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Günter Bischof - The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968

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Название:
The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968
Автор:
Günter Bischof
Издательство:
Lexington Books
Жанр:
История / Политика / на английском языке
Год:
2010
Город:
Lanham
ISBN:
978-0-7391-4304-9
Рейтинг книги:
4 / 5. Голосов: 1
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On August 20, 1968, tens of thousands of Soviet and East European ground and air forces moved into Czechoslovakia and occupied the country in an attempt to end the “Prague Spring” reforms and restore an orthodox Communist regime. The leader of the Soviet Communist Party, Leonid Brezhnev, was initially reluctant to use military force and tried to pressure his counterpart in Czechoslovakia, Alexander Dubcek, to crack down. But during the summer of 1968, after several months of careful deliberations, the Soviet Politburo finally decided that military force was the only option left. A large invading force of Soviet, Polish, Hungarian, and Bulgarian troops received final orders to move into Czechoslovakia; within 24 hours they had established complete military control of Czechoslovakia, bringing an end to hopes for “socialism with a human face.”
Dubcek and most of the other Czechoslovak reformers were temporarily restored to power, but their role from late August 1968 through April 1969 was to reverse many of the reforms that had been adopted. In April 1969, Dubchek was forced to step down for good, bringing a final end to the Prague Spring. Soviet leaders justified the invasion of Czechoslovakia by claiming that “the fate of any socialist country is the common affair of all socialist countries” and that the Soviet Union had both a “right” and a “sacred duty” to “defend socialism” in Czechoslovakia. The invasion caused some divisions within the Communist world, but overall the use of large-scale force proved remarkably successful in achieving Soviet goals. The United States and its NATO allies protested but refrained from direct military action and covert operations to counter the Soviet-led incursion into Czechoslovakia.
The essays of a dozen leading European and American Cold War historians analyze this turning point in the Cold War in light of new documentary evidence from the archives of two dozen countries and explain what happened behind the scenes. They also reassess the weak response of the United States and consider whether Washington might have given a “green light,” if only inadvertently, to the Soviet Union prior to the invasion.

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8. For details of the Hungarian party’s policy at the time of regime change, see Melinda Kalmár, “From ‘Model Change’ to Regime Change: The Metamorphosis of the MSZMP’s Tactics in the Democratic Transition,” in The Roundtable Talks of 1989: The Genesis of Hungarian Democracy , ed. András Bozóki (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2002).

9. Csaba Békés, The 1956 Hungarian Revolution and World Politics , Cold War International History Project, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC, September 1996, Working Paper No. 16, http://cwihp.si.edu.

10. For details see the chapter of Harald Knoll and Peter Ruggenthaler, “The Moscow ‘Negotiations,’” in this volume.

11. See Békés, Európából Európába , 233.

12. For details on Hungary’s policy with reference to the Czechoslovak crisis, see Tibor Huszár, 1968, Prága, Budapest, Moszkva: Kádár János és a csehszlovákiai intervenció [ 1968, Prague, Budapest, Moscow: János Kádár and the Intervention of Czechoslovakia ] (Budapest: Szabad Tér, 1998).

13. MOL, M-KS-288, F. 5/444, minutes of the meeting of the HSWP Politburo 23 January 1968.

14. MOL, M-KS-288, F. 47/743, memorandum of conversation between Kádár and Dubček, 22 January 1968.

15. Navrátil et al., Prague Spring 1968 , 22.

16. MOL, M-KS-288, F. 47/743, memorandum of conversation between Kádár and Novotny, 26 February 1968.

17. MOL, M-KS-288, F. 5/444 (cf. note 13 above); Huszár, 1968, Prága, Budapest , Moszkva , 15.

18. MOL, M-KS-288, F. 47/743 (cf. note 14 above).

19. MOL, M-KS-288, F. 5/444 (cf. note 13).

20. MOL, M-KS-288, F. 47/743 (cf. note 14).

21. For details, see the article by Manfred Wilke, “Ulbricht, East Germany, and the Prague Spring,” in this volume and Paweł Piotrowski, “Polen und die Intervention,” in Karner et al., Beiträge , 447–60.

22. The meeting was later moved forward to 8 February and finally took place on 7 February.

23. MOL, M-KS-288, F. 47/743 (cf. note 14).

24. MOL, M-KS-288, F. 47/743, memorandum on Dubček’s message to Kádár, 29 January 1968.

25. After the end of the negotiations, Dubček and his comrades paid a half-hour visit to Komárom on the Hungarian side of the border at Kádár’s request. Komárom was originally one town, located on both sides of the Danube that was cut in two by the Trianon Peace Treaty of 1920.

26. MOL, M-KS-288, F. 47/743, memorandum of conversation between Kádár and Dubček in Komárno, 5 February 1968.

27. MOL, M-KS-288, F. 5/445, minutes of the session of the HSWP Politburo, 6 February 1968.

28. MOL, M-KS-288, F. 5/445, minutes of the session of the HSWP Politburo, 6 February 1968.

29. For details on the Soviet Bloc’s FRG policy, see Csaba Békés, “The Warsaw Pact and the Helsinki Process, 1965–1970,” in The Making of Détente: Eastern and Western Europe in the Cold War, 1965–1975 , ed. Wilfried Loth and Georges-Henri Soutou (London: Routledge, 2008), 201–20 and Douglas Selvage, “The Warsaw Pact and the German Question, 1955–1970,” in NATO and the Warsaw Pact: Intrabloc Conflicts , ed. Mary Ann Heiss and S. Victor Papacosma (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2008).

