Günter Bischof - The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968

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On August 20, 1968, tens of thousands of Soviet and East European ground and air forces moved into Czechoslovakia and occupied the country in an attempt to end the “Prague Spring” reforms and restore an orthodox Communist regime. The leader of the Soviet Communist Party, Leonid Brezhnev, was initially reluctant to use military force and tried to pressure his counterpart in Czechoslovakia, Alexander Dubcek, to crack down. But during the summer of 1968, after several months of careful deliberations, the Soviet Politburo finally decided that military force was the only option left. A large invading force of Soviet, Polish, Hungarian, and Bulgarian troops received final orders to move into Czechoslovakia; within 24 hours they had established complete military control of Czechoslovakia, bringing an end to hopes for “socialism with a human face.”
Dubcek and most of the other Czechoslovak reformers were temporarily restored to power, but their role from late August 1968 through April 1969 was to reverse many of the reforms that had been adopted. In April 1969, Dubchek was forced to step down for good, bringing a final end to the Prague Spring. Soviet leaders justified the invasion of Czechoslovakia by claiming that “the fate of any socialist country is the common affair of all socialist countries” and that the Soviet Union had both a “right” and a “sacred duty” to “defend socialism” in Czechoslovakia. The invasion caused some divisions within the Communist world, but overall the use of large-scale force proved remarkably successful in achieving Soviet goals. The United States and its NATO allies protested but refrained from direct military action and covert operations to counter the Soviet-led incursion into Czechoslovakia.
The essays of a dozen leading European and American Cold War historians analyze this turning point in the Cold War in light of new documentary evidence from the archives of two dozen countries and explain what happened behind the scenes. They also reassess the weak response of the United States and consider whether Washington might have given a “green light,” if only inadvertently, to the Soviet Union prior to the invasion.

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52. Navrátil et al., The Prague Spring 1968 , 324–25; RGANI, F. 10, op. 1, d. 235, 27, minutes of the meeting of the head of the CC CPSU with the leaders of the Communist parties of Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, and Poland, 8 May 1968, reprinted in Karner et al., Dokumente , #77.

53. RGANI, F. 3, op. 72, d. 175, pp. 5–7, Politburo Resolution of the CC CPSU P 83 (37), the “Missive of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev to Comrade A. Dubček on the Question of the Meeting with the Leaders of the KSČ, BCP, USAP, SED, and PVAP on 8 May 1968 in Moscow,” 26 May 1968, reprinted in Karner et al., Dokumente , #78.

54. RGANI, F. 5, op. 60, d. 308, p. 63, appeal of the Presidium of the CC KSČ to the Politburo of the CC CPSU on the inadvisability of a conference of representatives of the CPSU, KSČ, BCP, SED, USAP and PVAP in the near future, 19 July 1968; for further details, see the following documents: SAPMO-BA, DY 30/3618, 105–7, meeting of the ambassador of the USSR to the GDR, P. A. Abrasimov, with W. Stoph, A. Norden and H. Axen, 10 July 1968, reprinted in Karner et al., Dokumente , #79; letter of the Hungarian CP leader, J. Kádár, to L. Brezhnev, 10 July 1968, reprinted in Karner et al., Dokumente , #80; RGANI, F. 3, op. 72, d. 186, p. 19, Politburo Resolution of the CC CPSU P 90 (12), “Letter of the Communist Fraternal Parties to the KSČ,” 11 July 1968, reprinted in Karner et al., Dokumente , #81.

55. RGANI, F. 3, op. 68, d. 852, p. 44, notes for the Politburo Resolution of the CC CPSU, “On the Memorandum of the Politburo of the CC CPSU to the Presidium of the KSČ”; Chervonenko’s accompanying letter to the CC CPSU, 18 July 1968; the dissatisfaction of the CPSU leader and of the leaders of the “Big Five” with the course of action taken by KSČ leadership was easy to explain. Moscow dispatched its invitation to Prague as early as 6 July in the name of all participants, the beginning of the conference being scheduled for 10 or 11 July; RGANI, F. 3, op. 72, d. 184, p. 24; RGANI, F. 3, op. 72, d. 185, p. 50, Politburo Resolution of the CC CPSU P 89 (30), “On the Letter of the CC CPSU to Dubček,” 6 July 1968. The Czechoslovak side did not only delay the answer for an unreasonably long period, but also informed the public both of the fact that a meeting was scheduled in the near future and of its possible agenda.

56. RGANI, F. 10, op. 1, d. 235, p. 2, minutes of the meeting of the leaders of the CC CPSU with the leaders of the Communist parties of Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR and Poland, 8 May 1968, reprinted in Karner et al., Dokumente , #77.

57. Navrátil, The Prague Spring 1968 , 218–19.

58. Particularly noteworthy is the passage in the document that says, “We are convinced that a situation has come about, in which the danger threatening socialism in Czechoslovakia jeopardizes the vital interests of the Socialist countries. The peoples of our countries would never forgive us if in the face of such dangers we were to remain indifferent and carefree.” RGANI, F. 2, op. 3, d. 110, p. 9, joint letter of the CC BCP, the CC USAP, the CC SED, the CC PVAP and the CC CPSU to the CC KSČ on the results of the Conference of the Communist Parties in Warsaw, 15 July 1968.

