 13 August 1968, reprinted in Karner et al., Dokumente , #57.

82. In Moscow, the idea was even floated of inviting Nixon to the Crimea, in case the majority of the Soviet party leaders were still away on holiday at the time.

83. On 9 and 10 August, Stepan Chervonenko was given the order twice by Moscow to pay the Czechoslovak leadership an official call because of the anti-Soviet and antisocialist campaign that continued to be waged in the country. At the same time (on 9 August), Brezhnev talked to Dubček on the phone; the tone was tense but relatively cordial—Dubček promised again he would stand by what he had committed himself to in Čierná nad Tisou, and Brezhnev wished him luck. Vondrová and Navrátil, Mezinárodní souvislosti československé krize , 164–66.

84. RGANI, F. 89, op. 76, d. 75, pp. 1–18, transcript of the telephone conversation between Brezhnev and Dubček, 13 August 1968, reprinted in Karner et al., Dokumente , #57.

85. “I would dearly love to throw in the towel and return to my former job…. At the next plenary session they are going to elect a new first secretary of the CC KSČ… I would do any kind of work. I don’t like this post. Whoever wants to have it, let him have it, it doesn’t matter to me who is going to be the first secretary of the CC KSČ.” RGANI, F. 89, op. 76, d. 75, pp. 1–18 (see note 89).

86. The notes that accompany this document, which has been published in Navrátil’s volume, The Prague Spring 1968 , float the idea that Brezhnev may have understood some of Dubček’s statements as a signal (“green light”) for the interventions to begin (327). Even if one assumes that Dubček did not want deliberately to provoke military measures taken by the Soviet leadership, the line he opted for as the leader of a party and a country that were under the threat of “fraternal military help” from the beginning of 1968 onward was utterly irresponsible in the existing circumstances.

87. This was actually borne out by Brezhnev, who said at the meeting of the five countries taking part in the military intervention on 18 August in Moscow that “the Politburo of the CC CPSU had discussed these questions in detail yesterday, the day before yesterday and three days ago [i.e., on 15 August].” RGANI, F. 10, op. 1, d. 246, p. 22, stenographic minutes of the meeting of the Interventionist Coalition in Moscow, 18 August 1968, reprinted in Karner et al., Dokumente , #87.

88. In the original draft of the document, the request addressed to KSČ leadership “to find the strength and the courage to mobilize the party” for the struggle against the counterrevolution was removed as well as remarks on the de facto split of the CC KSČ, and so forth. RGANI, F. 3, op. 68, d. 871, pp. 138–39, materials on the Politburo resolution of the CC CPSU, “On the Information of the Fraternal Parties Regarding the Results of the Meeting in Čierná nad Tisou and the Conference in Bratislava,” 13 August 1968.

89. RGANI, F. 3, op. 72, d. 193, pp. 45, 75–80, Politburo resolution of the CC CPSU P 94 (102), “On the Information of the Fraternal Parties Regarding the Results of the Meeting in Čierná nad Tisou and the Conference in Bratislava,” 13 August 1968, reprinted in Karner et al., Dokumente , #56.