30. MOL, M-KS-288, F. 5/445 (cf. note 27).

31. MOL, M-KS-288, F. 47/743, memorandum of a telephone conversation between Kádár and Brezhnev, 13 February 1968.

32. MOL, M-KS-288, F. 47/743, memorandum of conversation between Kádár Novotný, 26 February 1968.

33. MOL, M-KS-288, F. 47/743, telephone conversation between Kádár and Brezhnev.

34. MOL, M-KS-288, F. 47/743, telephone conversation between Kádár and Brezhnev.

35. MOL, M-KS-288, F. 47/743, telephone conversation between Kádár and Brezhnev.

36. MOL, M-KS-288, F. 47/743, telephone conversation between Kádár and Brezhnev.

37. For details on this, see Wilke, “Ulbricht, East Germany, and the Prague Spring,” in this volume.

38. MOL, M-KS-288, F. 47/743, memorandum of a telephone conversation between Kádár and Brezhnev, 19 March 1968.

39. MOL, M-KS-288, F. 47/743, telephone conversation between Kádár and Brezhnev.

40. MOL, M-KS-288, F. 5/451, minutes of the session of the HSWP Politburo, 19 March 1968.

41. MOL, M-KS-288, F. 47/743, memorandum of a telephone conversation between Kádár and Brezhnev, 19/2 March 1968.

42. SAPMO BA, ZPA, IV 2/201/778, minutes of the Dresden meeting, 23 March 1968, reprinted in Karner et al., Dokumente , #21.

43. MOL, M-KS-288, F. 5/452, minutes of the session of the HSWP Politburo, 2 April 1968.

44. MOL, M-KS-288, F. 47/743, memorandum of a telephone conversation between Kádár and Brezhnev, 16 April 1968.

45. Navrátil, The Prague Spring 1968 , 138.

46. For Kádár’s entire speech at the meeting of the CPSU leadership with the leaders of the Communist parties of Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, and Poland on 8 May in Moscow, see AdBIK, holding “Prague Spring,” minutes of the meeting of the leaders of the CPSU CC with the leaders of the Communist parties of Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, and Poland, 8 May 1968, reprinted in Karner et al., Dokumente , #77. The quotation as cited above is a translation from the report compiled by Károly Erdélyi, MOL, M-KS-288, F. 5/455, cited in Huszár, 1968, Prága, Budapest , Moszkva , 86.

47. Navrátil et al., Prague Spring , 139.

48. AdBIK, Holdings “Prague Spring,” minutes of the meeting between the leaders of the CPSU CC with the leaders of the Communist parties of Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, and Poland, 8 May 1968 (cf. note 46). The quotation as cited above is a translation from the report compiled by Károly Erdélyi, MOL, M-KS-288, F. 5/455, cited in Huszár, 1968, Prága, Budapest, Moszkva , 88. According to the Russian document, Kádár confined himself to saying how good it had been that there were Soviet troops in Hungary in 1956 because they were at hand to save Hungary, and he mentioned the problem of an intervention from outside only in the context of Czechoslovakia. However, there is good reason to believe that the statement cited here, which is found only in the Hungarian version of the report, expresses Kádár’s concerns about the deployment of foreign troops in a more precise and more complex manner.

49. See Csaba Békés, Az 1956-os magyar forradalom a világpolitikában [ The 1956 Hungarian Revolution and World Politics ] (Budapest: 1956-os Intézet, 2006), 85–86.

50. The Czechoslovak delegation consisted of Alexander Dubček, Oldřich Černík, Vasil Biľak, and Jiří Hájek.

51. MOL, M-KS-288, F. 47/743, memorandum of a telephone conversation between Kádár and Brezhnev, 12 June 1968.

52. Huszár, 1968, Prága, Budapest, Moszkva , 117.

53. Huszár, 1968, Prága, Budapest, Moszkva , 138.

54. Huszár, 1968, Prága, Budapest, Moszkva , 135.

55. Huszár, 1968, Prága, Budapest, Moszkva , 145.

56. Huszár, 1968, Prága, Budapest, Moszkva , 145.

57. Navrátil, Prague Spring , 251.

58. MOL, M-KS-288, F. 47/743, memorandum of a telephone conversation between Kádár and Brezhnev, 9 July 1968.

59. MOL, M-KS-288, F. 47/743, Kádár’s letter to Brezhnev, 10 July 1968; MOL, M-KS-288, F. 47/743, János Gosztonyi’s minutes of a conversation with Oldřich Švestka in Prague, 11 July 1968.

60. MOL, M-KS-288, F. 47/743, minutes of the conversation between György Aczél and Vasil Bil’ak in Budapest, 6 July 1968; MOL, M-KS-288, F. 47/743, minutes of the conversation between Bil’ak and Shelest, 20 July 1968. Bil’ak was in Hungary again on 20 July at Brezhnev’s behest to organize a secret meeting with Petro Shelest, a member of the Politburo of the CPSU.