59. Navrátil, The Prague Spring 1968 , 216.

60. SAPMO, DY 30/ 3618, 27, memorandum of the CC SED to the Presidium of the CC KSČ, 4 July 1968.

61. RGANI, F. 2, op. 3, d. 114, 25, stenographic notes of the plenary session of the CC CPSU, words of welcome from the secretary of the CC CPSU, M. A. Suslov, 17 June 1968.

62. First secretary of the CC CPSU Shelest asserted, “The Soviet Union and her allies in the Warsaw Pact will not stand idly by as the counterrevolution attempts to drive a wedge between the Communist Party and the Czechoslovak people; it is legitimate for them to fulfill the obligations that arise from the Pact and to defend the Socialist achievements of the Czechoslovak people.” RGANI, F. 2, op. 3, d. 114, p. 61, stenographic notes of the plenary session of the CC CPSU, discussion of the speech of the secretary-general of the CC CPSU, L. I. Brezhnev, “On the Results of the Meeting of the Delegations of the Communist and Workers’ Parties of the Socialist Countries in Warsaw,” speech of the first secretary of the CC CP of the Ukraine, P. E. Shelest, 17 July 1968. First secretary of the Moscow City Committee of the CPSU, Viktor Grishin explained: “The Politburo of the CC CPSU has to be urged to continue to take all necessary measures in order to support the healthy forces in the KSČ—which also includes the most extreme measures to get the situation in Czechoslovakia back to normal”; RGANI, F. 2, op. 3, d. 114, p. 68, first secretary of the CC CP of Kazakhstan Dinmukhamed Kunaev said: “If the appeal of the participants in the Warsaw Conference does not suffice to bring the leaders of the KSČ to their senses and if Dubček does not resort to decisive measures to suppress the counterrevolutionary forces in the country, then we have no alternative left but to rely openly on the healthy forces in the KSČ and to channel with their help development again into the direction that is required by us.” RGANI, F. 2, op. 3, d. 114, p. 72.

63. RGANI, F. 2, op. 3, d. 114, p. 118, stenographic notes of the plenary session of the CC CPSU, closing speech of the secretary-general of the CC CPSU, L. I. Brezhnev, 17 July 1968.

64. Jitka Vondrová and Jaromír Navrátil, Mezinárodni souvislosti Československé krize, 1967–1970. Červenec—Spren 1968 (Brno: Ústav pro soudobé dějiny AV ČR v nakl. Doplněk, 1996), 331–33.

65. Pikhoya mentions these resolutions of the Soviet leadership, which were filed in the Politburo “Special Folder,” and refers in this context to the Presidential Archive. AP RF, F. 3, op. 91, d. 98, pp. 58–89.

66. RGANI, F. 3, op. 72, d. 189, pp. 2, 4, Politburo resolution of the CC CPSU P 92 (II), “On the Question of the Situation in Czechoslovakia,” 20 July 1968.

67. RGANI, F. 3, op. 68, d. 860, p. 83, materials for the Politburo resolution of the CC CPSU, 26 July 1968, “On the Memorandum to the Ambassador of the USA in Moscow on Questions Relating to the Events in Czechoslovakia,” Gromyko’s report, 24 July 1968.

68. RGANI, F. 3, op. 68, d. 852, p. 15, materials for the Politburo resolution of the CC CPSU, “On the Directives to the Soviet Ambassadors in Connection with the Publication of the Five Communist Parties’ Letter to the CC KSČ,” 19 July 1968.

69. RGANI, F. 3, op. 68, d. 860, p. 30, materials for the Politburo resolution of the CC CPSU, “On the Information of the Fraternal Parties Concerning Events in Czechoslovakia,” 26 July 1968; on this subject, the CC CPSU wrote a special memorandum addressed to the forty-four “fraternal parties” explaining the Soviet policy regarding the situation in the ČSSR. The memorandum contained additional paragraphs written with the Communist parties of Great Britain, India, and Australia in mind, which had shown a particular “lack of understanding” for the USSR’s position on the Czechoslovak question; RGANI, F. 3, op. 68, d. 860, pp. 24–25.

70. RGANI, F. 5, op. 60, d. 491, p. 79, Waldeck Rochet’s telegram to the 29th CC of the Communist Parties of the European Countries, including the CC CPSU, with the proposal to convene a conference on the events in Czechoslovakia, 17 June 1968.

71. RGANI, F. 3, op. 72, d. 188, pp. 27, 92–93, Politburo resolution of the CC CPSU P 91 (31), “On the Answer to the CC of the Communist Party of France,” 18 July 1968, reprinted in Karner et al., Dokumente , #165; RGANI, F. 3, op. 72, d. 188, pp. 5, 14–15, Politburo resolution of the CC CPSU P 91 (III), “On the Answer to Comrade W. Rochet,” 19 July 1968, reprinted in Karner et al., Dokumente , #135.

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