Günter Bischof - The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968

25. RGANI, F. 3, op. 68, d. 820, p. 56; RGANI, F. 3, op. 72, d. 177, 27 (see note 17).

26. RGANI, F. 3, op. 72, d. 170, p. 3, Politburo Resolution des CC CPSU P 82 (II), “Concerning the Situation in Czechoslovakia,” 23 May 1968.

27. RGANI, F. 2, op. 3, d. 114, p. 47, stenographic notes on the session of the plenum of the CC CPSU, speech of the secretary-general of the CC CPSU, L. I. Brezhnev, “On the results of the meeting of the delegations of the Communist and Workers’ Parties of the Socialist countries in Warsaw,” 17 July 1968.

28. Pikhoya, Sovetskii Soyuz: Istoriya vlasti , 309.

29. On 15 March 1968, Dubček tried to conciliate Brezhnev in a telephone conversation by assuring him that “there will be no incidents either in Prague or elsewhere in the country; things are looking bad in Poland right now, and they need help straightaway.” Quoted in Pikhoya, Sovetskii Soyuz: Istoriya vlasti , 309.

30. Dubček apologized for the “unfortunate article” about Nagy, which had appeared in the periodical of the Czechoslovak writers’ association Literární listy under the title “One More Anniversary,” and assured Brezhnev that the situation after the publication of the article was meanwhile back to normal. “There will be no repetition of this… everything is in order now.” Quoted in Pikhoya, Sovetskii Soyuz: Istoriya vlasti , 324.

31. RGANI, F. 5, op. 60, d. 311, pp. 1–6, report of the military attaché of the Soviet embassy in the ČSSR, Lt.-Gen. Nikolai Trusov, to the CC CPSU on Czechoslovak press reports and radio and television programs on the Warsaw Pact exercises in the ČSSR, 18 July 1968, reprinted in: Karner et al., Dokumente , #91; some statements of Czechoslovak leaders concerning the Warsaw Pact further exacerbated tensions between the two countries. In Moscow, the statement of the head of the state administrative department of the CC KSČ, Václav Prchlík, provoked a storm of indignation. Prchlík criticized not only the pact’s structure and activities, but in doing so even “allowed,” as the document notes, “top secret data to be published.” RGANI, F. 3, op. 72, d. 189, pp. 6, 48–52, Politburo Resolution of the CC CPSU P 92 (2), “On the note to the government of the ČSSR.” Attachment: note to the government of the ČSSR, 20 July 1968. The demands for a reform of the Warsaw Pact system and even for a withdrawal option called up new associations in Moscow with Hungary in 1956, with Nagy announcing Hungary’s withdrawal from this organization at the climax of the revolution.

32. RGANI, F. 3, op. 68, d. 820, p. 53 (see note 20).

33. RGANI, F. 2, op. 3, d. 114, p. 45, stenographic notes of the session of the plenum of the CC CPSU, speech of the secretary-general of the CC CPSU, L. I. Brezhnev, “On the Results of the Meeting of the Delegations of the Communist and Workers’ Parties of the Socialist Countries in Warsaw,” 17 July 1968.

34. RGANI, F. 10, op. 1, d. 324, p. 23, minutes of the meeting of the leader of the CC CPSU with the leaders of the Communist parties of Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR and Poland, 8 May 1968, reprinted in Karner et al., Dokumente , #214; RGANI, F. 10, op. 1, d. 324, p. 23, stenographic minutes of the meeting of the Interventionist Coalition in Moscow, 18 August 1968, reprinted in Karner et al., Dokumente , #87; Kosygin held the same opinion, particularly after the KSČ leadership had asked the USSR in spring 1968 for a loan of 500 million rubles in gold: “They know that their request will be turned down, that we cannot possibly grant them a loan under the conditions that they are offering—and this is precisely what they are banking on.” In Pikhoya, Sovetskii Soyuz: Istoriya vlasti , 316.

