Günter Bischof - The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968

3. The attitude of reformist members of the Czechoslovak leadership is illustrated by a statement made by M. Tokar, an attaché at the ČSSR embassy in the GDR, in a meeting with a Soviet diplomat (Tokar was considered to be “pro-Soviet,” for he had graduated from the Moscow Institute for International Relations and had married the daughter of Mikhail Men’shikov, who was foreign minister of the RSFSR until August 1968): “In order to be able to solve the political and economic tasks confronting the ČSSR, 50,000 individuals who have held until now key positions in all areas of the political, state and economic administration have to resign from their post or face dismissal.” RGANI, F. 5, op. 60, d. 299, p. 155, minutes of a conversation between the first secretary of the Soviet embassy in the GDR, Vsevolod Sovva, with the attaché of the Czechoslovak embassy in the GDR, M. Tokar, 5 April 1968.

4. RGANI, F. 3, op. 68, d. 744, pp. 9–13, an excerpt from minutes of the session of the Politburo CC CPSU, “On the Memorandum of the Politburo CC CPSU to the presidium of the CC,” 15 March 1968.

5. RGANI, F. 3, op. 68, d. 744, pp. 5–6, 9–13.

6. RGANI, F. 3, op. 72, d. 155, pp. 9–12, decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union [CPSU], “Regarding the Invitation of the Czechoslovak Communist Party chiefs to spend their vacation in the Soviet Union,” addendum to the letter by Leonid Brezhnev to Dubček, 15 March 1968.

7. RGANI, F. 3, op. 72, d. 155, pp. 2–3.

8. After the invasion of the troops on the territory of Czechoslovakia, Brezhnev confirmed that the Soviet Union never tried to protect Novotný: “I did not know a thing then, only said, that if you don’t want to make him your president, then don’t.” RGANI, F. 89, op 38, d. 57, p. 32, stenographic protocol of the negotiations between Brezhnev, Aleksei Kosygin, and Nikolai Podgornyi with the Czechoslovak president Ludvík Svoboda, 23 August 1968, reprinted in Karner et al., Dokumente , #108. Indeed, there were grave concerns about Novotný in the Soviet Union; he enjoyed only little control in his country and the party, was unpopular with the Czechoslovak population, was critical about Nikita Khrushshev’s firing in 1964, and so forth. However, given the activation of “revisionist forces,” Moscow was interested in having even a conservative leader head Czechoslovakia as long as he believed in the ideas of “Soviet socialism.” The Soviets took assurances (from Prague) at face value for a while that Novotný’s resignation from the position of first secretary of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party was only a means to divvy up the jobs in the party’s leadership. The massive attacks on Novotný ensuing soon thereafter, which in the end led to his removal for the post of the presidency, however, were less easily tolerated by the Soviet Union (from a Central Committee of the CPSU resolution a few days after Novotný’s removal): “one cannot discount the possibility that those forces who want to remove Czechoslovakia from its Socialist path and destroy the fraternal ties between the Soviet Union and the ČSSR, will also put pressure on Novotný to give up his job as President. We believe that General Novotný will have sufficient stamina to obviate those endeavors.” RGANI, F. 3, op. 72, d. 155, p. 120, resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the SPSU, P 74 (43), “regarding instructions to the Soviet ambassador to Czechoslovakia,” 14 March 1968, reprinted in Karner et al., Dokumente , #5.

9. Communist putsch in February 1948, dismissal of twelve bourgeois ministers from their posts by the Communist president, Klement Gottwald, which was a definitive takeover of power by the Communists.

10. RGANI, F. 89, op. 38, d. 60, p. 12, stenographic notes of the negotiations between Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Podgornyi with the party leaders of the ČSSR, 26 August 1968, reprinted in Karner et al., Dokumente , #114.

11. Sasha is short for Aleksandr in Russian. Brezhnev dispensed with all formalities in his conversations with Dubček. For details, see the transcripts of their conversations. RGANI, F. 89, op. 76, d. 75, pp. 1–18, telephone conversation of L. I. Brezhnev with A. S. Dubček, 13 August 1968, reprinted in Karner et al., Dokumente , #57; ÚSD, sb. KV ČSFR, 8, Soviet transcript of a telephone conversation of L. I. Brezhnev with A. Dubček on the fulfillment of the agreements of Čierná nad Tisou and Bratislava, 9 August 1968, reprinted in Karner et al., Dokumente , #53. Reprinted in English in Navrátil et al., The Prague Spring 1968 , #77.

12. According to Suri, both Dubček and Brezhnev knew that reforms were overdue in Czechoslovakia, but they did not agree on the timing. The Soviet leader felt it was important to opt for an implementation step by step; Dubček, on the other hand, favored speed. Suri, Power and Protest , 200.

13. Moscow was following with a growing sense of unease developments within the Czechoslovak People’s Army where, as in all other armies of the Socialist countries, the principle of the leadership of the party and its control over the soldiers was strictly observed. However, in circumstances where the party itself was subject to political erosion, the control exercised by some political organs within the Czechoslovak army had the opposite effect. The political organs in parts of the Czechoslovak People’s Army demanded calling an extraordinary party conference, the establishment of trade unions in the army, a review of Czechoslovakia’s military strategy, and the country’s withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. Some of these party ideologues were actually advocating ideas that were in direct conflict with the general line that most KSČ leaders still upheld at the time, and by doing so, they created an atmosphere in the army that was hostile to the USSR and to the other Socialist countries.

14. Latysh, “Prazhskaya vesna” 1968 , 216.

15. RGANI, F. 3, op. 68, d. 744, pp. 15–19, notes for the transcript of the minutes of the session of the Politburo CC CPSU, “On the Politburo CC CPSU Memorandum to the Presidium of the CC,” 15 March 1968.

16. “Comrades, Karlovy Vary only serves as a smoke screen!” Brezhnev declared quite openly in a speech in the plenum of the CC CPSU on 17 July 1968. RGANI, F. 2, op. 3, d. 114, p. 28, stenographic notes of the plenum of the CC CPSU. Speech of the secretary-general of the CC CPSU, Brezhnev, “On the Results of the Meeting of the Delegations of Communist and Workers’ Parties of the Socialist Countries,” 17 July 1968.

17. RGANI, F. 3, op. 72, d. 177, pp. 26–27, Politburo Resolution P 84 (50), “On the Information of the Party Leadership of the BCP, USAP, PVAP and SED with Reference to Kosygin’s Trip to Czechoslovakia.” Attachment: telegrams to the Soviet ambassadors in Budapest, Warsaw and Sofia, 31 May 1968.

18. See R. G. Pikhoya, Sovetskii Soyuz: Istoriya vlasti , 317.

19. RGANI, F. 5, op. 60, d. 266, pp. 27–28, report filed by the correspondent Lukovec to the editor in chief of Pravda , Mikhail Zimyanin, on the situation at the Soviet embassy in Prague, 20 May 1968, reprinted in Karner et al., Dokumente , #35.

20. RGANI, F. 3, op. 68, d. 820, pp. 52–54, materials for the Politburo resolution of the CC CPSU of 31 May 1968, “On Informing the BCP, USAP, PVAP and SED regarding Kosygin’s Trip to Czechoslovakia”; the notes of Konstantin Katushev and Konstantin Rusakov, 27 May 1968.

21. RGANI, F. 3, op. 68, d. 820, p. 54.

22. RGANI, F. 3, op. 72, d. 177, 27 (see note 17).

23. RGANI, F. 3, op. 72, d. 177, p. 27.

24. RGANI, F. 3, op. 68, d. 820, 54 (see note 20).