35. Another difference between the situation in Czechoslovakia and events in Hungary in 1956 was the relationship of the local mass media with the Soviet Union and its politics. In their struggle with their conservative opponents, the Hungarian reformists pointed to the example of Moscow, where, as they thought, the process of “true” de-Stalinization and the democratization of society had set in after Nikita Khrushchev’s anti-Stalinist speech at the 20th Party Conference of the CPSU. By contrast, the tide of criticism of the USSR kept on rising in Czechoslovakia during the course of 1968. Even when Moscow attempted to demonstrate a measure of loyalty to and understanding of the specific situation in the ČSSR (as is evidenced above all by the alterations in the Pravda print version of large parts of the speech that Dubček gave at the April plenum of the CC KSČ, which concerned all passages that sounded “suspicious” to Soviet ears), no positive reaction was in evidence in the Czechoslovak mass media.

36. RGANI, F. 2, op. 3, d. 114, p. 42, stenographic notes of the session of the CC CPSU plenum, speech of the secretary-general of the CC CPSU, L. I. Brezhnev, “On the Results of the Meeting of the Delegations of the Communist and Workers’ Parties of the Socialist Countries in Warsaw,” 17 July 1968.

37. RGANI, F. 89, op. 38, d. 57, p. 9, stenographic notes of the meetings of the Soviet leadership with the state president of the ČSSR, L. Svoboda and M. Klusák, 23 August 1968, reprinted in Karner et al., Dokumente , #107; RGANI, F. 89, op. 38, d. 57, S. 49, stenographic notes of the meetings of the state president of the ČSSR, L. Svoboda, 23 August 1968, reprinted in Karner et al., Dokumente , #108.

38. RGANI, F. 3, op. 68, d. 838, pp. 7–17, 18–22, report by Suslov, Ponomaryov, and Rusakov, “On the Memorandum of the CC CPSU addressed to the CC KSČ,” 29 June 1968; draft of a memorandum of the CC CPSU addressed to the CC KSČ, with guidelines for the Soviet ambassador’s meeting with Dubček; text of a letter written by Sharaf Radishov from Tashkent, 1 July 1968; Shelepin’s report to Brezhnev, 30 June 1968.

39. RGANI, F. 3, op. 68, d. 838, pp. 25–32.

40. RGANI, F. 3, op. 68, d. 838, p. 38.

41. RGANI, F. 3, op. 68, d. 838, pp. 25–32.

42. RGANI, F. 3, op. 68, d. 838, p. 39.

43. Similar cases, in which the Politburo (and/or the Presidium) of the CC CPSU discussed one and the same issue for two days, were limited to the great political crises: Hungary (1956), Cuba (1962), and 1964, when Khrushchev was ousted.

44. RGANI, F. 3, op. 72, d. 183, pp. 3, 5–13, Politburo Resolution of the CC CPSU P 88 (I), “On the Memorandum of the Politburo of the CC CPSU addressed to the Presidium of the CC KSČ,” 3 July 1968, reprinted in Karner et al., Dokumente , #37.

45. RGANI, F. 3, op. 72, d. 183, pp. 3, 5–13.

46. RGANI, F. 3, op. 68, d. 838, p. 49, stenographic notes of the session of the plenum of the CC CPSU, speech of the secretary-general of the CC CPSU, L. I. Brezhnev, “On the Results of the Meeting of the Delegations of the Communist and Workers’ Parties of the Socialist Countries in Warsaw,” 17 July 1968.

47. RGANI, F. 3, op. 72, d. 183, p. 4, Politburo Resolution des CC CPSU P 88 (II), “On Organizing a Meeting of the Representatives of the Fraternal Parties,” 3 July 1968.

48. RGANI, F. 3, op. 72, d. 183, p. 13.

49. RGANI, F. 3, op. 68, d. 845, p. 15, report on the Politburo Resolution of the CC CPSU, “On Organizing a Meeting of the Representatives of the Fraternal Parties,” report by Suslov, Arvı-ds Pel’she, Shelepin, 3 July 1968.

50. Another member of the Warsaw Pact, Romania, was left out of this meeting owing to the “special” attitude of its leading political figures, who were at pains to flaunt their “independence” of the USSR.

51. The participants declared themselves particularly appalled by the demonstration on 1 May in Prague, where there had not been a single banner in honor of the Communist Party, where sympathizers of previously dissolved and banned organizations had turned up with nationalist catchphrases and even “a U.S. flag,” and where all this had been applauded by the Czechoslovak leadership with Dubček at the head.